

# THE CLASSICAL REVIEW

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# THE CLASSICAL REVIEW

*Editors* C. J. FORDYCE, M.A., 3 The University, Glasgow, W. 2  
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## DOGS AND LEATHER

STUDENTS of the ancient world seem now to be generally agreed that in those times dogs, as a special treat, fed upon leather. So Headlam begins his note on Herodas 7. 63 with the words: 'The appetite of dogs for leather was proverbial', and this judgement is echoed, though less forthrightly, by Gow writing on Theocritus 10. 11: 'The proverbial connection between dogs and leather is much older than Lucian.' Now it must be stressed that this connexion between dogs and leather, as is clear from the passages adduced by Gow, is gastronomic. Nothing else can be intended by those—and that means everyone concerned with any of these passages—who adduce expressions such as that of Horace, *Sat.* ii. 5. 83. But no memory, however vivid, of a dog chewing a slipper or gnawing at his lead wins conviction for the proposition that a dog treats such objects as food—except in circumstances in which human beings do so too. It seems worth while, therefore, to look again at the evidence on which this assertion is based. When this is done, there emerges from the simple statement as put by Headlam a complex of more reasonable statements about canine gastronomy and behaviour.

F. Seiler,<sup>1</sup> it is true, has indeed persuaded himself that there is no real problem, commencing his article (p. 435) with the words: 'Nicht alle Sprichwörter beruhen auf wirklicher Lebenserfahrung.' But he goes on to defend this position by referring to the proverb which forbids a glasshouse-dweller to throw stones. There is, however, no comparison between the pretty fantasy-picture of a man living in a glasshouse and the pretence that dogs find leather an irresistible delicacy. Seiler feels this difficulty but has a short way with it. He prefaches his very interesting and learned treatment of the medieval history of the proverb by a quite superficial sketch of its classical history, in which he decides that the difficulty disappears when it is realized that the proverb originally referred to a dog's taste for afterbirth<sup>2</sup> and that this essential point was missed by most later users of the proverb. This hypothesis achieves economy only at the cost of absurdity and violence done to the evidence.

I

A start may be made from the proverb *κύων παρ' ἐντέροις*: on this the commentary of Diogenianus (*Cent.* v. 67a, *Corp. Paroem.* i. 264; cf. ii. 182, 492)

<sup>1</sup> *Neue Jahrb. f. d. klass. Altertum*, xliv (1919), 435-40.

<sup>2</sup> The fragment of Aristophanes' *Protagon*, preserved by Athenaeus iii. 95 d, is quoted and used by Seiler as ἐγενούμην χορδῆς ὁ δύστηνος κύων; but the MSS. read τέκνων (not κύων) and this is accepted by Kaibel.

reads ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ δυναμένων ἀπολαύειν τῶν προκειμένων to which Macarius adds ἀχρηστα γάρ ταῦτα καὶ δύσθρατα καὶ δυσκατάποτα τοῖς κυστί. This is all patent nonsense: such pabulum is conspicuous in canine diet; and Leutsch consequently suggests that one should supply with κύνων παρ' ἐντέροις either φυλάττει or φυλάττων and understand it as referring to the height of stupidity. This is clearly right. Leaving a dog to guard a pile of lights is like leaving a cat to guard a canary. From here we can move to Horace, *Sat.* ii. 5, 83, for chronological sequence is often of no help in tracing what lies behind a proverb: in the absence of so much classical literature, not to mention ordinary conversation, the best that can usually be done is to see the way in which different authors view and use a particular proverb. Horace, then, speaks of a Penelope who has once got a whiff of profiteering, *ut canis a corio numquam absterrebitur uncto*. Here *corio* obviously does not mean leather, for *uncto* is most emphatic; it suggests rather the mess of skin and 'innards' of a carcass. Once a dog has started eating it, it is impossible to frighten him away. The reference is particular: there is one carcass and one occasion in mind. Now turn to Theocritus 10. 11: a rustic hopes he will never fall in love, for χαλεπὸν χορίων κύνα γενομαι. The meaning is clear and close to that of the Horatian passage: falling in love is like tasting something for which one craves insatiably. The word *χορίων* is clearly little different from Horace's *corio*, but it is not possible to say whether, as in Horace, one occasion is thought of, or whether it means 'it's a bad thing to let a dog taste lights' (i.e. he will want to be fed on them ever after). The latter seems more probable. The proverb is listed in this form by Gregorius Cyrius, *Cent.* iii. 97 (*Corp. Paroem.* i. 376), by Diogenianus, *Cent.* iii. 94, and by Macarius, *Cent.* viii. 79 (*Corp. Paroem.* ii. 51, 226) and the fullest explanation (that of Diogenianus) is this: τὸ ἔλυτρον τοῦ ἐμβρύου χόριον καλεῖται, οἱ δὲ κύνες γενομένοι τούτου καὶ τοῖς ἐμβρύοις ἐπιβουλεύονται διὰ τὸ λίχνον. ἐπὶ τῶν παρ' ἄξιαν τυὸς ἀπολαύοντων καὶ χωρούντων εἰς μείζονα. There seems to be small reason to understand *χόριον* so narrowly, and the definition seems too pedantic and technical for a proverbial usage. The scholia on Theocr. 10. 11 (p. 226 Wendel), between which and the comment of Diogenianus there is clear similarity, avoid the technical definition: ὁσπερ ὁ γενομένος χόριον κύνων δυσαποδίνωτος ἔστιν and εἰ γάρ εἴθισται, καὶ τοῖς θρέμμασιν αὐτοῖς ἐπιχειρεῖ. The former comment favours interpreting the proverb in Theocritus precisely as in Horace. But, however that may be, the essential fact emerges that the reference is to something which dogs find gastronomically attractive. They enjoy eating 'innards' and either, once they begin wolfing a carcass, they cannot be stopped, or, once they acquire a taste for 'innards', they find it irresistible. At this point may be mentioned a proverb quoted by Maximus, *Conf.* 41. 64 as coming from Antiphanes (326 K.): κύων μελετήσας σαρκῶν ἀπογεύεσθαι φυλάττειν οὐκέτι δύναται τὴν ἀγέλην, and Haupt (*Opuscula* iii. 380) compared Demosthenes 25. 40 τὸν γενομένους κύνας τῶν προβάτων κατακόπτειν φασὶ δεῖν. Both of these carry the proverbial concept under examination a little farther, to the point where the dog—a sheepdog—having acquired a taste for carcasses, indulges his taste by killing the sheep he is set to guard. The killer dog is a well-known phenomenon. There may be a hint of this as the awful consequence of letting a dog taste 'innards' in the previous form of the proverb χαλεπὸν χορίων κύνα γενέσθαι (especially when the implications of the proverb attributed to Antiphanes are examined), but it is, of course, impossible to be certain and different authors probably understood

it slightly differently. Finally we may recall the fable told by Aesop (138 Hausrath), by Phaedrus (i. 20), and by Plutarch (*Mor.* 1067 f.) of starving dogs, at the edge of a deep river, who see hides floating down the stream, and in their madness begin to drink the river dry to reach the hides, only to burst before attaining their object. This story is always quoted to illustrate the love of dogs for leather, but it is useless for the purpose. The dogs are starving and undertake an insane venture for an object which, if attained, will not relieve their hunger. They are as mistaken in the end as in the means.

## 2

This represents a coherent series of proverbs which concentrate on dogs' gastronomic proclivities and the moral (and practical) difficulties which these entail; the leading verb used is *γείνειν*, a gastronomic—almost aesthetic—verb. Now may be considered a series of proverbs, the leading verb of which is *τραγεῖν* / *τρωγεῖν*. For instance, Lucian *πρὸς τὸν ἀπαθευτὸν* 25: *οὐδὲ γάρ κίνων ἀπαξ πάνσαιτ' ἀν σκυτοτραγεῖν μαθοῦσα* or Alciphron iii. 11: *οὐδὲ γάρ κίνων σκυτοτραγεῖν μαθοῦσα τῆς τέχνης ἐπλήσσεται*. The similarity in the formulation of these two is remarkable (and will recall the common dependence of both Lucian and Alciphron on New Comedy). The context of the former is advice given to a bibliophile with a private vice: it is useless to advise him to give up the vice, for the dog does not, etc. The context would logically admit one of the proverbs examined in the previous section above and does not help in interpreting this specific proverb. But the passage of Alciphron is crystal-clear: a parasite has stolen a vase, sold it, got some money, and intends to spend it making others play the parasite to him. But when the money is spent? Well, he will not have forgotten the parasite's art, any more than a dog, etc. Here none of the previous series of proverbs would suit, for it is not a case of being dominated by a passion, but of having acquired a technique which, once acquired, becomes, as it were, part of one's personality. The language of both authors makes this clear too: *μαθοῦσα, τέχνης, ἐπλήσσεται*. The dog learns a trick, a trick connected with *σκυτοτραγεῖν*: it can surely be no other than that of gnawing through his lead (the nature of *τραγεῖν* / *τρωγεῖν* should here be contrasted with that of *γείνειν*). It seems that it was usual to restrain a dog with a *ἰμάς* or *lorum*: cf., for example, Xen. *Cyn.* vii. 6; the proverb *οὐν τῷ κυνὶ καὶ τὸν ἴματα* (*Corp. Paroem.* ii. 645); Grattius, *Cyn.* 213, or Pliny, *N.H.* viii. 147.<sup>1</sup> The point then is that the dog, secured by a leather strap, learns to gnaw through it and the trick, once learned, is never forgotten. To be mentioned in the context of this proverb is Herodas 7. 63 ὡς ἀν αἰσθούσθε / *σκύτεα γυναικες καὶ κύνες τὶ βρώζουσι*. This is an *ad hoc* adaptation of the proverb on the pattern of a well-known type of joke: 'Why do women and dogs both gnaw at leather?' It is obscene in intent and rests on no more than the fact that *σκυτοτραγεῖν* is proverbially connected with dogs<sup>2</sup> and, for the purpose of the joke, can be applied, in a different way, to women too. The phrase should not be connected with the earlier series of proverbs which speak of the gastronomic

<sup>1</sup> It is true that these passages refer to leading a dog out, but it would seem natural to use the same lead to secure him. A *catena* appears more usual for tying a dog up in Rome: cf., for example, Persius 5. 160; Sen. *de ira* iii. 37. 2; Petron. 29 (Porph. *ad Hor.*

*epp.* i. 17. 27 'catena autem proprie dicta est quod canem teneret' may be mere etymologizing; but this may just be the more usual word for the object, regardless of its material.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. also Apostolius, *Cent.* xv. 53 a (*Corp. Paroem.* ii. 643).

interests of dogs. The central point of this series of proverbs, then, is that a dog learns the trick of gnawing through his leather strap, and, once learned, the trick becomes part of his personality so that he never stops doing it. It is as silly to suppose that he could stop as to try to persuade a man to rid himself of a vice or to suppose that a parasite could ever forget how to be a parasite.

## 3

The suggested relationship between these series of proverbs seems to be both confirmed and illustrated if a Plautine proverb is examined which has never been either fully explained or fully drawn within the circle of these proverbs. It occurs in *Pseud.* 315 ff.:

PSEUD. *face hoc quod te rogamus, Ballio,*  
*mea fide, si isti formidas credere. ego in hoc triduo*  
*aut terra aut mari alicunde evolvam id argentum tibi.*  
 BALL. *tibi ego credam? PSEUD. quor non? BALL. quia pol qua opera credam tibi,*  
*una opera alligem fugitivam canem agninis lactibus.*

Calidorus and Pseudolus, his slave, are trying to persuade the pimp Ballio to allow them a few extra days before he sells Calidorus' girl to someone else. Pseudolus then, when Calidorus' credit is rejected with contempt, steps forward and, with the air of one settling the argument, offers his own credit. Such an offer from a slave, splendidly regardless of law, takes Ballio's breath away and he produces an especially impressive expression of his feelings. Lorenz, ad loc., simply compares the Greek proverb *κύων παρ' ἐντέροις* (*φυλάττει*); and Ussing, ad loc., says: 'Perdit operam qui canem quasi custodem apud lactes vincire conatur, nam eas brevi comedet.' But neither gives any account of *alligem* or *fugitivam*. The Loeb translation by Nixon takes a step in the right direction ('I'd as soon trust you as tie up a runaway dog with a string of lamb's intestines'); but full explanation is still lacking.

Nonius, p. 331 M., explains *lactes* as *intestina*, and recalls the starving parasite's words in *Circ.* 319 *ita cibi vacuitate venio lassis lactibus*. Persius in 2. 30 mentions *lactibus unctis* as a delicacy; and, of course, lamb in comparison with other meat is a special delicacy. So the remarkable stupidity which Ballio imagines is to tie up a dog (which, as we know from other proverbs, loves 'innards') not just with a rope made of 'innards', but of lamb's 'innards'. Now *fugitivam* is emphatic, and the special point of it must be that the dog is also one which has freed himself, that is, has gnawed through the usual type of (leather) fastening and knows the trick of freeing himself—trebly stupid to tie him up with lamb's 'innards'.

This fantastic joke is the product of combining the two groups of canine proverbs distinguished above—both those which assert a dog's insatiable appetite for lights, and those which assert that, once a dog learns the trick of gnawing through his strap, he can and will always do it. The humour of this splendid proverb is underlined by the unparalleled explicitness of the correlative *qua opera . . . una opera*, which only occurs once elsewhere, and in an equally emphatic and fantastic statement of equivalence—*Casina* 309-10.

## CALLIMACHUS, FR. 567 PFEIFFER

ἡδομένη νεκάδεσσιν ἐπισκυρῶν πολέμῳ

We owe the line to Hesychius, who says: *νεκάδεσσιν νεκνάδεσσιν ταῖς τῶν νεκρῶν τάξεσιν νεκροῖς ἐλέγχεται δὲ ὁ Καλλίμαχος νεκάδας ψυλῶς τὰς τάξεις νενοηκώς*: “ἡδομένη—πολέμῳ”. Similar comment is made by *Et. Gen. B*, s.v. *νεκάδες*, and by Suidas, s.v. *νεκάδες*, though neither names Callimachus. The former, after saying that Homer *εἴωθε λέγεντα νεκάδας τὰς τῶν νεκρῶν τάξεις*, adds *οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι τὰς τῶν ὄπλιτῶν τάξεις οὐταν καλοῦσι*; the latter explains *νεκάδες* thus, *νεκροί καταχρηστικῶς δὲ καὶ αἱ τῶν ζωῶν τάξεις*. It is clear then that in Fr. 567 *νεκάδεσσιν* means ‘ranks or lines of living warriors’. The person said to rejoice in such ranks is almost certainly Pallas Athene, as Bentley suggested (see Pfeiffer’s note).

The meaningless word *ἐπισκυρῶν* has so far found no satisfactory solution. Bentley’s emendation of it to *ἐπισκύρων* = ἀρχόντων or *ἐπικούρων* (see below) is sufficiently refuted by Pfeiffer. Yet division into two words and the change of one letter produce good sense. Read *ἡδομένη νεκάδεσσιν ἐπὶ σκύρῳ πολέμῳ* = ‘on the *σκύρος* of the battle rejoicing in the ranks of warriors’. The clue to the meaning of *σκύρος* here is to be found in Pollux. In ix. 104 Pollux gives a detailed description of the team game (*ἡ ἐπίκουνος παιδίδι*), played with a ball and called *ὁ ἐπίσκυρος*.<sup>1</sup> *παιζεται*, he says, *κατὰ πλῆθος διαστάντων ἵσων πρὸς ἵσους, εἴτα μέσην γραμμὴν λατύπη ἐλκυσάντων, ἦν σκύρον καλοῦσιν, ἐφ’ ἣν καταθέντες τὴν σφαῖραν, ἐτέρας δύο γραμμὰς κατόπιν ἐκατέρας τῆς τάξεως καταγράψαντες, ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἐτέρους οἱ προανελόμενοι ῥίπτουσαν*. . . . From this it appears that after dividing into two teams the players marked out with *λατύπη* (‘stone chippings’) a centre line, which was called *σκύρος* (also ‘stone chippings’), and two goal lines. I suggest that in Fr. 567 *ἐπὶ σκύρῳ πολέμῳ* = *ἐπὶ μέσῃ γραμμῇ μάχης*, i.e. on an imaginary line drawn between two armies ready for battle.

Mr. J. G. Griffith reminds me of the Homeric phrase *πτολέμῳ* (so *Il. viii. 378, 553; xi. 160; xx. 47: πολέμῳ Il. iv. 371*) *γέφυραι*. In three passages the phrase is *ἀνὰ πτολέμῳ γεφύρας*; in one *πολέμῳ γεφύρας* is the direct object of *ὅπιπετεις*, but at viii. 553–4, where the Oxford text reads *οἱ δὲ μέρα φρονέοντες ἐπὶ πτολέμῳ γεφύρας / ἡτο παννύχιοι*, the apparatus records ‘*γεφύρη* vulg.: *γεφύρας* v.l. ap. Eust.’. It seems likely that in Fr. 567, as so often, Callimachus is indirectly suggesting his own interpretation of a doubtful Homeric phrase and does so by employing a metaphor drawn from the *ἐπίσκυρος* game. If this is correct, his view would agree with the Scholia to the *Iliad*, which explain *πτολέμῳ γέφυραι* as *αἱ δίδοι τῶν φαλάγγων*, i.e. the corridor between hostile armies. A glance at the famous relief<sup>2</sup> discovered at Athens in 1922, which depicts a ball game with two sides, almost certainly *ὁ ἐπίσκυρος*, will show the aptness of Callimachus’ metaphor. It should be noted that the word *τάξις*, which is used by the three ancient commentators on *νεκάδες*, is also employed by Pollux in his description of the *ἐπίσκυρος* game.

There is, however, a further problem. In Hesychius we read *ἐπίσκυρος*: *ὁ μετὰ πολλῶν σφαιρομός* (*σκαρισμός* cod.). *καὶ ἀρχῶν, βραβευτῆς, βοηθός, ἐπίσκοπος, ἔφορος, ἐπήκοος*. The same author s.v. *ἐπισκύρους* (Bentley: *ἐπισχύρους*

<sup>1</sup> See E. N. Gardiner, *Athletics of the Ancient World*, pp. 235–7.

<sup>2</sup> Plate 212 in Gardiner, op. cit.

cod.) gives the explanation ἐπίκούρος.<sup>1</sup> This second meaning of ἐπίσκυρος as applied to a *person*, not to the game, is supported by the line cited in *Et. Gen. B* s.v. τευμήσατο, 'Κεκροπίης τευμήσατ' ἐπίσκυρος Εύρυκλεια'. This line appears in Schneider's edition of Callimachus' fragments as anon. 135, but Pfeiffer rightly rejects the attribution to Callimachus on account of the elision at the caesura of the third trochee. He adds some reasons for thinking that Euphorion may be the author. More important for our present purpose is the explanatory note which follows the citation of the line in *Et. Gen. B*. This runs as follows: ἐπίσκυρος δέ ἐστιν οἷον ἐπικυρῶτις ἡγεμών. Pfeiffer records no explanation or emendation of ἐπικυρῶτις, tacitly rejecting Schneider's ἐπικυρωτός = *approbatus*, but I suggest that this word conceals ἐπίσκυρον τις (less probably ἐπίσκυρω τις or ἐπὶ σκύρῳ τις), meaning, with ἡγεμών, 'a leader (captain) in the game *episcyros*'. If the Greeks had a word for the 'skipper' of a team, it is unknown to me, but ἡγεμών seems as suitable as any and better than the explanations, ἄρχων etc., which Hesychius offers of ἐπίσκυρος as applied to a person.

It is odd that in the anonymous line the *v* of ἐπίσκυρος is short, whereas in Callimachus, whether one reads ἐπὶ σκύρῳ or some case of ἐπίσκυρος, the *v* is long, as it is in Σκύρος, the name of the island, and σκυρωτός (Pindar, *P.* 5. 93, where σκυρωτὰ ὁδός refers to the famous road at Cyrene, Callimachus' birthplace). However, that some doubt was possible in the matter seems to be indicated by the correction in a papyrus of Alcaeus over the word σκύρον, altering a properispomenon accent to a paroxytone and adding a sign denoting shortness (see D. L. Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus*, pp. 160-1). The licence or confusion may have arisen from the rare words σκύρον and σκυρών used by Nicander (*Th.* 74, 75), in which the *v* is short.

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## COLUMELLA, *R.R.* vii. 3. 7 and 15

3. 7: *igitur, ut dixi, mercaberis ovis intonsas, variam et canam inprobabis, quod sit incerti coloris. maiorem trima dente minacem sterilem repudabis; eliges bimam. . . .*

So Lundström,<sup>2</sup> rightly. But after *canam* SA and most other MSS. add *conamque* or *comamque*, which Richter<sup>3</sup> emends to *calvamque*, interpreting the passage thus: the farmer is to ensure the colour of future lambs by rejecting breeding sheep which (a) are parti-coloured or (b) have altered in colour through old age or (c) have suffered partial or total loss of fleece through disease (i.e. sheep scab).<sup>4</sup> This interpretation is wrong in two respects.

Probably *canus* is not used figuratively in prose, 'grey or white with age, old'. In any case the fleece does not grow grey as the sheep ages:<sup>5</sup> the only colour variation possible is the appearance of grey hairs on the face of the black-faced varieties. Here the word means 'off-white',<sup>6</sup> in marked contrast to *candidissimos* (2. 5 above) and *candido* (3. 1). An *ovis cana* is as much to be avoided

<sup>1</sup> Emended by Schneider to ἐπούρος.

<sup>2</sup> *Columellae opera rec.* V. Lundström, *Fasc. iv.*, 1940.

<sup>3</sup> *Hermes*, lxxx (1952), 209-11.

<sup>4</sup> Probably *calvus* is not elsewhere used of animals; but Richter compares *Col. R.R.*

vi. 14. 7 *neve colla calvescant*, to which may be added Plin. *H.N.* x. 78 and xi. 130 and Veg. *Mul.* iv. 15. 5.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Arist. *G.A.* 782<sup>a</sup>12.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Col. R.R.* iii. 2. 12 *canescit lanugine* and Plin. *Ep.* vi. 31 *canum . . . mare.*

as an *ovis varia*, for both must have mixed genes for colour and neither is likely to produce pure white offspring.<sup>1</sup> Modern practice in flocks kept for wool is not to breed from sheep which are parti-coloured or of a uniform light or dark grey (both commonly described by shepherds as 'black' sheep).

Richter's proposed *calvamque* could only refer either to casting of fleece or to recent shearing.<sup>2</sup> The former is caused either by disease or by very poor condition, so that the advice would be superfluous; and Columella is too economical in expression to mean 'shorn' so soon after *intonsas*. Moreover, there is dark pigmentation in the skin to correspond with the dark parts of a parti-coloured sheep,<sup>3</sup> so that even if for some reason it had lost its fleece, marked variations in colour would still be apparent.

[The words which follow, *quod sit incerti coloris*, show that the preceding adjectives refer to colour. Emendation of *conamque* to a non-colour word is out of place. *conam* or *comam* has crept in by dittography and *-que* has been added later<sup>4</sup> as a 'correction'.]

Forster-Heffner<sup>5</sup> translate *dente minacem* 'has projecting teeth', but the implications of this translation are difficult. It is true that like horses<sup>6</sup> and oxen sheep show their age by an increasing acuteness of the angle between the upper jaw and the lower incisors, but the teeth do not protrude noticeably until the age of six or at the earliest five: this does not suit *maiorem trima*. Alternatively the words might refer to the condition known as 'undershot jaw' (or sometimes as 'hog' or 'sow mouth'<sup>7</sup>), which is a disadvantage for cropping grass and so causes an animal to thrive less well and, being hereditary, makes it unsuitable for breeding. But if this is what Columella meant we should have expected a fuller exposition.

I suggest that *dente minacem* is a colourful way of saying that the sheep has got all its teeth, i.e. is 'full-mouthed' and that these words should be taken closely with *maiorem trima*; for the fourth and last pair of permanent teeth are cut at two years and nine months or slightly later and come into use at just over three years.<sup>8</sup> These permanent teeth are strikingly longer and broader than the temporary incisors with which the lamb is born and could justify the description. The farmer is advised not to buy a sheep which on the evidence of its teeth is more than three years old if it has not yet shown itself fertile.

3. 15: *quod qui faciet, servare debet, ne minori quadrimae neve ei, quae excessit annos octo, prolem submittat.*

The reading of SA<sup>1</sup> is *quatrimae*, so that Lundström's *quadrimae* is palaeographically sound; but no more so than *quam trima*, which I suggest is certainly what Columella wrote. Here *trima* is dative by normal attraction, while *quadrimae* could only be supposed to be genitive of comparison, a construction probably not paralleled in Latin before the Vulgate.<sup>9</sup>

There is an even greater objection to *quadrimae* on grounds of sense. It is

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Col. *R.R.* vii. 3. 1 *pulla vel etiam varia nascitur proles. canus* and *pullus* denote respectively lighter and darker shades of grey.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Plaut. *Amph.* 462.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Arist. *G.A.* 78<sup>b</sup>4 ff.

<sup>4</sup> *cdr*<sup>1</sup> read *comam* and *rn coma*.

<sup>5</sup> Columella, *De Re Rustica* ii, Loeb Classical Library, 1954.

<sup>6</sup> See Miller and Robertson, *Practical*

*Animal Husbandry* (1952), p. 373.

<sup>7</sup> See Miller and West, *Black's Veterinary Dictionary*<sup>3</sup> (1953), p. 641.

<sup>8</sup> See Miller and Robertson, *op. cit.*, p. 390.

<sup>9</sup> See Ernout and Thomas, *Syntaxe Latine* (1953), p. 171. (Plaut. *Capt.* 825 there quoted appears to be an instance of the comparative used for the superlative.)

a question of rearing instead of selling unweaned about one lamb in five, in order to preserve the flock's continuity without introducing alien stock. Lambs born of old ewes are rightly rejected for this purpose because they may be weakly, but a lower age limit of four years is difficult to understand. Compare vii. 3. 6 *femina post bimatum maritari debet*.<sup>1</sup> If we assume that this takes place about the time of the Parilia<sup>2</sup> the lambs will be born in the latter half of September, the first crop ewes, tupped at two years and seven months, being then exactly three years old. At this age a ewe produces ample milk to feed one lamb, although its lactation is considerably less than that of an older animal; and so, as one of the main objects is milk production,<sup>3</sup> it would seem more profitable for lambs to be suckled as far as possible by first crop ewes. Columella agrees with Varro<sup>4</sup> that these should be not less than three years old for the best results; a necessary warning, for a ewe can conceive at six months and might well be tupped accidentally before reaching the prescribed two and a half years.<sup>5</sup>

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## THE DOMITIUS OF CURIATIUS MATERNUS

TWENTY years ago Tenney Frank propounded an attractive theory about the historical drama *Domitius*. Its hero was L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, *cos.* 54 B.C., an ancestor of Nero, and its purpose, in which Maternus succeeded, was to break the power of Nero's favourite Vatinius by damaging allusions to the Vatinius of the Republic. Maternus would have recited it c. A.D. 67.<sup>6</sup> Frank is able to show that this Domitius was a bitter enemy of P. Vatinius, and that certain remarkable similarities between the two Vatinii would have made Maternus' task easy.<sup>7</sup> I would add that, as Domitius and Cato were allied both by marriage and policy, Maternus' *Cato* would, on this view, form an admirable pendant to his earlier play.<sup>8</sup> But there are serious objections to Frank's tempting theory. We have firstly the younger Pliny's express testimony that only safe and innocuous literature could appear in Nero's later reign. This was no time for criticism of Nero's friends, however covert.<sup>9</sup> Did Maternus, however, attack Vatinius in a lawsuit, as Stroux suggested?<sup>10</sup> This too was dangerous, though there was some recognition of barristers' privilege at Rome.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>1</sup> So too Pall. *Agr.* viii. 4. 3 *femina debet bima summitti*.

<sup>2</sup> Col. *R.R.* vii. 3. 11; cf. Pall. *Agr.* v. 6.

<sup>3</sup> Col. *R.R.* vii. 2. 1.

<sup>4</sup> *R.R.* ii. 2. 14.

<sup>5</sup> Modern sheep farmers, however, usually have lowland sheep tupped at six months to a year old, hill sheep at one year and a half.

<sup>6</sup> *A.J.P.* lviii (1937), 225 ff. Wissowa (P.-W. iv. 1833) and Schanz-Hosius (*Gesch. d. rom. Lit.* ii. 525), following Schöll, make Cn. Domitius, *cos.* 32 B.C., Maternus' hero.

<sup>7</sup> *Op. cit.* 226 f.

<sup>8</sup> Domitius married Cato's sister; Cic. *Phil.* ii. 27 and Plut. *Cato Min.* 41. 2. His 'Catonian' policy; see P.-W. v. 1335-7. The *Dialogus* is our one source for the plays;

*Cato* had just appeared at its dramatic date (see chs. 2-3). Domitius' notorious *libertas* (Cic. *Brut.* 267) would have appealed to its author.

<sup>9</sup> *Ep.* iii. 5. 5; "Dubii sermonis octo" scripsit (meus avunculus) sub Nerone novissimis annis, cum omne studiorum genus paullo liberius et erectius periculoso servitus fecisset.

<sup>10</sup> *Philol.* lxxxvi, N.F. xl (1931), 338.

<sup>11</sup> See Aper's remarks (*Dial.* 10); nec pro amico aliquo, sed, quod periculosis est, pro Catone offendis, nec excusatur offensa necessitudine officii aut fide advocationis aut fortuitae et subitae dictionis impetu. Suet. *Vesp.* 13 shows Vespasian's tolerance towards the bar. Pliny, however, under

Stroux's view, however, runs contrary to the plain meaning of *Dialogus* 11, where Maternus insists that his reputation rests on his tragedies, and was first made by his successful attack on Vatinius. Frank and others are surely right in thinking of a play here.<sup>1</sup> But when was it written? When in fact did Maternus' dramatic activity begin?

At the dramatic date of the *Dialogus*, A.D. 75,<sup>2</sup> Maternus was on the point of retiring completely from the bar, to devote his whole energy to poetry.<sup>3</sup> M. Aper had from the first deprecated his friend's literary ambition, but Maternus' humorous references to their standing quarrel surely indicate that so far his dramatic career had lasted only a few years. From what they say we would not naturally assume that it went back beyond A.D. 70.<sup>4</sup> What then becomes of the duel with Vatinius? I doubt whether this should be dated to Nero's reign. When Tacitus characterizes Vatinius' power in *Annals* xv. 34, he gives no hint that it was broken while Nero was still Emperor. Indeed Vatinius' influence, specifically exercised over literature, perhaps produced the virtual censorship of Nero's last years, and the fate of other literary figures would surely have warned Maternus against such dangerous enterprise.<sup>5</sup> Vatinius probably survived Nero and the fierce reaction against some of Nero's tools.<sup>6</sup> But did his *potentia* survive? That is the vital question, for Maternus clearly did not attack a broken and discredited man. The Senatorial prosecutors remained formidable after Nero's fall, especially Eprius Marcellus and Vibius Crispus. No powerful *eques*, except Tigellinus, was ruined by his record under Nero, and Otho and Vitellius reinstated many of Nero's courtiers. Indeed the Neronian cause revived vigorously under them.<sup>7</sup> *Calvia Crispinilla*, Nero's *magistra libidinum*, made a consular marriage and reached unassailable wealth and power in the Flavian period. Similarly later M. Regulus, though compromised under Domitian, was widely respected and feared in the following reigns.<sup>8</sup> Vatinius, like Regulus, was merely suspected of informing, and, since

Domitian was nearly trapped by Regulus' *insidiosa interrogatio* (*Epist. i. 5. 4 ff.*).

<sup>1</sup> Ego autem, sicut in causis agendis efficere aliquid et eniti fortasse possum, ita recitatione tragoeidarum (et) ingredi famam auspicatus sum, cum quidem . . . Vatinii potentiam fregi. Stroux, reading *et*, takes *recitatione* with the preceding clause; even so, the next clause *ought* by referring to drama, to prove Maternus' point.

<sup>2</sup> Ch. 17; adice . . . sextam iam felicis huius principatus stationem; (dated from A.D. 69, 'longum et unum annum'). See Schanz-Hosius, op. cit. 608 for discussion.

<sup>3</sup> See chs. 4 and 9.

<sup>4</sup> Chs. 3-4, especially nisi frequens et adsidua nobis contentio iam prope in consuetudinem vertisset . . . et ego, cui desidiam advocationum obicis, quotidianum hoc patrocinium defendenda adversus te poeticae exerceo.

<sup>5</sup> Inter foedissima eius aulae ostenta fuit . . . primo in contumelias adsumptus, dehinc optimi cuiusque criminatione eo usque valuit, ut gratia pecunia vi nocendi etiam

malos praemineret. *Dial. 11* defines his power as 'improbam et studiorum quoque sacra profanantem', which, with Pliny, *Ep. iii. 5* (see p. 104, n. 9), may justify 'censorship'. For possible victims see *Ann. xiv. 48 ff.* (Sosianus and Veiento), *52. 3* (Seneca), *xv. 49. 3* (Lucan), *xvi. 28. 1* (Curtius Montanus). Significantly Dio (lxiii. 15) links Vatinius with Nero's artistic tour in Greece and the dragooning of Senators.

<sup>6</sup> Plut. *Galba* 8. 5 (mob's victims); *Hist. ii. 10* with *iv. 42* (Senate's revenge—only on *inopes*!). *Hist. i. 37* (where MSS. *perierunt* implies Vatinius' death) is surely corrupt; I prefer *perdiderunt*, with Ritter and Heraeus (*Historien*, i. 61 f. [Leipzig, 1929]).

<sup>7</sup> Senators: *Hist. ii. 10, iv. 6* and *43-44*; *Dial. 8* (Marcellus and Crispus). Tigellinus: *Hist. i. 72* (general scapegoat). Annius Faustus and P. Celer were *vile* and *inopes* (*Hist. ii. 10, iv. 10*). Nero's court: *Hist. i. 13* and *79, ii. 71* and *87*; Suet. *Otho* 7. 1; *Vit. ii. 2* (Nero's poems revived).

<sup>8</sup> *Hist. i. 73* (Dio. lxiii. 12. 3 f.); Pliny, *Ep. i. 5. 1-3* and *15, ii. 20. 12-13, iv. 2. 4*.

the imperial archives were kept secret, there was no way of bringing him to justice. Even his wealth probably suffered little from Galba's commission of recovery.<sup>1</sup> After long patronage and censorship of literature, he may well have kept his influence through the uncertainties of A.D. 68-69. Early in A.D. 70 the Senate's campaign against the informers finally broke down, despite the fiery oratory of Curtius Montanus, perhaps himself one of Vatinius' victims.<sup>2</sup> Safe from prosecution now, Vatinius must be attacked by other means. Maternus chose the most effective method. With an outspoken and critical work he shattered Vatinius' reputation along with his control. Here we must face a textual crux. Tenney Frank (op. cit. 228) will have none of 'the putative drama of "Nero"', which, reading *in Nerone*, some have found in the key passage of *Dialogus* 11. But he rejects equally the emendations *sub Nerone* or *imperante Nerone*, and, retaining *in Nerone* with Gudemann, he translates 'whose power was baneful over Nero'. This would surely be inelegant Latin, especially in view of the word-order.<sup>3</sup> Though Frank's version could suit my theory, I accordingly prefer the change to *in Nerone*, with the meaning 'in (or 'through') my Nero', a character in a *praetexta*.<sup>4</sup>

Now the one surviving *praetexta*, the *Octavia*, has Nero as a central figure. Ritter long ago ascribed it to Maternus, and Frank (op. cit. 229) is one of his few supporters.<sup>5</sup> I believe that they are right and that *Domitius* is the real title of the *Octavia*; the current name would be due to an editor who knew the *Annals* well. Even in his lifetime Nero was apparently sometimes called *Domitius* as an insult, instead of by his adoptive name. Before his accession Britannicus once angered him by thus publicly addressing him. Nero, however, had deep family pride and even talked of resuming his former name.<sup>6</sup> His body was buried in the tomb of the *Domitii*, whose hereditary vices he had faithfully reproduced.<sup>7</sup> During Vespasian's first years he was evidently referred to as *Domitius Nero* in certain literary circles.<sup>8</sup> He is never called *Domitius* outright in the play, but ll. 249 ff. come very close indeed. *Octavia* prays:

utinam suorum facinorum poenas luat  
Nero insitivus, Domitio genitus patre,  
orbis tyrannus! . . .

<sup>1</sup> Archives: *Hist.* iv. 40 with 44. Commission: *Hist.* i. 20 and 90; *Suet. Galba* 15. 1 and *Plut. Galba* 16. 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist.* iv. 40-44. For Montanus see *Ann. xvii.* 28. 1 (and p. 105, n. 5). Was it Vatinius who accused Thrasea Paetus of failing to appreciate Nero's artistry, despite appearing himself on the Patavian stage? See *Ann. xvi.* 21. 1, and *Hist.* iv. 6-7, 43 for the fight to avenge Thrasea.

<sup>3</sup> ' . . . ingredi famam auspiciatus sum cum . . . in Neroneim improbam . . . Vatinii potentiam fregi.'

<sup>4</sup> Compare ch. 3, 'si qua omisit Cato . . . Thyestes dicet' and 9, 'si apud te Agamemnon aut Iason diserte loq. itur'.

<sup>5</sup> Ritter, *Octavia Praetexta, Curiatio Materno vindicata* (Bonn, 1843). By 1901 Wissowa can write (P.-W. iv. 1834) that Ritter's theory 'bedarf heute keiner Widerlegung mehr'. Schanz-Hosius (op. cit. 474) support a

Flavian date. Marti, *A.J.P.* lxxiii (1952), 24-36, reverts to Seneca.

<sup>6</sup> Tacitus records *Domitius*, Suetonius *Ahenobarbus*; *Ann.* xii. 41. 3. with *Nero* 7. 1. Suetonius perhaps repeats his mistake in 41. 2, though *Ahenobarbus* implies the sneer 'a *Domitius*'. As Emperor, Nero promptly honoured his dead father (*Ann.* xiii. 10. 1, *Nero* 9), and the *gens Domitii* on the birth of Poppaea's daughter (*Ann.* xv. 23. 2.); Seneca's enemies played on this trait (*Ann.* xiv. 52. 4): 'exueret magistrum, satis amplis doctoribus instructus maioribus suis.'

<sup>7</sup> *Suet. Nero* 50 and 1. 2.

<sup>8</sup> Pliny, *N.H.* ii. 92, iv. 10 and 22, vii. 45 and 71, xi. 238, xxxvii. 50. I owe these references to Mr. G. B. Townend, who contrasts them with some 60 allusions to *Nero* or *Nero princeps*. See also Dio lxii. 6. 5 and Juv. viii. 227 ff.

Later (ll. 636 ff.) Agrippina's ghost wistfully laments that Nero did not die at birth, for he would have died a Domitius and innocent :

iunctus atque haerens mihi  
semper quietam cerneret sedem inferum,  
proavos patremque, nominis magni viros,  
quos nunc pudor luctusque perpetuus manet  
ex te, nefande . . .

Despite all he is a Domitius still and a scandal to his *gens*. Equally significant are the consistency with which Octavia is referred to as Claudia, and the stress laid on the incestuous nature of the union which led to Nero's adoption.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, Claudius is loyally called *divus*, and spoken of with real respect. Nero was no fit successor to his Claudian name or his power.<sup>2</sup> The contrast of *gens Claudia* and *gens Domitia* seems to be an underlying theme of the play.

Nero's speeches, I believe, contain Maternus' attack on Vatinius. When Seneca, after overhearing orders for new executions, argues for clemency (ll. 440 ff.), Nero claims that he can think for himself. Even as he says this, we sense that he is repeating lessons instilled by his new teachers. His phrase *quidquid est excelsum cadat* (471) echoes Vatinius' envious intrigues against the nobility. Particularly Vatinian are the contemptuous lines (492 ff.) :

munus deorum est, ipsa quod servit mihi  
Roma et senatus quodque ab invitis preces  
humilesque voces exprimit nostri metus.

It was Vatinius who told Nero that he hated him for being a Senator.<sup>3</sup> Even at Vatinius' games, neither (Tacitus implies) had a holiday, and D. Silanus was forced to suicide.<sup>4</sup> Vatinius perhaps further speaks through Nero in a passage (495 ff.) with Senecan echoes:<sup>5</sup>

servare cives principi et patriae graves,  
claro tumentes genere—qua dementia est,  
cum liceat una voce suspectos sibi  
mori iubere?

The *Octavia*, I repeat, should really be called *Domitius*. Appearing early in A.D. 70, it would have effectively reminded Rome of the people who encouraged Nero's moral collapse and his vendetta against wealth and birth. Vatinius crumbled under it. What did Marcellus and Crispus think? In the *Cato* Maternus managed to get some shrewd thrusts within their defences and made anxious friends hope for a revised edition. Instead he returned to the attack in the *Thyestes*.<sup>6</sup> Did his *innocentia* finally save him from disaster, as he firmly trusted?<sup>7</sup> That question requires a separate inquiry. In this paper I have simply tried to throw some light on Maternus' earlier career and outlook.

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<sup>1</sup> See ll. 277 f., 534, 671 f., 789 f., 802 f. For the *nefas* see ll. 137 ff. (nurse's speech).

<sup>2</sup> See ll. 25 ff., 37 ff., 534, 789. For Nero see ll. 89 ff., 235 f., 619 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Dio. lxxiii. 15.

<sup>4</sup> Ann. xv. 35. Vatinius' *potentia* grew *optimi cuiusque criminazione* (ibid. 34. 2).

<sup>5</sup> See *De Clementia*; with *una voce* compare ii. 1. 1, 'ut de clementia scriberem . . . una

me vox tua maxime compulit' (Nero's 'vellem litteras nescirem!').

<sup>6</sup> Frank (op. cit. 226 and 228) links both plays with Helvidius Priscus' banishment. Priscus appears in *Dial. 5*. In view of ch. 8 the *potentes* of ch. 2 must include Priscus' main foes.

<sup>7</sup> *Dial. 11* and 13.

## AESCHYLUS

## AGAMEMNON 1389 f.

κάκφυσιών δέξειαν αίματος σφαγήν  
βάλλει μ' ἐρευνή φακάδι φονίας δρόσουν.

*Σφαγήν* has caused many head-shakings and worse. And yet it is as right as rain. 'Ἐκφυσιών αίματος σφαγήν' is an Aeschylean variant of ἐρευγόμενοι φόνον αίματος in Hom. *Il.* xvi. 162, correctly and lucidly explained in Monroe's note ad loc. It affords an admirable illustration of Mr. A. H. Coxon's just observation in *C.Q.* lii (1958), 46: 'Too little heed is usually paid to Aeschylus' allusions to Homer, which presuppose the closest knowledge of the text and are of great subtlety.' For the concrete use of *σφαγήν* cf. 1599 ἀπό *σφαγήν* ἐρών.

The similarity of [Eur.] *Rh.* 790 f., *θερμός* δὲ κρονύς δεσπότον πάρα σφαγαῖς | βάλλει με δυσθήγακον αίματος νέου, cited by Headlam, to the manuscript text of Aeschylus seems too great to be fortuitous and thus serves to make assurance of the correctness of *αίματος σφαγήν* double sure.

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## MENANDER

## FR. 416 KÖRTE = 481 KOCK

THE present writer presumably is not alone in being dissatisfied with the upshot of his long discussion of v. 11 of this fragment in *Proc. Brit. Acad.* xlii. 213 f.

In Stobaeus, the verse reads

ἄν πρώτος ἀπίγις καταλύσεις βέλτιον.

An easy and, I suspect, not unsuitable correction would be

ἄν πρώτος ἀπίγις, καταλύσεις βέλτιον—

'if you leave betimes, you will have a better rest' (i.e. a better death), 'for—this connexion is implied by the asyndeton—'you would (in this case) have left with a *viaticum*, hated by nobody'. The *viaticum* is the goodwill of those left behind.

The elements of this restoration are old. *Πρώτος* for *πρώτος* was found by Preller (who, however, took the word to be disyllabic and hence continued differently). *Βέλτιον* for *βέλτιονα* is due to Salmasius (but with a different wording preceding). For *πρώτος* trisyllabic cf. Menander, *Fab. Inc.* 58 *πρώτος* disyllabic and Philemon fr. 116 Mein. *πρώτας* trisyllabic. As to the metre, there is indeed a tendency for the two syllables of a 'resolved biceps' to belong to one word; but this tendency is far from hardening into a

strict rule. For *βέλτιον* see p. 214, note 1, of the essay referred to.

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## PLATO, LAWS 704 a-707 c

## AND THUCYDIDES,

ii. 35-46

In his *Study of History* (vol. iii, pp. 90-92) A. J. Toynbee discusses the Utopias published in Athens in the fourth century B.C. and asserts that the views expressed in them are the product of a hostility to the democracy caused by defeat in the Peloponnesian War and the judicial murder of Socrates. As an example of their repudiation of everything that had made Athens great he quotes Plato's *Laws* 704 a-707 c and then notes that it reads 'almost like a deliberate rejoinder, point for point, to the eulogy of Athens in Pericles' Funeral Speech as reported by Thucydides in Bk. II. Chs. 35-46' (p. 92, n. 2).<sup>1</sup>

It can be shown, however, that neither are the views expressed in this passage peculiar to the fourth century nor can the passage as a whole claim to be an intentional rebuttal of the Funeral Speech. A comparison of the points made by the Athenian Stranger with passages from the 'Old Oligarch' makes it clear enough that Plato is merely airing long-standing conservative prejudices against the Athenian democracy and the source of its strength—naval power—which can be traced back well into the fifth century.<sup>2</sup>

- (i) 704 d-5 a εἰ μὲν γάρ . . . ὠσαίτως.
- 2. 3 οὐ γάρ ἔστι . . . τῆς θαλάττης.
- 2. 7-8 εἰ δὲ δεῖ . . . καὶ βαρβάρων.
- (ii) 705 a-b παραμίθιον δὲ δή . . . κτῆσιν.
- 2. 11 τὸν δὲ πλοῦτον . . . τῆς θαλάττης;
- (iii) 706 c-d ἔστι γάρ . . . οὐ καλόν.
- 2. 4 ἔσπειτα δὲ . . . παραβοηθῶν.
- (iv) 707 a-<sup>πρός</sup> δὲ τούτους . . . μάχην.
- 1. 2 δικαίως . . . οἱ χρηστοί.<sup>3</sup>

The divergent approaches of moralist and politician do not hide the quite impressive similarity of their material.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See also vol. iv, p. 264.

<sup>2</sup> Jaeger, *Paideia*, iii. 239 f. traces conservative criticism of Athenian naval power as far back as Aeschylus' *Persae*.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Barker, *Greek Political Theory*, p. 317, n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> And this is not the only occasion on which Plato and the 'O.O.' voice similar conservative prejudices. Cf. *Rep.* 563 b and 'O.O.' 1. 10.

In support of his contention that Plato is refuting Pericles' Funeral Speech, Toynbee compares 706 c-d with ii. 39. 2-3 (p. 92, n. 1). There is in fact only one other sentence in the whole Funeral Speech which will stand comparison (ch. 38. 2) and consideration of both these passages will make clear how tenuous is the connexion. Not once does Thucydides mention Athenian maritime supremacy as the foundation on which the democracy's power rests. Both Plato and 'O.O.' parade their conservative dislike of sea power and the domination of the state by the inferior classes which it entails.

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For this reason it seems worth while recalling that *utpote qui*, though it sometimes has indeed a causal value like that of *quippe qui*, does not always do so. This is shown by such passages as *Plautus, Rudens* 462 *satis nequam sum, utpote qui hodie amare incepimus* (considering it's less than twenty-four hours since I fell in love, see how far gone I am already); and *Cicero, ad Att.* ii. 24. 4 *ea nos, utpote qui nihil contemnere solemus (soleamus Orelli: soleremus Klotz), non pertimescambus* (considering it's not my way to take anything too lightly, I'm not greatly troubled about these events). In both cases the clause governed by *utpote qui* introduces, not a reason for the main statement, but a circumstance to be kept in mind when evaluating it. This is the sense required in the passage of Sallust under discussion, where any interpretation which would give a causal value to *utpote qui* is excluded by the words *magno exercitu*. The fact that Antonius had a large army must have tended to delay his progress and cannot have accelerated it.

## SALLUSTIANA

(1) *Catiline* 57. 4:

neque tamen Antonius procul aberat, utpote  
qui magno exercitu locis aquioribus ex-  
peditos in fuga sequeretur.

This is the text of the manuscript tradition, both in Sallust and in Priscian, who quotes the passage. Sallust has just told his readers that the praetor Metellus Celer was waiting for Catiline (who was hastening *per montes asperos magnis itineribus* in an effort to escape) at the point where Catiline's route would bring him down into the plain. He now goes on to say that the consul Antonius (who was pursuing Catiline) was not far behind, considering that he had a large army and had to take an easier and therefore more circuitous route than the fugitives, who as fugitives were travelling light.

There does not seem to be any difficulty about this. However, modern editions of Sallust—Teubner (1919), Loeb (1920), Jacobs-Wirz-Kurfess (1922), Budé (1924), revised Teubner (1954)—all disapprove the text of the tradition and read *expeditus* for *expeditos*; presumably on the assumption that *utpote qui* must (as if it were *quippe qui*) introduce a reason why Antonius was not far behind, which the following words in the tradition do not afford. This assumption is not discouraged by the treatment given to *utpote qui* in standard lexica and grammars such as Corradini, Lewis and Short,

(2) *Catiline* 58. 15:

si haec relinquere uoltis, audacia opus est.  
nemo nisi uictor pace bellum mutauit.

Catiline is here addressing his troops and stressing the desperate state of their affairs in order to make them fight harder. He says: 'peace can be got only by victory'. This is not true as a general proposition, since peace can often be got by the alternative method of surrender, but it is true of the particular situation in which Catiline's followers are. A true statement is here required, or the argument will have no point. Sallust is an author to whom point is important. It therefore seems probable that *mutabit* (future tense, with subject 'none of us', giving a statement about Catiline's army) should be read instead of the *mutauit* of the recorded tradition (a presumably gnomic perfect which gives a general proposition that is untrue and therefore unlikely to be what Sallust wrote). The mistranscription *u* for *b* is a common one.

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## REVIEWS

## THE ACHAEAN ELEMENT IN HOMERIC GREEK

C. J. RUIJGH: *L'Élément achéen dans la langue épique*. Pp. 178. Assen: van Gorcum and Co., 1957. Paper, fl. 11.50.

DR. RUIJGH's purpose is to show that there is in the language of Homer an 'Achaean' element which is earlier than either the Aeolic or the Ionic element. By 'Achaean' he means Greek spoken in the Peloponnese and in adjacent islands of the Aegean during the Mycenaean age. Remnants of this dialect (or group of dialects) occur in classical times in Arcadia and Cyprus; but since Ruijgh accepts the Ventris decipherment, he also finds a record of the earliest Achaean in the Mycenaean clay-tablets.

Ch. i gives a short but lucid account of the history of dialect studies, in so far as they concern the Homeric question and Arcado-Cyprian (pp. 1-11). In ch. ii the author outlines his own approach to the problem. Comparing Ventris's -i and -si endings with the Greek dat. plur. endings, -ois, -ais, -si, he claims that deciphered Mycenaean is closely related to Arcado-Cyprian but distinct from Ionic and Aeolic. This discussion is rather unfruitful, however; it ends with the admission that Arcado-Cyprian is intermediate between Ionic and Aeolic, and not clearly distinguished from them phonologically or morphologically. Ruijgh hopes, however, that, by proving the reality of an 'Achaean' phase in epic poetry, he will make it possible to assign to this source Homeric elements hitherto regarded as Ionic or Aeolic (pp. 11-18). He claims that much may be gained from the statistical analysis of Homeric diction, citing by way of example the distribution of particles in Aristophanes' plays and the researches of Shipp on linguistic innovations in certain parts of the poems (pp. 18-29). His principal authority is Milman Parry, whose interpretation of Homeric formulae he proposes to apply to a wide range of linguistic phenomena. He will demonstrate that particles, suffixes, and modes of inflexion as well as characteristic words occur on the one hand in Arcado-Cyprian and on the other in formulae of the epic dialect. Since, on Parry's hypothesis, formulae are fundamental in the Homeric poems and very old, Arcado-Cyprian elements may justly be regarded as Achaean or Mycenaean. If any of these elements can be compared with words in the deciphered clay-tablets, the case will thereby be strengthened.

There follows an extremely careful analysis of the particles *aντάρ*, *ιδέ*, and *νν*, from which it emerges that these occur in a restricted number of metrical positions and in certain types of grammatical context. They also occur freely in Arcadian and Cyprian inscriptions but are not current in other classical dialects, outside literature (pp. 29-67). Next the -ηναι ending in the present infinitive of contracted verbs is picked out. This is found in Hom. *φορηναι*, *άηναι*, and also in Arcadian and Cyprian, but nowhere else.

Ruijgh then draws attention to a group of verbs ending in -άζω, -ίζω, which in Homer have an -ξ-aorist-stem, and not -σ(σ)-. One or two of these have parallels in Arcadia and in Cyprus. It is concluded that the -ξ-aorist is

an Achaean feature (pp. 67-89). Finally five nouns which signify weapons and two other military terms (*μῶλος*, *πρυλέες*) are stated to be Achaean (pp. 89-97).

In ch. iii Ruijgh turns aside to refute the notion of M. Leumann that parallels between Homeric diction and the later dialects, especially as reflected in the *γλῶσσαι κατὰ πόλεις*, are due to borrowing from Homer. This is perhaps the most successful part of Ruijgh's book. While acknowledging that Leumann's method of analysis may in certain contexts be valid, he shows effectively that in the case of the Arcadian and Cyprian dialects it leads to conclusions which are untenable. Consequently *Homerische Wörter* cannot upset his own theory that the Arcado-Cyprian links with Homer point to an Achaean element in epic poetry (pp. 98-110).

The case against Leumann is continued in detail in ch. iv. Ruijgh undertakes to prove the formulae character of Homer's use of six words (*ἄναξ*, *δῶμα*, *ἄλσα*, *δατέομαι*, *ρήτρη*, *ῆμαρ*), which occur also in Arcadian and Cyprian inscriptions. These words belong 'without doubt' to the Achaean substrate (pp. 111-21). Then nineteen words from the two dialects, which Leumann does not discuss in his book, are subjected to the same kind of examination; they include *ἄρουρα*, *κέλευθος*, *λᾶος*, *ἰητήρ*, *οἶος*, *ἄνωγα*, *ἴκω*, *ἔρπω*, *λεύσσω*, and rarities such as *ἔρουντος* and the personal name *'Ικραδίος*. There follows a list of eleven glosses, which are treated in like fashion (*ἀγλαός*, *ἀπόλος*, *κέραμος*, etc.). Leumann's interpretation of these is shown to be faulty or inadequate. And the list is capped with twenty-eight other Arcadian and Cyprian glosses, not dealt with by Leumann (chiefly from the *γλῶσσαι κατὰ πόλεις*). They include *ανδή*, *δέπας*, *κύπελλον*, *χθών*, *ἐσθλός*, *θήγω*, *πάροιθε*, etc. These too are Achaean elements in Homer, being recognized as such chiefly from their use in formulae.

This is obviously an interesting and stimulating book; its originality is, however, limited. The notion of an 'Achaean' element or stratum in the Homeric language has been current in one form or another since the discovery of inscriptions in the Arcadian dialect, and particularly since the decipherment of the Cyprian syllabary. In this country Sir Maurice Bowra has written a good deal on the subject, and Ruijgh frequently refers to his opinions. Ruijgh's own contribution consists chiefly in drawing on Ventris's deciphered texts, in gathering in Milman Parry's later speculations on dialect matters, and in extending the list of parallels between Homer and Arcado-Cyprian.

It may be said at once that the evidence gleaned from the clay-tablets is of trifling value. If Ventris's decipherment of the endings *-i*, *-si* and of words such as *di-pa* were in every detail correct, they would scarcely affect Ruijgh's argument, which is based on other material. If, on the other hand, the decipherment be wrong, the relationship of Arcado-Cyprian to the epic dialect will still demand explanation. In fact, the deciphered words to which Ruijgh appeals (*qe-to-ro-po-pi*, *di-pa*, *wa-na-ka-te-ro*, *pa-ki-ja-si*, *i-pe-me-de-ja*, etc.) are the least trustworthy of Ventris's results.

Milman Parry's researches were in the first instance concerned with the development of a literary technique. He made some attempt to correlate the formulae which he identified with the dialectal aspects of Homeric diction (Aeolic and Ionic), but his results in this field of study were neither far-reaching nor conclusive. Given that the composition of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* is to a large extent based on the expert use of formulae, it is a question whether

one formula or another can be used as a criterion of dialect. Even words and phrases which are purely Ionic, or which have no marked connexion with one local dialect rather than another, tend to recur in recognizable patterns. In these circumstances it seems useless to say that a given form, because it occurs in Arcado-Cyprian and also appears in epic poetry in restricted contexts of sense, grammar, or metre, *must* be evidence of an 'Achaean' element in epic. The argument in all such cases really rests on the word being found in Arcado-Cyprian. If *αὐτάρ*, *ἰδε*, and *νν*, the infinitive ending *-ῆναι*, the *-ξ*-aorist, etc., are to be 'Achaean', they will no doubt fall within the orbit of Parry's observations; but this will not prove them 'Achaean'.

The argument rests heavily on the sixty-four words listed in chs. ii and iv. The number is substantial and, since the author states the evidence in each instance with scrupulous fairness, one might at first sight take his conclusions to be justified. Nevertheless, a distinction must be drawn between the words attested both in Homer and in Arcado-Cyprian texts and those culled from other sources (principally the *γλώσσαι κατὰ πόλεις*). In dealing with words of the second category, Ruijgh often jumps boldly to conclusions whose chief attraction is that they suit his hypothesis. For example, when a word which he wishes to label 'Achaean' crops up in a Doric-speaking area, or even in Aeolic or north-west Greek, he is too apt to ascribe it to an 'Achaean' survival in that area; but on the other hand he is not inclined to trace in Arcadian or Cyprian any survival of a non-'Achaean' dialect or any influence from an Ionic or other source. In addition he sometimes makes too much of proper names which are really inscrutable ('Επίρροιος, 'Ικράλος); and the connexions which he draws sometimes depend on fanciful changes of meaning and context (*κέραμος*, *τάφος*, *ἴσθμιον*); and occasionally the occurrence of words in texts outside Homer and Arcado-Cyprian inscriptions is pushed aside in somewhat arbitrary fashion (*ἄρουρα*, *αἰδή*, *ἐσθλός*, *ρύγτρα*, *χθών*).

But the general question remains: whether we accept all of Ruijgh's parallel cases, or forty, or only twenty of them, do they point to an 'Achaean' element in the epic language? It is apparently common ground that classical Arcadian and Cyprian are descended from a kind of Greek that in the Mycenaean age and later was spoken in the Peloponnese and Sporades; also that this kind of Greek was more nearly related to Ionic than to Doric or even to Aeolic; and it is further agreed that in the post-Mycenaean age the Ionian areas of the Aegean and Asia received settlers from the Peloponnese, who presumably spoke this same kind of Greek. In the classical period Arcadian and Cyprian were isolated, peripheral, and relatively archaic; Ionic was centrally placed and the principal dialect of the Hellenic community and relatively progressive. If certain features were common to early Ionic and to the ancestor of Arcado-Cyprian, it is likely enough that some of them would be preserved in Ionic poetry and others lost and that Arcadian and Cyprian would keep in ordinary use features that survived only sporadically in Ionic. This in principle would seem to be a reasonable explanation of the links that exist between the Homeric dialect and the Arcado-Cyprian texts. To separate these features from the rest of the Homeric dialect and to classify them as an early 'Achaean' element of that dialect would appear to be going beyond the evidence.

One must in any case make allowance for many cross-currents in the development of a language such as Greek. It may be allowed that, if Peloponnesian settlers went to Ionia after the Dorian invasion, their speech may have

contributed something to the formation of the epic dialect; the  $-\hat{\eta}\nu\alpha\iota$  infinitives might be considered in this light. But why should we overlook the possibility that Ionic may have influenced the dialects of Arcadia and Cyprus throughout the centuries and in various ways? Even if we agree with Ruijgh in rejecting Leumann's method, it seems probable that through trade and settlement as well as through literary modes Ionic exercised a strong influence on Cyprian usage in the archaic and classical periods. (A fifth-century Cyprian text published recently by Mr. Mitford shows not only loss of digamma but one or two other features that might be Ionic in origin.) So also with Arcadian; one would like to know whether the  $\gamma\lambda\hat{\omega}\sigma\sigma\alpha\iota$  attributed to the Clitorians and others belong to the period before the liberation of Arcadia in the fourth century or to the following period. If they are late, then they might well come from revivalist literature and official documents which drew heavily on Homeric poetry. There are too many unknown factors in this situation, which should prevent us ruling a straight line from Arcadian and Cyprian to the epic dialect.

For these reasons I find Ruijgh's thesis unconvincing. At the same time I consider that he is right to draw attention to the possibility of an 'Achaean' element in Homeric diction and I recommend his book to all who are interested in the growth of epic poetry in Greece.

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## STROPHIC STRUCTURE

WALTHER KRAUS: *Strophengestaltung in der griechischen Tragödie. I: Aischylos und Sophokles*. Pp. 179. Vienna: Rohrer, 1957. Paper, ö. S. 78.

In this study of strophic structure, Kraus aims to resolve the stanza-forms of Greek Tragedy into a number of comparatively simple patterns, without trying to impose a single, rigid scheme. In his preface he outlines the history of the study of strophic structure and lays down the main principles on which he has worked. Then follows an 'Allgemeiner Teil' in which he briefly states his theories and conclusions. The greater part of the book consists of analyses of the lyric of all the complete plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles. Where the text is in doubt, Kraus usually states briefly what reading he is accepting, but some textual points he discusses at length. His analyses are almost exclusively verbal; he prints as few scensions as possible. This is a great pity, since much metrical nomenclature is completely uninformative. Moreover, the relation between one colon and another (say  $\circ - \circ - - \circ - - \circ - -$  and  $\circ - \circ - - \circ - -$ ) is clear from a glance at the scansion; to explain it in words (and to follow such an explanation) is comparatively a slow and painful business. The absence of scensions adds enormously to the difficulty of reading the book.

Kraus adopts Schroeder's metron-counting, but applies it far more flexibly. He also adopts the terms 'Stollen' and 'Abgesang' from German medieval metre. He finds that about a third of the strophae of Aeschylus and Sophocles are of the form AAB. AA represents two 'Stollen' consisting of an equal number of metra. B may be either a simple clausula or a full 'Abgesang'. He also distinguishes forms AAAB, AABB, ABAC, etc. He uses capital letters to represent periods, small letters for single cola. Thus, if the period A consists of two trimeters and a dimeter, this may be expressed as A = aab. In addition,

Kraus notices certain special effects. A strophe may begin with an isolated metron or colon, often an invocation or exclamation of some sort. This he terms 'Kopf'. Thus *Ant.* 781 ff. is analysed as 'Kopf' ('Ἐρως ἀνίκατε μάχαν'), AAB. He also distinguishes a special type of 'Abgesang' which consists of a long string of repeating metra, 'Ablauf' in his terminology.

Kraus rightly insists that in order to understand the formation of a strophe it is necessary to observe such phenomena as anaphora, epanalepsis, alliteration, and rhyme. He puts perhaps too much stress on this last. There can be little doubt that at *Eum.* 490 = 499, for example (*νῦν καταστροφαὶ νέων | θεομίων* ~ *οὐδὲ γὰρ βροτοκόπων | μανάδων*), the rhyming -ων emphasizes the isolation of the final cretic, but it should be borne in mind that a certain amount of casual rhyming is inevitable in an inflected language. Moreover, Kraus overlooks the fact that prepositions and postpositives are not to be reckoned as independent words. Thus it is a mistake to cite Aeschylus, *Supp.* 60 *ὅπα τὰς | Τηρετάς* as an example of rhyme; article and noun together fuse into a single word. We can be reasonably certain that the unemphatic character of the article and its close association with the noun would have made such a 'rhyme' inaudible. Again, Kraus sees 'Doppelreim' at *Ag.* 194-5 (*βροτῶν | ἀλαὶ, | ναῶν | τε καὶ |*), but there is no rhyme at all. The correct word-division is: *βροτῶν ἀλαὶ, ναῶντε καίπεισμάτων*. He makes similar mistakes of word-division in other connexions: p. 71, *Sept.* 942 *ἐκ πυρὸς* is one word; also p. 126 *Ant.* 591 *καὶ δυσάνεμοι*, p. 155, *El.* 1091 *καὶ πλούτω*, p. 123, *Ant.* 124, *ἀμφὶ* is not a complete word. But these are minor points.

The chief question raised by the book is whether or not metron-counting is an acceptable basis on which to construct theories of strophic structure. It is not enough to divide a strophe into periods arithmetically: there must also be metrical and rhetorical grounds for the division. Unfortunately there is no reliable criterion for dividing periods. Hiatus, catalexis, and rhetorical division occur within apparently obvious periods, yet these phenomena are the only indications we have, and they must not be disregarded. Kraus is generally careful and attentive, and his system is flexible enough not to require much forcing of the material, but occasionally his divisions seem to have none but numerical justification. At *Ag.* 140 ff., for example, his periods are completely at variance with the rhetorical division of the stanza: l. 146, *ἴητον δὲ καλέει Παιάνα*, belongs with what follows, not with what precedes. Again, he forces 152-9 into two periods of 17 feet each by dividing after *τοιάδε Κάλχας*, but there is no reason to divide here, while there is strong and obvious rhetorical division before *τοιάδε Κάλχας*. *Sept.* 698 ff. is an uninterrupted sequence of 6 dochmias; 'here is no justification for dividing it into three "Stollen", as if it consisted of three dimeters. At *Sept.* 203 the first dochmiac (*ω φίλον Οἰδίπον*) is not isolated metrically or rhetorically and has no right to be classed as a 'Kopf'.

Metron-counting presents yet another difficulty. The metra differ considerably in length. At *Supp.* 429, Kraus himself feels the difficulty of asserting that - - - - - and - - - - - - - - - - - are 'umfangsgleich'. He mentions the possibility that the dochmias may have been delivered faster, then makes his escape with 'aber wir wissen ja überhaupt nicht, wodurch die Einheit eines Taktes oder Metrons und damit die Zahl der Metren dem Griechen fühlbar wurde'. But our ignorance of what Greek poetry sounded like to a Greek ought to act as a check on theorizing; it should

not be used as a refuge when our theories seem about to lead us into difficulties. Dochmiacs and cretics are not the only types of metre which raise problems. An anapaestic dipody ( $\sim \sim - \sim \sim$ ) counts as one metron, while a hemiepes ( $- \sim \sim - \sim \sim$ ) counts as two. Dactyls give Kraus repeated trouble. Usually he treats  $\sim \sim \sim \sim$  as the metron. He supposes that cola composed of uneven numbers of feet were made up by hold or pause to the nearest even length. Thus at *Pers.* 855 = 861 (Wilamowitz's colometry) the catalectic pentapody  $\sim \sim \sim \sim \sim \sim \sim \sim$  is taken to equal 3 metra, necessitating a pause or hold the equivalent of  $\sim \sim \sim$ . At *Ag.* 104 ff., however, Kraus resorts to counting feet. Metron-counting is particularly unconvincing when applied to the aeolochoriambics of Sophocles. *Aj.* 627-30 = 639-41 is a particularly striking example. Here Kraus calls  $\sim \sim \sim \sim$  'asklepiadischer Halbvers' and counts it as  $1\frac{1}{2}$  metra. Then follows a catalectic lesser Asclepiad,  $\sim \sim \sim \sim \sim \sim$ , then  $\sim \sim \sim \sim \sim \sim$  which he treats not as a trailing variant of the asclepiad, but as 'asklepiadischer Halbvers' (the first half, this time), + chor. ba., therefore  $3\frac{1}{2}$  metra. This is more ingenious than convincing.

In conclusion, Kraus's theories cannot be lightly dismissed, but they do not carry immediate conviction. Some of his analyses are illuminating, some are not, and some raise more problems than they solve. It seems to me that he is trying to answer questions which we have not and probably never shall have sufficient knowledge to answer with any degree of certainty. Nevertheless, the large amount of careful and sensitive observation which it contains gives the book a value independent of the validity of the theories expounded.

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## DRAMATIC FORM IN EURIPIDES

HANS STROHM: *Euripides: Interpretationen zur dramatischen Form.* (Zetemata, Heft 15.) Pp. vii + 185. Munich: Beck, 1957. Paper, DM. 18.

THERE have been in recent years a number of studies of separate elements or types of scene that recur in all or most Greek tragedies.<sup>1</sup> The author of this addition to the Zetemata series promises a study of Messenger Speeches, and in the present book deals in the first part with various 'Einzelformen' in Euripides. These are 'Agon', 'Altarmotiv' (which occurs in five plays), 'Opfermotiv' (which includes all scenes of willing self-sacrifice, whether actually consummated or not), and finally 'Intrige' and 'Wiedererkennung', which in some plays are inseparable.

The author stresses the range of variation in the form and dramatic function of the Agon, and succeeds in showing that this and the other recurring types of scene in Euripides are less stereotyped and governed by convention than some critics, ancient and modern, have supposed. Other points, not in themselves altogether new, are clearly brought out in the course of the discussion. We see, for instance, how the Agon in Euripides does not normally affect the course of events, but serves to demonstrate and strengthen the opposition between the two parties. The altar scenes illustrate the more secular atmosphere of Euripidean drama, since, in contrast with the religious feeling in the first

<sup>1</sup> e.g. E. Epke, *Über die Streitszenen und ihre Entwicklung in der griechischen Tragödie* (1951); U. Treu Thust, *Die Bedeutung der erzählenden Rhesis innerhalb der Handlung der attischen Tragödie* (1952).

part of the *Supplices* of Aeschylus (characteristically described as 'das Urbild dieser dramatischen Form'), in Euripides the altar appears to be merely a convenient dramatic device to give otherwise helpless victims a breathing space in which to state their case, arouse pity, and prolong suspense. But although some general points of interest emerge and there are good observations on points of detail, on the whole this formal analysis of types of scene, their variations in form, and the different ways in which they can be used and combined seems to me to be a little unsatisfying. No doubt the author knows as well as anybody that a play is more than a collection of 'Einzelformen'; indeed in his preface he freely admits the provisional nature of his investigations and claims only that they may be of use to future commentators. This is a modest claim for which there is some justification, since most dramatists probably tend to develop certain habits in their technique, and these must be taken into consideration in dealing with any play. All the same I feel some doubt about the advisability of separating off this particular aspect of drama even for convenience of analysis, and I certainly believe that to deal with each play as a whole, and study the dramatic technique in relation to the basic material of the legend and the dramatist's conception of its significance is a much sounder approach to drama than this sort of rather detached 'Form-analyse', carried out in detail and at times with almost relentless thoroughness. When it is so carried out, it is in some danger of developing into an end in itself. Thus when we read that 'the Altarszene is closely related to the Streitgespräch and has influenced its development', these elements seem to be on the way to acquiring a life of their own, independent of the plays, if not of the dramatist.

Many scholars would probably agree that among the plays of Euripides there is a good deal of variation: that the analysis of dramatic technique is a more suitable approach to some than to others, and that the degree of formal excellence varies considerably. In this book, however, no distinction is drawn: all are treated alike and all apparently illustrate the dramatist's mastery of his craft. But when we come to those plays which from the formal aspect have been thought puzzling, the treatment is not very enlightening. In the *Andromache*, for instance, unity of action can hardly be vindicated by explaining that as in the first half we have the rescue of Andromache by Peleus, so in the second we have another rescue, this time of Hermione by Orestes. This connexion, such as it is, is supposed to be underlined for the audience by some verbal correspondencies, such as 572 (Andromache to Peleus) *τῶν σῶν πάρος πίννονσα γονάτων* and 892 (Hermione to Orestes) *πρός σε τῶνδε γονιάτων*. There are many other examples of allegedly significant verbal correspondence, some more plausible than the example cited (e.g. the repetition of the unusual metaphor *ἔφολκίδες* in *H.F.* 631 and 1424), and some even less plausible. It may possibly be a weakness of this analytic approach that its exponents are apt to find contrivance where none was intended, and to over-estimate the extent to which a theatre audience could be even unconsciously affected by the repetition of ordinary words or phrases to which they have no reason to pay any special attention.

The second part of the book deals with 'Triebkräfte', the propelling forces that set and keep the action moving, and with some other topics of dramaturgy. Here the treatment is less scrappy, and a wider sweep of action is surveyed in each of the plays considered, but though much care and learning has been

expended on these chapters, I cannot say that they throw very much new light on the interpretation of the plays. Generally speaking the results of careful analysis in rather elaborate and technical language appear to me to be conclusions that are sound enough but not particularly fresh or illuminating; e.g. that Medea's first act of revenge, in sending the children with poisoned gifts to Jason's bride, was itself a free act, but that, once performed, it acquired a power of its own to determine future actions.

I hope I have not been prejudiced against the content of this book by the fact that I found much of it rather stiff reading. I cannot say how far this is my fault, but to those who are able to read it more easily it might seem more rewarding.

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### THE BUDÉ DEMOSTHENES

LOUIS GERNET: Démosthène, *Plaidoyers Civils*. Tome ii (Discours xxxix-xlviii). (Collection Budé.) Pp. 254 (mostly double). Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1957. Paper.

THE speeches contained in this second volume are not as a whole of the same quality as those of the first. Only three of them (*Boeotus A*, *Spudias*, *Stephanus A*) can claim, on grounds of style, to be by Demosthenes, and the rest receive from Gernet, with almost monotonous regularity, such descriptions as 'mal bâti', 'mal écrit', 'embrouillé', 'confus et maladroit'. I feel, however, that these judgements are in most cases too harsh, and certainly the speeches are not bad enough (except *Macartatus*, a truly dreary production) to fail to hold the reader's attention, though this may be largely due to the interest of their subject-matter.

Just as in the first volume the largest single theme was commercial law, so there is a preoccupation here with law affecting the family, its marriage- and property-relationships. I mention this coherence particularly, because Gernet strangely fails to notice it, both here and in the 'Introduction Générale' to vol. i (pp. 9 f.), where he shows that the archetypal grouping of the private speeches was by external or contingent principles (e.g. by procedure, or according to whether the speech was delivered by the same person): the disturbance of this order in our manuscripts (where it still bulks largely), he says, is due to material causes and 'dislocations plus ou moins accidentelles'. Yet the fact that the two batches represented by his first two volumes (following the conventional order, that of the manuscript F) have this internal coherence is surely evidence of a third principle of classification at work, i.e. by essential subject-matter. And even the two speeches in this batch which are plainly intrusive from the sphere of public law (*Phaenippus*—our chief document on the Antidosis—and *Euergus* and *Mnesibulus*—involving violations of private property incidental to trierarch-service) are not without a certain relevance of atmosphere and detail to the rest of the speeches.

As is well known, family-law is one of the most difficult and perplexing tracts of the Athenian system. The speeches in this volume form our most important single source for it, apart from Isaeus, and they go beyond Isaeus in one important particular, namely that three of them (*Macart.* and *Steph. A* and *B*) actually quote the laws which are found in Isaeus only in paraphrase:

hence we have here precious texts of the laws of intestate succession, adoption, wills, provision for heiresses, even part of the Draco homicide law (cited to show how the law defined the circle of *ἀγχιστεῖς*). Unfortunately, the presence of these texts by no means removes the difficulties of the material. These are of two kinds: first, the laws are far from self-explanatory, and many difficulties and uncertainties arise with regard to them; second, the present batch of speeches in particular touches upon many situations which are not covered by the laws which we have, or which, even more embarrassing, appear to contradict them. Two examples, from many, will serve to illustrate this. In *Spudias* Polyeuctus, who has adopted a son and given him one of his daughters in marriage, breaks the marriage and the adoption (apparently in the same act), and marries her to Spudias: after his death Spudias and the husband of the other daughter divide the property, neither of them having been adopted or having claimed the heiresses (as next-of-kin) by *ἐπιδικασία*. Almost everything here seems contrary to the Solonian code which was the formal law of fourth-century Athens; yet there is no suggestion in the speech that the arrangements were open to objection in principle. Again, Apollodorus in *Stephanus* B points out (almost as an afterthought) that the will which his father Pasion is alleged to have made was invalid by the same code: yet such wills are common in the fourth century, and go otherwise unchallenged.

It will be seen that it has been a difficult task to deal with such awkward material (requiring so much exposition and qualification) within the compass of a Budé volume. Gernet has managed to do it, however, and scholars will be grateful for having these speeches available in a handy edition, which incorporates such up-to-date material as is available for understanding them. Naturally, there are limitations; but what is remarkable is the wealth of information and comment which he has managed to get in. He explains the deficiencies or discrepancies in Athenian family-law by suggesting, partly that it is really a law of custom ('c'est moins à la loi qu'à la coutume qu'il était soumis', pp. 51 f.), partly that it was in evolution ('c'est une évolution aussi et une espèce de modernisme, que nous constatons dans les modalités inattendues de la succession'); the will was a most effective instrument in this evolution ('écrit ou oral, c'est le testament qui, dès cette époque, pouvait justement avoir assez d'autorité pour déroger au droit théorique'). No one will disagree with this, but it might have been added that the curious tolerance which we find here of mutually contradictory principles of law necessarily implies a certain kind of judiciary, i.e. one which, like the Athenian, (a) regarded its business as to decide between litigants rather than to declare law, (b) was not responsible for its decisions. I feel that this is the explanation which should have been offered also of the curious situation in *Olympiodorus*, where the court is blandly asked to uphold what is in effect a contract to cheat the law!

There are a few inaccuracies. In the case just mentioned the court is specifically asked to arbitrate between the litigants (para. 3): Gernet says this is an isolated instance of such a role being associated with it; but others are collected by Steinwenter (*Streitbeendigung*, p. 123, cited by Gernet). Gernet says that 'un bourgeois d'Athènes' would not marry without a dowry-settlement (p. 40, n. 2); but some did (Lys. xix. 15 f.; Lipsius, *A.R.* 489). In the 'note complémentaire' to p. 112, l. 30 Gernet ignores H. J. Wolff's conclusion that the exclusion of bastards from *ἀγχιστεία* was suspended during the later years of the Peloponnesian War (cf. *Traditio* ii [1944], 43 ff., cited elsewhere by Gernet).

At *Steph.* B 12 Gernet can see no relevance in Apollodorus' invocation of the law against *privilegia*; it is just an unusual way of expressing the commonplace that the law is no respecter of persons (cf. Is. vi. 9, where the law, also of wills, is called *κοινὸς ἄπασι*): the dicasts would know what Apollodorus meant. No note occurs on the phrase ἐντὸς ἀνεψιότητος καὶ ἀνεψιοῦ of the Homicide Law (*Macart.* 57), and the translation 'en deça du degré d'enfant de cousin' glosses over the difficulty. There is a particularly annoying misprint in Gernet's text of this law, the first *οἱ* of *γνῶσι δὲ οἱ πεντήκοντα καὶ εἰς οἱ ἔφεται* being omitted (ironically, since the critical note directs attention to a similar error on the part of the ancient scribe). On the whole, however, these documents are well handled, considering the book's limits.

Gernet seems to have little interest in the style of these speeches, once they are determined not to be by Demosthenes. Thus he waves aside the question whether *Euergus* and *Mnesibulus* is by the same author as the 'speeches of Apollodorus' with the remark that this would at least mean that Apollodorus is not that author, as if that was all that mattered. In fact the style of these speeches (to which *E. and M.* almost certainly belongs) is one of the interesting phenomena of the corpus: it is by no means an unsuccessful style, and *E. and M.* in particular is a most exciting piece of sustained narration. To dismiss it as 'confus et maladroit' seems to me very one-sided criticism.

Did Demosthenes 'rat' on the banker Phormio (for whom he wrote speech xxxvi) and compose *Steph.* A for Phormio's rival, Apollodorus? Modern critics have resisted the conclusion, partly at least on ethical grounds. But the stylistic evidence is there, and points strongly in that direction. And, as Gernet shows, Demosthenes may have had good and even patriotic reasons for wishing to oblige Apollodorus at that time.

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## THE PRESOCRATICS

G. S. KIRK and J. RAVEN: *The Presocratic Philosophers. A critical history with a selection of texts.* Pp. xi+487. Cambridge: University Press, 1957. Cloth, 55s. net.

THE study of the Presocratics during the last seventy years has produced a most enormous specialized literature. In the same period it has developed from a study which interested a few specialists—those who liked to go slumming in the side-paths of classical antiquity, or those whose universal scholarship required them to leave no field untried—into a subject about which all are expected to know something since it deals with one of the great triumphs of the human spirit, the emergence of rational or scientific thought from the chrysalis of mythological dogma. Even seventy years ago the subject was a complicated one, and Burnet's famous book, *Early Greek Philosophy*, first published in 1892, began, we are told, as an attempt to summarize the scholarship of others, though it soon developed into an original synthesis of the first importance. It will continue to be read long after this, but as a tool of the working scholar it will in many ways be replaced by Kirk and Raven. For this will inevitably be the standard work by which all serious students whose language is English will be initiated into the strange worlds of the Presocratics. The work is most

excellently done and vast masses of detailed scholarship are handled and presented in such a way that difficulties are neither concealed nor allowed to hide the main outlines of an endlessly fascinating story.

Despite the immense complication of the material the book can be read straight through, though no one would pretend that it is easy going. It is built about some 600 passages in Greek and translation. By an unfortunate decision detailed references to Diels-Kranz are given only where Diels-Kranz give more than Kirk and Raven. Moreover, though ample in number the fragments are only a selection. Not all the fragments of Heraclitus, for example, are given, and it is for the discussion and interpretation rather than as a repository of texts that the book will be primarily used. In view of the importance of these, the book will inevitably be somewhat anxiously scanned by those who, in the words of the preface, 'have a more than casual interest in the history of early Greek thought'. It is in this spirit that what follows is written, and if there is more criticism than praise this is because only those points are selected which seem likely to provoke disagreement.

Throughout there is a complete concentration upon cosmology—logic, epistemology, ethical and political beliefs, religious beliefs, and ideas about the soul receive attention which at best is only incidental. This is partly due no doubt to the pre-selection of our source material by Aristotle and his immediate followers. But at least in the case of the soul there is considerable material, and yet it is impossible to get any clear idea of the developing course of thought from the present book. The decision to exclude seems in part deliberate (see p. 9), but it weakens the presentation as a whole and in detail. Whence did the Greeks get the theory of transmigration, what influence did the Persians have on Greek beliefs, how far did early views about the universe reflect beliefs about man and society?—these are questions about which little or no guidance is given.

We begin with a most valuable chapter on the fore-runners of philosophical cosmogony, where due weight is given to probable near-eastern origins for much of the material. Briefly, it is supposed that there was a fairly standard naïve view of the world which most thinkers used as a basis for improvement. A mistranslation of *οὐδός* as 'floor' in 1 and 28 (it is correctly translated in 342) is used to support the view that the standard picture of the world was symmetrical in the sense that to the bowl of the sky there corresponded the brazen 'floor' of Tartarus. On the other hand, it is good to see Cornford's theory of Chaos as the gap between heaven and earth successfully defended against recent criticisms. Kirk's desire to exclude Night as a separate primary principle has led him into some unconvincing special pleading on p. 22. The plain fact is that Night is attested as such both by Aristotle and Eudemus and in poetical accounts probably from the sixth century B.C., and these cannot be derived from nor fitted into the scheme of Hesiod. Arguments against early Orphic cosmogonies are better but far from cogent. One is left with the impression that the hypothesis of a single developing picture of the world amongst cosmogonists has been adopted too rigidly in advance of the evidence. In 42-61 Pherecydes is rightly separated from Anaximander, as against von Fritz. In 51 Kern's reading *αὐτοῦ* deserves a mention. It is more usual Greek and the idea that Time produced the world or its constituents from the seed of an established god like Zeus seems much more likely for the sixth century.

The discussion of Thales is excellent, indeed almost impeccable. 74-75, anecdotes about Thales, would have more point if related more clearly to the

doctrine of the *βιὸς πρακτικός* rather than offered as consolations to the modern classical scholar. 94 n. 2 keep Hippias, and refer to Snell's article in *Philologus*, xcvi (1944), 170–82 which sheds a great deal of light on this problem. The discussion of Anaximander is much more controversial and embodies Kirk's own views previously published in *C.Q.* n.s. v (1955) pp. 21 ff. To the present reviewer they seem unnecessarily agnostic. The words *τῶν δὲ ἀρεσκόντων αὐτῷ πεποίηται κεφαλαῖδη τὴν ἔκθεσιν* in 96 suggest not that either Anaximander or someone after him made a précis of his already published doctrines, but that the original publication was fairly succinct. Whatever Theophrastus used, it was not a *bare* summary since it included a sample of Anaximander's own poetic language. To suggest that he might have been using a book of quotations from Anaximander is not plausible, and while certainty as always is impossible, it remains most probable that Theophrastus had access to what Anaximander actually wrote. Here as elsewhere Kirk is too much infected by what may be called McDiarmidism—the belief that when Theophrastus and Aristotle agree the former is either drawing on or arbitrarily elaborating the latter and their joint evidence may be dismissed (cf. McDiarmid, 'Theophrastus on the Presocratic Causes', *H.S.C.P.* lxi [1953], 85–156, with reply by W. K. C. Guthrie, 'Aristotle as a Historian of Philosophy' in *J.H.S.* lxxvii [1957], 35–41). This gravely misrepresents the nature of the investigations undertaken in the Lyceum under Aristotle's guidance. Kirk is convincing in his re-establishment of Burnet's view on 103—what Theophrastus said was that Anaximander was the first to use *ἀπειρον*, not the first to use *ἀρχή*. But should not the translation in 103 be altered—not 'said that the principle and element of existing things was the *apeiron*', but 'said that the *apeiron* was the principle and element of existing things'? Kirk sees that the *apeiron* must have been in fact spatially infinite, but with Cornford and others he is attracted to the idea that the term may have meant 'infinite in its internal divisions'. There is no need to doubt Aristotle here. Nor need we reject the simplest explanation of fr. 1, which is that given by Theophrastus, that all the worlds come from the *apeiron* and return to it, and the view, which seems to have been that of Theophrastus, that in some sense there were infinite or innumerable worlds. There is a tendency here to take the dangerous step from 'such and such a misunderstanding could have given rise to this statement' to 'that was the source of this statement'.

The discussion of Xenophanes is surprisingly brief after the space lavished on Anaximander. With some distortion he is treated among the Ionians, mainly from the point of view of cosmology, though this is admitted not to have been his main interest. The treatment of Heraclitus is relatively brief, but includes an answer to Vlastos on the vital question of whether there was anything which could be called a doctrine of flux in Heraclitus, which will be read with great interest.

The discussion of the Pythagoreans and the Eleatics rests firmly on the view that both groups alike held that existence in space is the only form of existence, though the Pythagoreans treated numbers as extended in space implicitly rather than explicitly. The views of the Pythagoreans are very clearly presented by Raven, who argues as against Cornford for an ultimate dualism in their thought. But one would like more help in assessing the value to be attached to later Pythagorean traditions, and there is virtually nothing about Pythagorean communities and their organization. As always the emphasis is very much on

cosmology. The treatment of Parmenides seems to me particularly good. 342 I. 3 δαιμόνος is kept as against Diels-Kranz, correctly, but I. 32 has δοκυμῶσ' for δοκυμῶσαι which is very hard to believe in. The discussion on the subject of the verb ἔστι in Parmenides (pp. 269-70) is most satisfying. But it is assumed rather than argued that for Parmenides reality actually is a sphere and does not merely resemble one. The Way of Opinion is presented as Parmenides' own view of what results when the sphere is filled with the Opposites. Though naturally not all will agree, this remains by far the best view of a most difficult problem and it is good to see it given expression here. On the στρέφαναι we are told 'it is fortunate that . . . Parmenides' astronomical system is of little importance; for it is virtually impossible to reconstruct', and that is all. This is simply running away from the problem, and is surprising in a work where so much emphasis is placed on the varying picture of the physical universe. There are several reasonable possibilities and if space was a consideration these could have been presented easily in a few diagrams.

In the treatment of Empedocles it is perhaps a weakness that the distribution of the fragments between the two poems is simply taken over from Diels — this prejudices the presentation of the relation between the two, and in fact makes the solution offered by Raven more difficult than it need be.

The history of thought after Parmenides is presented as wholly concerned with replies to the position maintained in the Way of Truth, and this gives a greater unity to the story than it is frequently given. In the Pluralists we see painful attempts, which were not altogether unsuccessful, so to reorganize the pre-Parmenidean world that it can still satisfy the intellect. The resulting picture is attractive. The sophists are excluded from the book on the ground that 'their positive philosophical contribution, often exaggerated, lay mainly in the fields of epistemology and semantics'. The real reason for excluding them may have been different, e.g. lack of space, but the reasons given are not good ones. It was through epistemology and semantics, just as much as through pluralism, that reasonable answers were produced to the challenge of Parmenides, and it is the work of the sophists which bridges the gap between the Presocratics and Plato.

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## PLATO'S ONTOLOGY

MAURICE VANHOUTTE: *La Méthode Ontologique de Platon*. Pp. 193. Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1956. Paper, 160 B. fr.

M. VANHOUTTE is concerned to argue 'la dualité de la méthode ontologique chez Platon': he sees a fundamental change in the Theory of Ideas after the *Parmenides*, both in the nature of Ideas and in their mode of being apprehended. In the earlier dialogues they are simple absolutes, to be known by immediate intuition; in the later they are complex 'relatives', constituted from 'higher kinds' (called γένη and εἶδη at *Parm.* 129, κοινά at *Theaet.* 185, μέγιστα γένη at *Soph.* 254, εἶδη at *Pol.* 285, and ὁδέα at *Phil.* 16) and apprehended in the process of their construction.

Vanhoutte's subject is one of the most important in Platonic studies today. He realizes that the party of 'dualité' has little following, especially among

English-speaking scholars, and sees himself as in the line of Stenzel and Robin, particularly the latter. It is unfortunate that his book, published in 1956, was to all intents and purposes completed in 1948. He was thus writing before the publication of, for example, Hackforth's *Phaedrus*, Skemp's *Statesman*, and N. Gulley's *Plato's Theory of Recollection* (C.Q., n.s. iv. 3-4). The book cannot be described as at all convincing. It is continuously extravagant, and invites disagreement at every turn.

Vanhoutte's procedure is first to deal very briefly, by means of a criticism of Festugière and Loriaux, with the partisans of 'l'unité', those, that is to say, who do not see a fundamental change in the Ideal theory in the later dialogues. Then, turning to 'la dualité', Vanhoutte argues that a change in Plato's ontology can be anticipated from observing a change in 'les éléments méthodologiques secondaires', for example Recollection which 'is quite obviously replaced by the theory of the communion of kinds'. Next, after a chapter devoted to 'la méthode intuitive' of the middle dialogues, a short chapter dealing with 'la crise méthodologique' of the *Parmenides* leads on to the final chapter 'la méthode synthétique'. It is in this last chapter that Vanhoutte develops his more important debatable views.

The turning-point, then, in Plato's ontology comes at *Parm.* 129 d-e: 'But were anyone . . . first to set apart by themselves the kinds, such as Likeness and Unlikeness, Plurality and One, Rest and Motion and so forth, and then show that *they* could be combined with one other or disjoined, I should *really* be surprised'. It is these 'kinds', according to Vanhoutte, with which we are concerned not only in *Theaetetus* and *Sophist* but also in *Statesman* and *Philebus*.

Vanhoutte considers the method of Collection and Division illustrated in *Phaedrus*, *Sophist*, and *Statesman* ('la dialectique mineure') no more than a logical exercise in abstract concepts without ontological significance. It is from the 'higher kinds' common to the intelligible and sensible worlds that Ideas are derived ('la dialectique majeure'). Vanhoutte, that is to say, interprets the *κονά* of *Theaet.* 185 as kinds 'common to intelligibles and sensibles' and thereby answering the difficulties raised about the two worlds in the first part of the *Parmenides*.

Vanhoutte describes the new ontology of the *Sophist* as follows: 'There are principles, of which the *Sophist* clearly does not give a full list, disposed in pairs . . . Plato calls them "the greatest kinds" because on the one hand, by establishing continuity among all the kinds they make their combination possible, while on the other . . . they are agents of division' (p. 127). (By calling the higher kinds 'agents of division' Vanhoutte means that each of them, considered by itself, possesses a peculiar function which distinguishes it from the rest.) By contrast the lower kinds (Ideas) combine, some of them with a few higher kinds, others with many, but none all-pervasively like the 'greatest' kinds. An Idea such as the Just is related to, among other higher kinds, (a) Being, because the Just is a 'portion of Being' and (b) not-Being, because the Just is related to (i.e. 'other' than) the not-Just, which is a 'portion of not-Being'. 'One could thus say that the lower kinds are syntheses of higher kinds.'

Vanhoutte continues this line of interpretation in the *Statesman* and *Philebus*. At *Pol.* 285 he does not recognize the method of Division, but imports the 'higher kinds' of the *Sophist*, as follows: 'In so far as these highest kinds are mutually opposed and unlike (*ἀνομούστητες*), nothing having existence is produced. Likeness or equality (*όμοιότης*), resulting from a suitable ratio being

established between them, forms complexes having existence. . . . If the equality is perfect, it produces what the *Statesman* calls "absolute accuracy", which could not be better designated than by the term "Idea" (p. 135).  $\alphaὐτὸς τἀκριβές$  at 284 d 2 is thus taken as a formula in accordance with which Ideas are constructed. 'The Beautiful is at the conjunction of Being and not-Being, Likeness and Unlikeness, One and Many, and so on.'

Vanhoutte rejects Hackforth's view of *Phil.* 16 that it represents the method of Division, and sees (p. 142) the passage as concerned with (a) 'beings which are said to exist always' (Ideas), which is how he translates  $\tauῶν ἀεὶ λεγομένων εἶναι$ , 16 c 9, and (b) 'their components, One and Many and . . . Limit and Unlimitedness' (common kinds). Here  $\epsilonὐ-πολλά$  refers to the number of pairs of opposed kinds involved in an Idea, and  $\piέρας-ἀπειρον$  to the number of possible points between the opposites in their various pairs.

Rather than pursue farther the details of Vanhoutte's exposition here, it may be more profitable to observe that his thesis that the method of Division is not the subject of *Phil.* 16-17 merits consideration. Hackforth's own admission is sufficiently striking: 'Unfortunately [Plato's] attempts to illustrate the method are more confusing than helpful: the first illustration is, indeed, a real one if we supplement its very brief statement by taking account of the details of the third; but the third itself is confused, and the second, as we have seen, is not in fact an illustration of dialectic at all' (P.E.P. p. 26).

But, to revert to Vanhoutte's thesis of the production of Ideas from common kinds, the question arises, which 'synthèses ontologiques' will in fact produce Ideas? Vanhoutte has to admit (p. 172) that there is no criterion. 'Tout cela, semble-t-il, est à charge de l'intuition.'

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### ARISTOTLE'S *PROTREPTICUS*

W. GERSON RABINOWITZ: *Aristotle's Protrepticus and the sources of its reconstruction*. (Publ. in Classical Archaeology, vol. 16, no. 1.) Pp. 195. Berkeley: University of California Press (London: Cambridge University Press), 1957. Paper, \$2.

SINCE Bywater's article of 1869 it has been taken for granted that we have considerable fragments of Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, and their number has tended to grow. Scholars, while admitting that there is room for argument about the extent of the Aristotelian passages and the degree of faithfulness with which the reporters reproduce them, have not thought it premature to raise problems of interpretation. The whole modern study of Aristotle's development rests on the assumption that such questions can profitably be raised. Now Mr. Rabinowitz comes forward to maintain that the extent of the known fragments is *nil*, so that the problems of interpretation do not at present arise.

He first gives a review of the opinions stated and arguments used since Bernays and Bywater, leading to the conclusion, which I do not endorse, that we have no solid ground under our feet and that everything is as yet unproved. He then proceeds to a careful examination of (a) the passages which the editors term *Testimonia* to the *Protrepticus*, two in Walzer's edition; and (b) the first

five fragments printed by Walzer. (These are: the alleged remark of Zeno to Crates; the *εἴτε φιλοσοφητέον* passages; a Stobaeus passage concerned with external goods; and two Iamblichus passages.) And this leads him to conclude, amongst other things, (i) that there is no proof that the *Hortensius* of Cicero was modelled upon Aristotle's *Protrepticus*; (ii) that Iamblichus was not a mechanical copyist, but has put together his material from a variety of sources. Even when a sentence coincident with one included in Iamblichus' *Protrepticus* is attributed by Proclus to Aristotle, Rabinowitz is ready to prove from numerous instances that we can place no confidence in Proclus' quotations.

The first thing which I would wish to say is that the picture of chaos and disagreement seems overdrawn. It is true that scholars have found it convenient to ignore arguments already brought against the positions they hold. But the divergences between them are not more remarkable than is normally the case when questions of evidence are mixed up with those of philosophical interpretation. And they are not symptomatic of a past error, that of recognizing Iamblichus and Cicero as sources, but spring from the complexity of the problems under discussion.

Secondly, the method pursued seems open to objection. When Walzer, systematizing the results of his predecessors, prints *nineteen* fragments of the *Protrepticus*, consisting in some cases of complementary passages from different authors, and when these are not given in order of assumed interest or importance, what can be the force of a refutation which fastens upon the first *five*, especially when this does not claim to demonstrate that the opinions expressed are *not* Aristotle's, but only that Bywater, Diels, Jaeger, and others have failed to demonstrate that they are? If a selection must be made, a criticism of this sort, written against the prevailing view, should surely concentrate on the five passages having the strongest apparent claim to Aristotelian authorship?

Thirdly, the Cartesian model of inference which Rabinowitz seems to have in mind is unsuitable to the subject. I mean that something essential is missed when each of the *Testimonia* and fragments is separately examined in its turn. In spite of all the thoroughness and acuteness which Rabinowitz brings to this examination, the impression remains that when the pieces of evidence at our disposal are brought together, a conclusion almost irresistibly follows. (I think, however, that even under the limitation imposed by the method, much could still be said in reply. For example, the verbal coincidences between the Iamblichus passages and the *Nicomachean Ethics* are often remarkable. Many of them have not, as far as I know, been pointed out, and comparison seems to show that Iamblichus has preserved the original train of thought.)

Let us look at the first of the *Testimonia*. Trebellius Pollio (4th century A.D.) says: 'Nec ignota esse arbitror quae dixit M. Tullius in Hortensio, quem ad exemplum protreptici scripsit.' Rabinowitz, following Hirzel and Hartlich, would translate 'which he wrote after the pattern of a protreptic discourse', and so would expunge this from the *Testimonia*. It must, however, be considered in connexion with the second of the alleged fragments. The Aristotelian commentators, headed by Alexander, tell us that Aristotle reasoned: *εἴτε φιλοσοφητέον, φιλοσοφητέον, εἴτε μὴ φιλοσοφητέον, φιλοσοφητέον*. (I cannot accept the view that this form of reasoning is due to Olympiodorus and is not guaranteed by Alexander.) Now we also hear from Lactantius that just this argument was employed against Cicero's *Hortensius* in the dialogue of that

name in reply to his attack on philosophy. Martianus Capella adds that the question whether one should philosophize was debated in the *Hortensius*. And if, to meet this, it is said that Cicero only took Aristotle as one of several Greek patterns in the genre in which he was writing, one can quote an instance of his reproducing the thought and expression of Aristotle in particular. Take some words which Augustine quotes from the *Hortensius*, Walzer *Protr.* fr. 17: 'Congruere enim cum cogitatione magna voluptas corporis non potest. Quis enim, cum utatur voluptate ea, qua nulla possit maior esse, attendere animum, inire rationes, cogitare omnino quidquam potest?'—and set this against *Ethics* vii. 1152<sup>b</sup>16–18. Is there any easier explanation than that Aristotle, summarizing prevailing views about pleasure, quotes from a work of his own which Cicero also had before him?

Now as to the passages from Iamblichus. Rabinowitz admits that there is Aristotelian material, and I think his quarrel is mainly with the prevailing idea that this is copied from a single lost work, of which a considerable part is therefore preserved. He seeks to show that Iamblichus transforms his material and combines one source with another, and that some of the sentiments in the alleged fragments are certainly his, and are incredible for Aristotle. Walzer fr. 4 (an injunction to treat the body as instrumental to the soul) could, he argues, be in part a condensed summary of a passage in the *First Alcibiades* and in part a reminiscence of the *Politicus*. But here I am inclined to commit him to the competent hands of M. Moraux, who, while recognizing that this idea occurs in the *Alcibiades*, has made out a strong case for its having been maintained in one of Aristotle's major dialogues, which could have been contemporary with the *Protrepticus*.

Lastly, fr. 5. Here we have three passages, two of Iamblichus and one of Proclus, partly coincident, and dealing with the rapid rise of the sciences. A problem presents itself about their interrelation, and relation to known passages of Plato and Aristotle. Rabinowitz holds that there is a reference to a theory about the derivation of mathematical entities, inspired by Speusippus, with which Aristotle clearly did not sympathize, but Iamblichus did. I believe that this depends upon reading too much into the expression *τὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐξ ἔκεινων ἔχοντα*, which might only be a loose way of describing ontological priority, and does not necessarily express the derivation of one series of things from another.

Some criticisms of detail. Pp. 42 and 43: 'that they are wretched *who value* their possessions more than the nature that is theirs uniquely'. The italicized words introduce an idea that is not in the Greek, *oīs* being simply a dative of ownership, 'people whose intrinsic worth is less than that of their possessions'. Again: 'Lack of education when conjoined with power *engendered by the externals* breeds folly', *τίκτει . . . ἀπαιδευσία δὲ μετ' ἔξοντος ἀνουαν*. Where do the words italicized come from, and what do they mean? P. 52 (note): I cannot see how it can be denied that Cicero says in *Ep. ad Att.* xiii. 19. 4 that a dialogue written in the Aristotelian manner was one in which the author appeared and kept control of the discussion. In the antithesis *ceterorum—ipsum, ipsum* must mean the writer, not 'the head of the school', and Cicero was not the head of a school. P. 43: 'can with natural propriety make use of *all the sciences*': the Greek has *πᾶσι* not *πάσαις*, 'all other goods'. P. 65, note 104: the phrase *ἀνθρώποις γὰρ διαλεγόμεθα, ἀλλ' οὐ θεοῖς* is Platonic (*Laws* v. 732 c), and the context explains its meaning. P. 73: *ὅ καὶ Αριστοτέλης πού φησιν*, does not mean

'which is Aristotle's assertion too, *somewhere*', but 'as Aristotle also, I think, says'. The reference therefore is not vague.

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## ARISTOTLE'S DIALOGUE ON JUSTICE

PAUL MORAUX: *A la recherche de l'Aristote perdu: le dialogue Sur la Justice*. Pp. xii+180. Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1957. Paper, 150 B. fr.

CICERO tells us that Aristotle *de iustitia quatuor implevit sane grandes libros*. And, sure enough, a work on justice in four books is placed by Diogenes Laertius first in his list of Aristotle's writings. But in modern collections of fragments this extensive work is poorly represented. From an allusion in Demetrius, *On Style*, we can infer that it was in dialogue form. From references by Lactantius, we can see that Carneades coupled it with Plato's *Republic*, for criticism in his famous discourses for and against justice. Another ancient opponent of the Aristotelian work was Chrysippus. But there is nothing at all, in the few passages printed by Rose, to show what these four long books were about.

M. Paul Moraux believes he has stumbled upon extensive traces of the dialogue in the form of a considerable block of teaching in Aristotle's own treatises, and undertakes to show that, when its central theme is thus identified, some echoes of it can be perceived in various later authors, who may not, however, have used it directly. Aristotle often refers to, and builds upon, a distinction between three types of authority: that exercised by the master over a slave, that exercised by the *paterfamilias* over members of the family, and the political authority which, ideally, is a rule of free and equal citizens over one another in alternation. In the first type, the master aims at his own good, and the slave is an instrument. In the other two, the ruler has in view the advantage of the governed.

The distinction is aimed at a remark of Plato's Eleatic Stranger in the *Politicus*, and is undoubtedly an Aristotelian novelty. Aristotle puts it to various uses. Of special interest is its application to the individual man, in such a way as to yield principles of ethics. The soul should by nature control the body with a despotic rule, or, to express the same point differently, should employ the body as an instrument. Within the soul itself, reason is the natural superior of the irrational, but its control should be that of king over subjects or father over children (cf. *E.N.* 1103<sup>a</sup>3 ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκονοτικόν τι).

When stating his distinction in the *Politics*, Aristotle says that it is one which is often made in the ἔξωτερικοί λόγοι—whatever that may mean. There is a strong impression that all this comes from some earlier work, in a popular style, in which an elaborate parallel was drawn between the organization of society and the inner organization of the good man.

Moraux proceeds to argue that this could most naturally be identified with the *sane grandes libri* on Justice. Firstly, the short passages already assigned by editors to this work can (or so he claims) be fitted into this train of argument. Secondly, we know, as has been mentioned, that Carneades coupled the work with the *Republic*, and this would be natural enough, supposing that the three-fold distinction had its original home there. Plato does not normally, for ethical purposes at least, maintain that the body is an instrument to the soul. But the

writer of the *First Alcibiades* does so; and, in any case, the analogy between the individual and society would be a striking point of resemblance between the *Περὶ δικαιοσύνης* and the *Republic*.

This is a bare sketch of a work which raises a number of interesting side-issues. Among later writers in whom the influence of the dialogue is traced are Plutarch, *de virtute morali*, and Cicero, *de republica* book iii, the latter of whom, it is thought, may have known it through a Stoic informant—even though he knew how large the books were.

It is, then, from Aristotle's evidence that this reconstruction is achieved. We still possess practically nothing in the form of actual quotation from the text of the work on Justice, nor do we know anything of the participants in the dialogue or the situation assumed.

That the ideas associated with the three kinds of rule were put forward in an early composition of Aristotle's I am fully convinced. But the arguments by which Moraux seeks to identify this with the work on Justice are hardly strong enough for their purpose. The affinity between the types of ruling and the few already acknowledged fragments is really visible only to the eye of faith. And an equally good case might perhaps be made out for assigning the kinds of rule to the work, in two books, *Περὶ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ*, from which both Cicero and Seneca seem to quote. This has the same title as the Platonic dialogue, by criticism of which the distinction arose, and the passages printed by Rose make it clear that Aristotle was here concerned with the positive value of *θημός* when properly subordinated to reason. This is only one facet of the argument arising from the three kinds of rule. It seems to me that the *Περὶ δικαιοσύνης* may have been devoted rather to the proof that Justice is advantageous, and that it may have been in this respect that it was compared with the *Republic*.

However this may be, Moraux's work, which is written clearly and with a sense of proportion, brings an important new factor into the debate concerning Aristotle's development.

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## THE BIOGRAPHY OF ARISTOTLE

INGEMAR DÜRING: *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition*. (Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia v.) Pp. 490; 1 plate. Gothenburg: Institute of Classical Studies, 1957. Paper, Kr. 32.

THIS large work is modestly described by its author in terms which imply that it is a sort of 'tidying-up' operation. In fact it is very much more than that and constitutes an original contribution to the study of Aristotle which is of considerable value. Part i provides new editions of the texts of all the ancient Lives of Aristotle in Latin and Greek, including fresh collations of nearly all the manuscripts—of which there are a considerable number—together with testimonia, introductions, commentaries, and general evaluations. In addition there is a briefer survey of some of the late medieval Lives. Part ii contains a survey of the Syriac and Arabian tradition, with texts presented in new English translations that have been checked by orientalists. Part iii contains about four hundred passages from ancient and medieval writers arranged according

to subject-matter and bearing upon different details or aspects in Aristotle's life. Much of this material is related to statements in the ancient Lives and it is necessary to study the tradition as a whole. Now for the first time this can be done pleasantly within the compass of a single volume. Finally Part iv gives a brief summary of results and conclusions.

It will be clear first of all that this will henceforth be the standard work of reference for all who are concerned with the ancient Lives. We are given in almost every case improved texts, fuller and more accurate apparatus critici, many new emendations, and in the parallel passages at the foot of the text the indispensable materials for comparison between one Life and another, and with the rest of the ancient tradition upon any one point. The arrangement and organization of the material is excellent and masterly. Secondly, the 'tidying-up' is considerable and provides us with a tentative but extremely plausible way of relating the various strands of the ancient tradition to each other. The picture that emerges may be summarized as follows. The *Vita Marciana*, the *Vita Vulgata*, and the *Vita Latina* all rest upon a neoplatonic epitome of about A.D. 500 prefixed to the edition of Aristotle in use in the school in Athens at that time. This epitome was an abbreviation of the Life by Ptolemy-el-Garib which was also the sole source for the Syriac and Arabic Lives. The tendency of Ptolemy's Life is the glorification of Aristotle, based on some typically neoplatonic conceptions. This Ptolemy cannot be the Ptolemy Chennos of first century A.D. (Ptolemy Σένος = Chennos = el Garib, i.e. *the stranger*), but he was probably an Alexandrian neoplatonist influenced by or belonging to the school of Iamblichus in the fourth century A.D. Ptolemy relied on Andronicus of Rhodes for the list of Aristotle's writings and the text of the Will, prefixed to the edition of Aristotle in the first century B.C. But rather strangely Düring doubts whether Andronicus actually gave a Life of Aristotle in addition to the Will and Catalogue. While certainty is impossible, it would seem more probable that the Will did in fact form part of a Life for Andronicus as well as for later writers.

An essentially different tradition is found in the *Vita Hesychii* (*Vita Menagiana*) and in the Life given by Diogenes Laertius. The main source here was the Life by Hermippus towards the end of the third century B.C. His object was entertainment and he did not hesitate to include slanderous material from the opponents of Aristotle and the Peripatos, although other material comes from Peripatetics such as Ariston of Ceos. This Ariston was the ultimate source from which P. Moraux, *Les Listes anciennes des ouvrages d'Aristote* (Louvain, 1951), derived the catalogues of Aristotle's writings which appear in the Lives. Düring rejects this thesis while paying a tribute to the value of Moraux's study for its detailed comments. He argues that the list represents an inventory of manuscripts acquired fairly soon after the Alexandrian Library was established and found and used by Hermippus later on. It is the essence of this view that in fact the Alexandrian Library contained additional Aristotelian works not in the original list but already there when Hermippus hit upon it. This is certainly possible but it remains strange that Hermippus did not take the occasion to present an up-to-date list.

It may reasonably be asked, how does this affect our understanding of Aristotle? First of all we are enabled to assess and correct points of detail in the biographical tradition. Thus, on the basis of a sentence in the Will preserved in the Arabic but missing in the Greek texts, Düring argues forcefully that

Nicomachus was Aristotle's legitimate son by his marriage with Pythias, and not illegitimate by Herpyllis, and that Nicanor was never his adopted son. In other cases it is now possible to see that particular statements are later additions or embroideries upon the biographical tradition. Of the greatest interest are the statements about the relations between Plato and Aristotle. It has for some time been Düring's thesis as against Jaeger that there never was a period when Aristotle adhered to and defended Plato's two-world doctrine and in particular that he never accepted  $\chiωριστὰ \epsilonἴδη$  but from the beginning thought of them as  $\epsilonἴνα$ . In a fascinating discussion which is bound to be treated as controversial Düring argues that just this is clearly and fully stated in the tradition. The statements that Aristotle at some point 'broke' with Plato are to be dismissed as part of the hostile tradition or as due to later attempts to harmonize Plato and Aristotle or rather to minimize the differences between them. Aristotle never opened a school of his own during the lifetime of Plato, but on the other hand there can hardly have been any question of his becoming head of the Academy either during Plato's absence or after his death. Aristotle in fact was never a 'Platonist'.

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### THE SCHOOL OF ARISTOTLE

FRITZ WEHRLI: *Phainias von Eresos, Chamaeleon, Praxiphanes*. (Die Schule des Aristoteles, Heft ix.) Pp. 115. Basel: Schwabe, 1957. Paper, 16 Sw. fr.

THIS is the penultimate part of Professor Wehrli's work. The remaining part will deal with Hieronymus of Rhodes and Critolaus, and will give a history of the Peripatos down to the first century B.C. with full Indexes. The three persons dealt with in the present part are all of somewhat minor interest. Phaenias of Eresos in Lesbos was a pupil of Aristotle and an almost exact contemporary of Theophrastus. He maintained an interest in logic, and it is to him that we owe the information that Polycrates, a contemporary of Plato, brought a form of the third-man argument against the theory of forms. This is important for the attitude of the Peripatos towards Plato, and it is a pity we are not given more help by the editor—add references at least to A. E. Taylor in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* vol. xvi (1916) = *Philosophical Studies*, ch. ii, Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides*, p. 89, and Wilpert in *Philologus*, xciv (1939), 51 ff. In addition Phaenias wrote on Plants, a work from which a handful of quotations survives, and on a number of historical subjects, including Solon and Themistocles, whence information has come to us through Plutarch, but it is difficult to form any very clear idea of his mind or work.

Chamaeleon came from Heraclea Pontica. This was the town of Heraclides Ponticus whom he accused of plagiarizing from his writings, but Chamaeleon must have been much younger, since he was still alive in 281 B.C., and the reverse might be the truth. His fragments were previously available only in an obscurely published article of 1856. He is chiefly of significance for his writings on literature, apart from some typical hellenistic treatises on moral subjects, such as Pleasure and Drunkenness. He wrote upon the *Iliad*, the *Odyssey*, Hesiod, Alcman, Sappho, Stesichorus, Lasus, Pindar, Simonides, Anacreon,

Thespis, and Aeschylus, and was clearly interested in the beginnings of Comedy and Satyr plays. He may have been the source of statements on these subjects which are found in some later Hellenistic writers, but this is only speculation.

Praxiphanes of Mytilene was said to have been a pupil of Theophrastus, and he later settled in Rhodes. He was clearly very well known as a literary critic. He wrote a dialogue 'On Poets' in which he introduced Isocrates talking to Plato on the estate of the latter, from which Diogenes Laertius naturally enough inferred a close friendship between Plato and Isocrates. The fragments were last edited by Professor Brink in *C.Q.* 1946, who showed conclusively that Callimachus' treatise *Πρὸς Πραξιφάνην* was an attack upon Praxiphanes from an anti-Peripatetic point of view. According to Apollodorus in his *Chronica* as cited by Diogenes Laertius (Praxiphanes fr. 5 Wehrli) Praxiphanes was 'heard' by Epicurus, and it has been supposed, e.g. by Bignone, *L'Aristotele perduto*, ii. 54 n. 1 and De Witt, *Epicurus and his Philosophy*, pp. 56-60, that this is correct and occurred in the period 321-311 B.C. It is no argument against this that Praxiphanes was later attacked by the Epicurean Carneiscus (Praxiphanes fr. 7). But Wehrli would follow Jacoby and Brink in doubting the story on chronological grounds—Praxiphanes was probably the same age or younger than Epicurus. This might be true, however, without excluding attendance by Epicurus at lectures given by Praxiphanes whether in Rhodes or Mytilene in order to learn about the thought of the Peripatos. Certainly Jacoby's explanation that Praxiphanes is miscopied for Nausiphanes gets no support from Diogenes Laertius who attributes both names to Apollodorus. As in the case of Phaenias and Chamaeleon we have only the most scanty fragments for Praxiphanes. Wehrli does what can be done to interpret them and to relate them to Peripatetic and Hellenistic themes. When it is a question of the historical truth of the statements in the fragments he is usually content to refer to discussions elsewhere or even to pass the matter over in silence. This makes for brevity in the commentary but does not always give the user the help to which he may reasonably regard himself as entitled.

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## A GREEK ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY

HJALMAR FRISK: *Griechisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch*. Lieferung 5, pp. 385-480; Lieferung 6, pp. 481-576. Heidelberg: Winter, 1957. Paper, DM. 8.60 each.

THESE two fascicles of Frisk's *Wörterbuch*, reaching *έορία*, bear further witness to the author's learning and industry. Like their forerunners they provide what is essential without recording every unacceptable conjecture or usurping the part of an Indo-European dictionary. At the present rate of progress the completion of the work will clearly take considerable time; but no greater speed can fairly be expected in the production of a volume which, in addition to the labour of compilation, presents special difficulties for printer and proof reader. The skill with which they have performed their tasks is seen in its admirable, though not complete, freedom from errors. There is again a number of omissions for which the reasons are not immediately obvious. For example, *εἴλος*, *εἴλεα* is not visible under either *εἴλεω*, and in general L.S.J. contains a few words

which are not to be found in Frisk (but see below). The range of these fascicules includes some words for which, or for cognates of which, an original initial *f* is attested in Hesychius as *γ*. These seem poorly represented. Frisk does indeed quote *γέλων*, but not *γελλίζαι*, *συνελήσαι* nor *γελίκη*, *ἔλιξ* nor the interesting *γέλλαυ*, *τίλαυ*. Yet the cautious reader will be slow to assert unconditionally that a word, especially a short word, is missing and not merely overlooked in the closely printed throng of forms, derivatives, references, and sometimes comments which constitute the first paragraph of the longer articles. Indexes of words, including Greek words, would much facilitate consultation of the complete volume.

As discussion of general linguistic principles has no place in a dictionary, Frisk is precluded from defending one to which he has recourse under *δρῶς* and *ἐπίορκος*, that the more usual or widespread of two forms or meanings is to be presumed the earlier; yet its validity is far from obvious. In the Indo-European field the impression is confirmed that Frisk, besides being no follower of laryngal theories, is reluctant even to mention views based upon them. Speculations of Specht and Schwyzer about the *ē-* of *ἔγείρω* are given, but none which accounts for it, and at the same time for the *η* of *ἔγριγορα*, in laryngal terms. Mycenaean forms are quoted in increasing numbers, and in the sixth fascicule 'mykenisch' replaces the regrettable 'āgāisch'. There are, however, still many cases in which possible Mycenaean evidence is not quoted: *διδάσκω*, *δίδωμι*, *δῖος*, *ἔγχος*, *εἴμι* (the Mycenaean forms are of prime importance for the history of this word), *εἰς*, *"Ἐκτωρ*, *ἔξ*, *ἐρενάω*, *ἔρυμαι*. Sometimes the Mycenaean form, even when cited, is not given due weight in discussion. Under *ἔλικη* Frisk gives *e-ri-ka* without remarking that, if correctly interpreted, it contradicts Corinna's *felukán* by its lack of *w-*. He makes no reference to the embarrassment caused by *e-ne-ka* for the accepted etymology of *ἔνεκα*.

Some details, of which the following are a selection, suggest themselves for discussion:

*διπετής*: is not its use with *οἰωνοί* influenced by similar compounds meaning 'flying' (so apparently L.S.J.)? *εἰλυφάω*: it is not clear from Frisk's reference that Chantraine considers this word to be merely a metrical variant for *εἰλυφάζω*, not an 'iterativ-intensive Bildung . . . mit Erweiterung zu -άζω'. 1. *εἴρω*: the explanation of the non-aspiration as due to the influence of the much commoner compounds *συνείρω*, etc., implies that psilosis was regular in prepositional compounds; but see Schwyzer i. 219. 2. *εἴρω*: it is not enough to refer to Schwyzer alone for the phonetic history of *εἴρημαι*; contrast Lejeune, *Traité de phonétique grecque* (1955), pp. 154 and 314. *εἰς*: there is no hint that this word is common in West Greek dialects. *ἔλινάω*: why need *ἔλινές* be an adjective, as Frisk implies, and derived from the verb rather than a substantive from which the verb is derived? *ἔδορα*: it is unsatisfactory to explain this as a 'Verbalnomen zu *ἔνδέρομαι* mit gleichzeitiger Beziehung auf δορά'; it is rather a case of 'Hypostase' (cf. *ἔμπορος*, *ἔξαλος*) from the phrase *ἐν δορᾷ* (or *ἐν δοράν*), whence *ἔνδέρομαι* on the approximate formal analogy of *δέρω*: *δορά*, and finally *ἔνδρατα* to *ἔνδέρομαι* as *δρατά/δαρτά* to *δέρω*. *ἐπίορκος*: *ἐπίορκέω* is compared in formation with *ἐπιθυμέω*, *ἐπιχειρέω*, and credited with an original meaning 'gegen den Eid handeln'; but the analogy of the parallels quoted suggests rather 'to swear an oath on (against) . . .' with subsequent development in accordance with Leumann's explanation. *ἐπίρροθος*: if from *ἐπί* and *ρόθος*, the semantic development here suggested, ' "lärzend auf jem.

zukommend" = "mit Lärm herbeieilend, zu Hilfe kommend", seems unusual and indeed far-fetched; perhaps another 'Hypostase' from *ἐπὶ ρόθον* ('hastening) towards the cry (tumult), analogous in meaning to the differently constructed *βοηθός*. It is, however, a weakness of this as of Frisk's explanation that *ρόθος*, unlike *ἐπίρροθος*, is not Homeric, and that a military context, in which the assumed semantic processes could best have started, is lacking or not specially characteristic for either word. *ἐπισσαῖ*: 'nachgeborene Töchter' is an odd translation, seeing that the little information on this word suggests a kind of lambs; cf. L.S.J. s.v. *ἐπισσαῖ*, *μέτασσαῖ*, and Hecat. 363 J (where in *αἱ ἐπιγιώμεναι τοῖς προγόνοις* comparison with *Od.* ix. 221 favours emendation to *ταῖς προγόνοις*). *ἐπιτηλίς*: Frisk does not mention an interesting chain of relationships which can be traced in L.S.J.; since (as he states) *ἐπιτηλίς* is from *τῆλις* 'fenugreek', it is noteworthy that the former word is said to mean 'horned poppy' while fenugreek is called also *βούκερας* and *ἐπίκερας*. *ἐρέικω*: Welsh *rhuwygo* 'to tear' has a claim to be cited here, *ἐρρα*, *ἐρση* (and some other words with inherited *-rs-* or *-ls-*): see now Kathleen Forbes, *Glotta*, xxxvi. 235 ff.

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## GREEK PROPER NAMES

FRANZ DORNSEIFF, BERNHARD HANSEN: *Rückläufiges Wörterbuch der griechischen Eigennamen*. Pp. 320. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1957. Paper, DM. 52.

ALL who have tried the fascinating game of restoring a lacunose text will welcome the appearance of yet another reverse index of Greek words. We have already E. Locker's *Rückläufiges Wörterbuch der griechischen Sprache* (Göttingen, 1944) and Buck and Petersen's *Reverse Index of Greek Nouns and Adjectives* (Chicago, 1944). To these is now added a Reverse Index of Greek Proper Names, planned by Professor Franz Dornseiff and executed by Dr. Bernhard Hansen. The need for such books is obvious; the reviewer need only comment on their execution.

The basis for any work on Greek proper names is the *Wörterbuch der griechischen Eigennamen* of Pape (3rd edition by Benseler, Braunschweig, 1863-70). This indispensable book is long out of date, but despite the existence of specialized indexes dealing with particular groups of documents, no attempt has been made at a thorough revision. In particular the epigraphic entries need to be checked and the references brought into line with modern publications; and this is the more necessary because improved readings have destroyed the basis of some entries. Hansen could of course make no attempt to verify all these references.<sup>1</sup> Unavoidable as the repetition of errors is, we may express the pious hope that some organization (for it is beyond the scope of a single scholar) will in due course undertake the production of a new Dictionary of Greek Proper Names.

Hansen has very properly added a number of other sources, especially the indexes of names from papyri. It is regrettable that he has not paid similar

<sup>1</sup> Thus the name *Ἐχάνθρα* is indexed from Pape-Benseler, though, having myself quoted it from that source, I have since dis-

covered that the correct reading is *Ἐνάνθρα*; see *S.G.D.I.* 2060.

attention to inscriptions, which give more information about onomastic in Greece proper. The long lists of Egyptian and Biblical names will be of little use to most students of Greek. A source book for inscriptions as a whole is lacking; but there are the well-known *Prosopographiae*<sup>1</sup> and the Indices Nominum of *I.G.* and *S.E.G.* It would not be fair to give the impression that this Reverse Index is as lacunose as the texts it is intended to help restore; but there are many gaps which might easily have been filled, and the user is recommended to take Professor Dornseiff's advice and have the book interleaved for additional entries.

Those interested in early inscriptions will regret the absence of many dialect forms and variants. *Ποσειδῶν*, *Ποσειδῶντ*, and *Ποτειδῶν* get entries, presumably because they are found in literary texts, while the inscriptional forms *Ποτειδά-*(*ρ*)*ων*, *Ποσοιδῶν* and *Ποχοιδῶν* are omitted. Names in -δας and -δης are listed separately, and there is surprisingly little duplication in the lists (i.e. both must be consulted in each case); but generally forms with *ā* for Attic-Ionic *η* are ignored, and *Μίλατος*, for instance, does not get an entry distinct from *Μίλητος*, although it is the normal form for the Cretan town.

A problem which confronts the editor of such a book is the extent to which fictitious names should be included. We should not expect an English dictionary of proper names to list such names as *Buzfuz* or *Dotheboys*, famous as they are. Yet similarly invented names like *Βοελυκλέων*, *Ψευδαρτάβας*, and *Νεφελοκοκκυγία* are here indexed; indeed the presence of *Συκοφάτης*, would suggest that the dramatis personae of Aristophanes had been well scanned. The principle on which *m(ythologisch)* is added to *P(erson)* is obscure; why does *Τρυγάτος* qualify for *Pm*, while *Ηρακλειοχαθίας* is merely *P*? Similarly the mark *S* (= *Schrift, Titel*) is used very sparingly and is not added in every case where a name is the title of a literary work; of the Platonic dialogues only *Συμπόσιον* is so indicated.

The names are listed in paragraphs, the ending of the words in each paragraph being given in the margin in bold type; the individual entries are listed in continuous lines across the page without their suffix. This causes some problems of accentuation. Since the rules are not explicitly stated, it may be worth recording them here. (i) Where the accent falls on the ending it is shown in the paragraph heading; but (ii) if a few entries have a different accent, this is indicated by an accent on the individual form (e.g., s.v. -μαῖος, *Ti-* indicates *Τιμαῖος*, but *Tί-* *Τίμαιος*). (iii)  $\acute{}$  or  $\circ$  indicates that the accent falls on the syllable following (or preceding in the case of endings). (iv)  $\acute{-}$  indicates an accent on the next syllable but one (similarly  $\acute{-}$  in the case of endings).

More confusing is the division of a continuous list into paragraphs which have no relation to the structure of the words so grouped. I can see no reason for two successive paragraphs headed -γία. Longer sections are broken up by adding more letters to the ending, although these must then be shed and the original entry repeated, thus: -εια is followed by -δεια, -θεια (some entries paroxytone), -εια, -θεια, -ιεια, -κεια, -άλεια, -λεια, -κλεια, -λεια, κτλ. Occasionally an unusual entry stands alone without marginal gloss (e.g. *Κνίζος*, *Γόρτυν* and *Ψύν*). *Iων* stands awkwardly under the marginal -αίων. Though

<sup>1</sup> Viz. J. Kirchner, *Prosopographia Attica* (Berlin, 1901-3); P. Poralla, *Prosopographie der Lakedaimonier* (Breslau, 1913); W. Peremans and E. Van 't Dack, *Prosopographia Ptolemaica* (Louvain, 1950-2); M. Mitsos, *Αργολικὴ Προσωπογραφία* (Athens, 1952); D. Kanatsoulis, *Μακεδονικὴ Προσωπογραφία* (Salonika, 1955).

one sympathizes with any attempt to keep down printing costs, the arrangement of Locker, giving whole words in vertical columns (the ends of the words being alined) is far more satisfactory. Separation into paragraphs, more on the lines of Buck and Petersen, would be justified if this represented the grouping of words formed alike. It would be interesting to see under *-λέων* which names contained the element *λέων*, which were derivatives of *λαός*, which of *κλέος*, and so forth. But this would cut across the basic principle of alphabetical arrangement, and for easy use an unbroken order is preferable.

These criticisms of method must not be regarded as invalidating the book as a very useful work of reference, for which many, papyrologists especially, will be grateful. We echo the compiler's regret that 'eine Vollständigkeit ließ sich bedauerlicherweise nicht erzielen'.

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### ΘΕΟΣ AND ΔΑΙΜΩΝ

GILBERT FRANÇOIS: *Le Polythéisme et l'emploi au singulier des mots θεός, δαίμονος dans la littérature grecque d'Homère à Platon*. Pp. 374. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1957. Paper.

THIS is a work of great industry (the author claims to have read for the purpose all Greek literature up to the middle of the fourth century B.C.), and limited scope. What is the meaning, among a people undoubtedly polytheistic in their beliefs, of words connoting 'god' or 'divinity' in the singular without reference to a particular individual god? This is the question which attracts the author, as it has attracted many before him, and his aim is to contribute to its elucidation by analysing and comparing texts from Homer to Plato in which appear the words *θεός* or *δαίμον* or the expressions *τὸ θεῖον* or *τὸ δαιμόνιον*. He proceeds author by author, dividing the quotations from each into two or three sections according to whether the subject is cult (worship and respect shown to the gods), theological conceptions (pronouncements about the nature and mode of action of divinity), or the intervention of the divine in nature and human affairs.

His general conclusion is that in the great majority of literary texts of the period, when *θεός*, etc., are used in the singular without reference to a particular god, the sense is simply collective. This is proved time after time by the use of *θεοί* either in the same context and with the same reference or in another passage from the same author where the sense is beyond reasonable doubt identical. François thinks that *δαίμον* used in this way generally = *θεός* or *θεοί*, though occasionally it may stand for an earlier notion, still surviving, of a more impersonal and amoral power which he designates *le Sort*.

A number of bubbles are pricked: for example the notion that Aeschylus intended any lofty monotheism by his use of the singular *θεός* is found not to stand up to a close examination of the instances.<sup>1</sup> In tragedy in general, François concludes that the use of (ό) *θεός* implies no tendency to abstract, unify, or purify the notion of divine power, but is simply an alternative for *οί θεοί*. For Pindar he qualifies this view. Although neither monotheist nor

<sup>1</sup> Although in general the author's acquaintance with relevant scholarly literature is very wide indeed, he does not seem to

know of Mr. H. Lloyd-Jones's article 'Zeus in Aeschylus' in *J.H.S.* lxxvi (1956), 55-57.

pantheist, his exceptionally frequent use of the singular does indicate an attempt not only to purify the idea of divine power but also 'exprimer d'une manière plus tangible l'unité réelle du monde divin'.

In a balanced discussion of Xenophanes, François decides that except where he takes pains to express his own, highly original conception of a single, immanent, and to some extent personal god (fr. 23-26), he conforms to the language of his age and literary genre. In fr. 1, v. 13 (against Jaeger and Vlastos), the *θεός*, though not named, is an ordinary individual god, as is indicated by the presence of his *βωμός* (v. 11). Other Presocratic philosophers use the words in a sense of their own, *θεός* as the expression of a philosophical pantheism and *δύναμις* to signify a force or motive principle.

The general conclusions are scarcely novel, but are given considerably more positive support against opposing views which are still quite strongly held. The use of singular expressions is found to give no evidence that any monotheistic conception was trying to make itself felt among the polytheism of cult and myth, and François repeats what has often (and rightly) been said before, that the 'problem' of monotheism or polytheism was no problem for the Greeks at least down to, and including, Plato.

The passages from Greek literature which form a great part of the book are quoted from published translations wherever these exist, otherwise in a version of the author's, with only the keywords of Greek (*θεός*, etc.) in brackets after their French equivalents. Since this is emphatically a work for scholars, it would have been better to quote the originals, to which constant reference is necessary if the results are to be properly assessed. The book could also be shortened with advantage, by cutting down discussion of views which are either well known or rather absurd, e.g. the suggestion (p. 40) that Homer, himself a polytheist, might have had the idea of attributing monotheistic sentiments to his characters.

On p. 107 *τὸ θεοῦ* seems an unusual expression, and in fact the text here translated (*Soph. O.C. 1694*) is *τὸ φέρον ἐκ θεοῦ*. Pp. 135 f. translate Eur. fr. 584

*εἰς τοι δίκαιος μυρίων οὐκ ἐνδίκων  
κρατεῖ τὸ θεῖον τὴν δίκην τε συλλαβάν*

as follows: 'Une seule Puissance est juste (*εἰς τοι δίκαιος*) : la Puissance divine (*τὸ θεῖον*) ; elle règne sur des milliers d'êtres injustes et se charge de la justice.' I suggest that the correct translation is quite different, namely: 'One just man outweighs ten thousand unjust with the gods and justice on his side.'

This is an uneven book, but manages to reach sensible conclusions and conveniently collects a large amount of evidence, which would, however, have been more useful in the original.

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### THE LATIN THEATRE

ETTORE PARATORE: *Storia del teatro latino*. (Estratto dalla 'Storia del teatro' diretta da Mario Praz.) Pp. viii+288. Milan: Dr. Francesco Vallardi, 1957. Paper, L. 2,500.

ITALIAN scholars have written prolifically about Roman drama in recent years, and Professor Paratore now adds to his personal total of contributions

a general chronological survey of the whole field—from Etruscan dancers by way of Plautus, Terence, and Seneca to the later Empire, with a final glance at the Middle Ages, and some remarks in passing on the literary influence of the extant plays in modern times. As part of an over-all *Storia del teatro*, the work is no doubt intended to be useful to readers whose main interest is outside classical antiquity, as well as to fellow experts and would-be experts. All but the shortest Latin quotations are translated, and the criticism is illustrated by longer passages in versions by the author and others. In the absence of plates or figures, what is said about theatres, costumes, and staging is relatively slight: much less concerned with these matters than Beare's *Roman Stage* (refer now to the second edition, 1955), the book is in fact less concerned with the plays as drama at all than either Beare's book or, in its different way, Duckworth's *Nature of Roman Comedy* (1952); what is most prominent, within the form of a literary history, is the author's attempt to bring out what he thinks is characteristically Roman about the Roman theatre, and to assess the works of its poets by the light of an over-all conception of their originality and artistic value.

Our earliest play of reasonably certain date is still the *Miles Gloriosus*, 205; thirty-five years earlier, in 240, Plautus was perhaps already in his teens when the production of a play or plays adapted from the Greek by Livius Andronicus laid the foundations of literary drama in Rome. Even these textbook dates are occasionally debated (most recently by H. B. Mattingly, *C.Q.* n.s. vii [1957], 159 ff.), but Paratore rightly sees no good reason to change them. What developments had taken place before 240 is still extremely unclear; but in an opening chapter Paratore, like Livy (vii. 2), does his best to reconstruct a tradition from Etruscan mimetic dancing to music, *uersus Fescennini, Atellana*, mime, and the kind of performances described by Livy as *impletæ modis saturæ*, whose existence he accepts. Even if we follow him in taking an optimistic view of the early development of popular comedy in Latin and its influence on all forms of literary drama, the achievement of the first known poets is remarkable. As Duckworth puts it, op. cit., p. 4, 'to transfer a literary work from one language to another was in itself a new idea and a bold undertaking at a time when the Latin tongue had not yet attained a truly poetic expression'. A major difficulty in assessing the work of the early Latin dramatists is that our modern notions of literary originality are largely inapplicable.

Another more concrete difficulty lies in the tendency of Greek and Latin studies to run separately at points where they should obviously meet. It seems unnecessarily parochial to remark on the development of a guild of poets and actors in third-century Rome 'in conformity with the profession of author-actor practised by Livius Andronicus' without any reference to similar guilds elsewhere (p. 25); it is wrong to say that *κόθορποι* were only worn by female characters in Greek tragedy and claim that their adoption by males was a 'notable reform' which the Romans introduced (no authority is given for this statement, p. 30). At pp. 57 ff., 68, 148 and elsewhere, in considering early Roman poets' taste in Greek tragedy, it would have been worth referring to the evidence for the later Greek tragic repertory and for productions in south Italy and Sicily which has recently been discussed by T. B. L. Webster, *Hermes*, lxxxii (1954), 294 ff., and *Greek Theatre Production* (1956), pp. 101 ff. The lack of adequate background information is felt most strongly in the treatment of writers of *palliatæ*, where no systematic attempt is made to distinguish

different kinds of plot, characters, and character-drawing, and where much of what is said about Menander and his fellow authors is coloured by being placed in a context of polemic against the untenable view that the Latin poets were no more than incapable translators (e.g. pp. 85 ff., 173 ff.); on 'Toscuro e mediocre Apollodoro' (so much so, apparently, that he could not have been responsible for the higher qualities of the *Hecyra*), cf. Anon. *de com.* (ii. 15 Kaibel) who reckons him among the six most notable poets out of sixty-four who wrote New Comedy.

In Plautus Paratore recognizes the 'voce genuina della drammaturgia latina, voce risuonante ancora del timbro di una caratteristica tradizione autoctona' (p. 2), and the major part of the section on that author is devoted to an appreciation of those qualities of ebullient comic vigour which distinguish his work. A brief comparison is made between the soldier and parasite scenes at the opening of *M.G.* and Terence, *Eun.* 391 ff. (the suggestion that both may come from the same original is quite unconvincing); other good illustrations include Chrysalus' great *canticum* at *Ba.* 925 ff., Ballio at *Ps.* 133 ff., Truculentus and Astaphium at *Truc.* 256 ff., and two quotations from the scene of *Curculio* with the enticement of Leaena and Phaedromus' serenade to the door; unfortunately the major problems of Plautine chronology and originality which are raised do not progress towards useful solutions within the very general terms of the discussion.

The keynote of the discussion of Terence is the emphasis which is placed on his *humanitas*, leading in particular to a high estimate of the *Hecyra* and of Terence's originality in its composition. On the detail, more use could have been made of what we know from Donatus and elsewhere about Terence's treatment of specific passages and situations of his originals; on the general assessment, apart from the works quoted on p. 162, one may now compare K. Büchner, *Humanitas Romana* (1957), pp. 35 ff. The prologues of the six plays throw some light on the literary atmosphere in which Terence worked, and Paratore's account of the Golden Age of the Roman Theatre gives a fair share to the lost contemporaries and successors of the two surviving comic poets, and to the tragedians (in whom he tries to find hints of what is to come in Seneca), as well as to what little is known of *praetexta*, *togata*, and literary *Atellana* and mime.

It is hard to say briefly what drama meant in the late Republic and under the Empire in its various roles of spectacle, literature, inspiration for decorative art, and vehicle for rhetoric and philosophy. Paratore is rightly sceptical about the view that Seneca's tragedies were written for theatrical production, though he adduces the contemporary taste in sanguinary spectacles as a factor to be taken into account in considering their scenes of horror (pp. 247 f.). Dismissing the *Octavia* from the corpus, he argues on the basis of some of his earlier studies that the remaining plays are all genuine, and can be arranged in an artistic and chronological series beginning from the *Hercules Oetaeus*: he is convinced in so doing that 'la migliore poesia tragica di Seneca è condizionata da un profondo senso dell' umano' (p. 256). As with the treatment of Plautus, the argument from a logical to a chronological order is involved with major difficulties both of principle and of detail; it does incidentally bring out some useful points, but rests on too many unexplored assumptions to carry conviction.

It may be that those who do not share the present reviewer's considerable reservations about this bold attempt to see the Roman theatre whole will be

prompted by it to further investigations of their own. They will find generous, though unevenly selected bibliography throughout the text and notes, and will be impeded, like anyone but the most casual reader, by the lack of an index of any kind.

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### THE SATIRES OF HORACE

Q. Horatius Flaccus: *Satiren*: Erklärt von ADOLF KIESSLING. Sechste Auflage erneuert von RICHARD HEINZE, mit einem Nachwort und bibliographischen Nachträgen von ERICH BURCK. Pp. xlv+413. Berlin: Weidmann, 1957. Cloth, DM. 14.

HEINZE's fifth edition of what was originally Kiessling's *Satires* appeared in 1921, and was particularly enriched by the section on metre. The present volume completes the reprint of his Horace. As with the other two, Erich Burck has appended his own critical survey of work published since, and handy, if admittedly incomplete, bibliographies. The English editions of Horace are now more than sixty years out of date, and anyone seriously studying his work would be well advised to take Heinze-Burck for basis. Burck's own sensible assessments inspire confidence.

Studies since 1921 relating to the *Satires* have continued to feel the impetus imparted to them by Marx's new edition of Lucilius (1904), and by the realization of the contribution of Hellenistic popular philosophy, which characterized in particular Lejay's excellent edition of 1911 as well as Heinze's. But Heinze was also one of those who have emphasized the originality of Horace in the use he made of tradition.

The first section of the *Nachwort* deals with the text. It is interesting to learn (p. 355) that W. Peters, a pupil of Knoche, in a 1954 Hamburg dissertation, has shown grounds for taking Kiessling's Q group as seriously as his  $\Xi$  and  $\Psi$ , since it too (though contaminated by them) goes back to antiquity and reflects a tradition of which traces can also be found in the Blandinianus *Vetustissimus*. Of recent texts, Klingner's agrees most often with Heinze's. We may take i. 1-4 as a sample.<sup>1</sup> Heinze seems wrong, as against Klingner, to read *cupimus* at 3. 56 (for *furimus*, Goth.), right to read *non, non* (for *non hic*) at 4. 53. Both seem wrong in preferring *adfixit* to *adfixit* at 1. 81. Several good emendations of passages which cannot really stand as they are have been overlooked or rejected by all recent editors: 1. 66, *si sibilat* (Palmer); 3. 103, *uerba, quibus sensus, uocesque, notarent* (Housman: hyperbaton); 4. 14, *numero* (Horkel). At 1. 108 they reject the manuscripts' reading *ut*, which Heindorf showed to be right (*-ne ut, cf. utne*, exclamatory, 'can it be that . . . ?'; *auarus = ob auaritiam*), and at 1. 87 *an sic* (Goth.), which Reisig adopted, putting query at *amicos* and full stop at *frenis*. One may share Fraenkel's regret (*Horace*, pp. 139 n., 384) that Heinze and other editors do not use indentation to make clear what they take to be the organization and trend of thought (even though Horace was sometimes at pains to disguise this in the interests of naturalistic *sermo*).

New light on Horace's predecessors and successors has thrown his own

<sup>1</sup> I am here indebted to Housman's lectures.

individuality into relief. The continuing controversies over the original meaning of *satura* and the early development of the genre are barely relevant; more important is the increased knowledge and understanding of Lucilius, to which Terzaghi's massive work (1934) bears witness. Fiske (1920) is a useful basis for the study of his influence on Horace, but this will prove a matter of criticism rather than expansion. In an unpublished Dublin dissertation on *Horace on Lucilius* N. Rudd has done much to disencumber and elucidate controversial points in i. 4 and 10 and ii. 1. On *paupertas impulit audax ut uersus facerem* he criticizes Heinze's view (p. xiv) that Horace was never bitter over his poverty, and Fraenkel's (p. 14) that he did not hope to profit financially from his verse. (To bibliographical references to him add *Hermath.* 1956 and 1957; *Mnem.* 1957.)

Fraenkel's book was available for this volume, and his chapters iii and iv are the most important study of the *Satires* themselves in this period. In his view Horace began (i. 1-3) by taking themes from previous literature or popular philosophy and enlivening them with topical allusions or attacks on people who were either dead or unimportant, and ended by realizing the value of Lucilius' work as autobiography and setting himself to what was largely self-portraiture and became more essentially so in the *Epistles* (pp. 152-3). There is much in this; but Burck, following others, has questioned the uniformity of this development (pp. 386-7). Fraenkel has chosen to deal at length only with *Satires* 1 and 6 from Book ii. The others would have blurred the impression. Thus no. 5 heralds (as he himself notes) Juvenal, not the autobiographical *Epistles*. On the subject of i. 1 he has corrected Heinze (pp. 92-93). It is not a contamination of diatribes on *μεμφυοιρία* and *φιλοπλούτια*, for in Hellenistic popular philosophy the latter figures as primary cause of the former. Of particular interest is his demonstration of what the element of dialogue, so prominent in *Satires* ii, owes to Plato (4. 1, cf. *Phaedrus* 228 b; 8. 4, cf. *Tim.* 17 b; in addition to 2. 2, cf. *Symp.* 177 a, as adduced by Heindorf).

There is room for a new commentary on Horace, and one in English is badly needed. Meanwhile Burck and the publishers deserve our gratitude for keeping us going with the next best thing.

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### SALLUST'S *JUGURTHA*

A. D. LEEMAN: *Aufbau und Absicht von Sallusts Bellum Jugurthinum*. (Med. der K. Ned. Akad. van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, N.R., Deel 20, No. 8.) Pp. 33. Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Mij., 1957. Paper, fl. 2.

This is the third *Aufbau* of the *B.J.* to appear in four years. It would be pardonable to suppose brevity to be the only virtue it could lay claim to: in fact, brevity is its only fault. This is a valuable discussion of Sallust's methods, at once simpler and more profound than either of its predecessors.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> K. Büchner, 'Der Aufbau von Sallusts Bellum Jugurthinum', *Hermes* Einzelschriften, Heft ix (1953); K. Vretzka, 'Studien zu Sallusts Bellum Jugurthinum', *Österr. Ak. d. Wiss.* 1955.

In 1953 Büchner opened a new chapter in Sallustian studies with his description of a *B.J.* divided into sections, each separated from the others by an excursus, and each with its own leitmotif. In 1955 Vretska, working independently, published remarkably similar conclusions. Leeman accepts the validity and importance of structure analysis as a method ('Das *B.J.* zu interpretieren, bedeutet seine Gestaltung zu verstehen'); he admits his debt to the pioneer work of Büchner and Vretska, and has his own contribution to make to the framework of the monograph. But he differs radically from them both in his attitude to Sallust as an historian and in his interpretation of the succeeding themes of the *B.J.* He rejects their hypothesis, adopted in opposition to the 'political bias' view, that Sallust is first and foremost a 'moral' historian, and is rightly critical of the absurdities of interpretation, and indeed of translation, into which they are driven in order to maintain their own view and to allow no handle for their opponents.

Leeman believes that previous views of Sallust have been oversimplified, that Sallust is a complex character, and that it is inviting failure to treat him as simply a party hack, or simply a moralist, or simply an artist. Specifically he believes that Büchner and Vretska have been over-impressed by the moralizing of the prologue, and that while Sallust's philosophizings are important for him, and for our understanding of him, they do not dictate the characteristics of his historical writing. 'Für mich ist Sallust mehr Geschichtsphilosoph als Moralist' he writes, and much of the value of this essay lies in its attempt to elucidate Sallust's attitude to his work.

The general outlines, as marked by the three excursions, are necessarily as before, but the ruling themes are, for Leeman, different. Leaving aside the *Vorgeschichte*, the three phases of the war which follow each excursion in turn are as follows:

Phase 1 (cc. 20-40). *Avaritia nobilitatis*: the war first postponed by corrupt politicians at home, then mismanaged by corrupt generals in the field.

Phase 2 (cc. 43-77). *Superbia nobilitatis*: Metellus' lack of success; Marius and the first effective challenge to the political pretensions of the *nobles*.

Phase 3 (cc. 80-114). *Fortuna*: the triumph of the *virtus* of Marius.

By adopting a less mechanical framework, Leeman is able to show a subtler craftsman at work. When we find that Sallust does not keep rigidly to his divisions, the answer is not to cast around for a more comprehensive leitmotif which will embrace the extraneous matter, but to assume that the displacement aims at deliberate effect. For example, the declaration of war might be expected to follow immediately after the first excursion in c. 20; it does not occur until c. 27, and cc. 20-26 belong strictly to the *Vorgeschichte*. Leeman argues that this serves to emphasize its belatedness. Again, the final actions of Metellus follow the third excursion and so intrude into the section *Marius-fortuna*, a fact which leads Vretska to look for the new element in the situation elsewhere, and to provide this section with the unlikely title of 'Rome at war with Jugurtha and Bocchus'. These two or three chapters on Metellus cannot alter the fact that Phase 3 is about Marius, and it is surely enough simply to say so. But Leeman seeks to explain, and his explanation is not entirely satisfactory. He thinks it possible that the *Leptis* excursion is not a dividing line but the central point about which the drama of the rivalry between Metellus and

Marius revolves. He fails to make it clear what organic function as a central point the excursus has, apart from merely being at the centre.

For Leeman the main theme of the *B. J.* is the *superbia nobilitatis*, of which Metellus is the type, and the first successful challenge to it in the person of Marius (5. 1 *tunc primum superbiae nobilitatis obviam itum est*). This interpretation throws the *B. J.* back into the field of party politics. The consequent problem of bias, which Büchner and Vretska avoided largely by ostrich tactics, he faces squarely and answers convincingly, allowing the smaller faults of partiality and denying the grosser. He believes that Sallust comes to the saddening conclusion that it is only the *insolentia* of a Marius which can break the *superbia* of an entrenched oligarchy: he regrets the methods which the *populares* are driven to, and shows them corrupted in turn by power. If this is true, then Sallust is revealed as a rather profounder political thinker than is usually allowed.

A second theme running through the monograph is *virtus*, and the problem of what crowns human endeavour with success: not inefficiency (Phase 1), nor *consilium* without *fortuna* (Phase 2: Metellus), but *fortuna* (Phase 3: Marius). This leads to an important concluding section in which Leeman discusses Sallust's views on the relationship between *virtus* and *fortuna*; he makes two points, that the philosophical and practical imports of *virtus* are two different things for him, and that his view of the power of *fortuna* over human affairs is a changing one.

Leeman's sensible and sensitive approach to his author inspires great confidence. He treats the Latin of Sallust with respect (e.g. it is refreshing to find that a plain, straightforward phrase like *haud dubie iam vixit* (102. 1), bears a plain, straightforward meaning). He avoids selective quotation, and, in general, he impresses one with what has all the air of an intuitive understanding of Sallust's plan. Büchner and Vretska are the Ugly Sisters, struggling into the glass slipper amid dismembered toes and heels: Leeman fits in with the inevitability of truth. One feels that Leeman's *Aufbau* is Sallust's *Aufbau* too.

There are a few minor misprints; on p. 15 two chapter references are misquoted, and on p. 26 the footnotes are wrongly numbered.

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## CICERO'S TRANSLATIONS FROM PLATO

ROLAND PONCELET: *Cicéron traducteur de Platon: l'expression de la pensée complexe en latin classique*. Pp. 401. Paris: De Boccard, 1957. Paper.

THIS interesting and provocative book has a wider scope than its title suggests. Professor Poncelet's concern is with Latin as a medium for expressing philosophic thought, in so far as this can be studied in Cicero; and although he begins by examining Cicero's translations from Plato, and in particular from the *Timaeus*, he extends his investigation to more original passages from, for example, *De Finibus* and *Tusculans*. He also conducts a lively polemic against current French opinion, which declares Latin to be an eminently 'analytical' language that became steadily more capable of 'abstraction', and claims Cicero as the creator of modern philosophical language. His own somewhat paradoxical view is that it is just the inability of classical Latin to express ideas that constitutes its value, by requiring a violent mental effort of the reader.

'Grâce à son infirmité, par impuissance à décrire, le latin ne pouvait être qu'un appel à l'esprit militant de chacun. Le latin ne transmet pas le sens, mais l'esprit en action.'

Poncelet starts with a fruitful approach. What Cicero omits when translating reveals what he finds it difficult to express, and the first obstacle is the Greek preposition, whether in a phrase or as a prefix. In particular it appears that whereas Greek easily combines in one clause prepositional phrases expressive of different relations, Latin does not; the absence of parallels to such compounds as *ἀντ-απο-δοῦναι* is significant. Cicero normally omits all relations but one; even a single prepositional phrase is often suppressed, or replaced by a verb or by an instrumental ablative, which may carry a verb with it. If the verb is taken at its face value, the sense is inevitably modified. Moreover, to repeat the same verb as a substitute would be stylistically intolerable, as the repetition of a preposition is not; hence Latin cannot assign a single phrase to a single concept. Nor does Cicero attempt to give any precision to his inadequate prepositional resources: he uses them interchangeably and capriciously, and often not to express definite relations but as grammatical devices to string words together. The business of abstract thought is the expression of relations: hence the importance of prepositions in Greek philosophical writing. Abstract thought has little to do with the use of 'abstract' nouns, and to list such nouns invented or used by Cicero proves nothing about the capacity of Latin to convey abstract thought. Even so the words usually quoted in this connexion, *qualitas*, etc., were stillborn in his vocabulary. It is to be noted, moreover, that the singular abstract noun remains intractable: it passes muster in a series, or in antithesis to another abstract, but if isolated needs some explanatory backing, often a determining genitive (*ἐπιστήμη*: *cognitio rerum*). This determinant will sometimes not sustain logical analysis (cf. *de finibus bonorum et malorum*, a phrase on which there is a lively excursus). It is to be noted that many Ciceronian 'abstract' nouns function as verbs (*doloris amatio successionem efficit uoluptatis*).

The second great difficulty found by Cicero is the lack of an article, and his palliatives breed confusion, e.g. *omne* may represent either *πᾶν* or *τό*. A common substitute is a relative clause, leading to the overwork of this construction, which is also needed to render compound and other words which lack a Latin equivalent. But *qui*-clauses are little used to render participles, in which Latin poverty is notorious; the commonest substitutes are finite verbs, resulting in mere juxtaposition and therefore less precise relating of ideas. On the other hand subordination by the use of *ut* and subjunctive, and co-ordination by *ut . . . ita*, are carried to such lengths that we must often recognize in them grammatical devices to make a sentence rather than the expressions of any true relations.

Poncelet further shows that a principle of compensation frequently operates: if something cannot be translated there is a substitution (*δ τόδε τό πᾶν γεννήσας*: *is deus qui omnia genuit*); where something cannot be adequately expressed, some kind of 'expressiveness', e.g. doubling, chiasmus, emotive words, is called in to make up. As Poncelet remarks in another context, 'un bon moyen de paraître riche quand on souffre de la pauvreté, c'est de produire aux yeux en même temps tous les biens dont on dispose'. Thus what one says is partly determined by what it is easy to say (and let the *Quellenforscher* beware!). On the other hand a translation must be commensurate with the original; so when

swollen by forced periphrases and compensatory additions, it will avoid prolixity by abandoning phrases that appear inessential, yet supply important nuances. There are most interesting comparisons of *Republic* 571 c with *De Div.* i. 61 (note the far-reaching consequences of replacing active participles by passive), 329 a with *De Senectute* 6-8, and 359 a with *De Officiis* iii. 38. In each passage Cicero may be adapting rather than formally translating, but what he changes is what would be linguistically awkward to retain. 'La philosophie sur le sol latin échappe à la contrainte des idées et subit les dictats de la grammaire.' Poncelet will therefore have nothing to do with the idea that 'Cicero could have written differently'. Perhaps Cicero could not, but Poncelet admits that he sometimes strove against the genius of the language; might not another have striven even harder? His *thèse complémentaire*, not reviewed here, deals with Chalcidius as a translator; it would be interesting if he would also compare the methods of Cicero with those of Seneca—and of Lucretius, with whom Cicero has something in common.

Finally Poncelet maintains that Latin vocabulary is marked by a conceptual vagueness and imprecision. There is no attempt to distinguish between concepts by assigning each its own symbol. On the contrary Cicero's principle of identification is *erit notius quale sit pluribus notatum vocabulū idem declarantibus* (not synonyms, but words which give a pointer to the required concept). Now since each of these words can be subsequently used either in its proper sense or as a sign for the new concept, there is no stable vocabulary. This part of the book is the least satisfactory. The number of Ciceronian texts adduced is inadequate and their treatment marred by misconceptions. This cannot be demonstrated briefly, but one may instance the almost unbelievable use made on pp. 318-19 of *ea quae Zeno aestimanda . . . eadem illi bona appellant*. Indeed Poncelet is from time to time too excited by his thesis to examine his foundations; e.g. on p. 120 he explicitly builds on the supposition that *per se praeposita* = *καθ' αὐτὰ ληπτά* and *propter se sumenda* = *δι' αὐτὰ προηγμένα*. He can no more really believe this than that *νοητά ζῷα* means 'êtres doués d'esprit' (p. 71) or that '*ζῷων τὸ θεοσεβέστατον*, c'est l'univers' (p. 78), but in each case Cicero's innocent knuckles are rapped. On p. 160 it is not noticed that Cicero's translation of *Timaeus* 41 a, although not agreeing with our manuscripts, has the support of Proclus, Philo, and half a dozen other ancient writers. Such things make one feel that Poncelet's approach is one-sided, and one would like to see him supplement this book with another to show what Cicero *achieved* with his inadequate tools. Meanwhile no Latinist or historian of Hellenistic philosophy should disregard this book, which contains a wealth of acute observation and challenging reflection; the foregoing account is more a sample than a summary.

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### THE 'CONCESSIVE' IN LIVY

EINO MIKKOLA: *Die Konzessivität bei Livius, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der ersten und fünften Dekade*. Eine syntaktisch-stilistische Untersuchung. (Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae, Ser. B, Tom. 107. 1.) Pp. 181. Helsinki: Finnish Academy, 1957. Paper, mk. 900.

In describing a complex situation, one may assume, the conscious stylist will employ syntactical means to show the logical relations of the parts of his state-

ment; and, if this is so, the critic in his turn may attempt to classify syntactical usage in terms of the formulation and expression of his author's thought. This method has been applied to Sallust and Tacitus, and it should hold good for Cicero and Livy. Along these lines Mikkola has undertaken the examination of Livy's 'concessive' usage in the First and Fifth Decades.

Mikkola begins with a general definition. Where in a given situation a particular event appears to take place in spite of the circumstances, the relationship of situation and event in the writer's mind is 'concessive' and may be represented syntactically. Instances are classified under the following heads: 'adjectival', where a noun is qualified so as to indicate a situation despite which an event takes place, e.g. vi. 38. 10 'quem quid creari attinebat ad id certamen quo M. Furius victus esset?' (*id . . . quo* representing *tale . . . quali*); 'sociative', with the ablative, especially the ablative absolute, in a 'concessive' sense; 'comparative' (*ut . . . ita, quam . . . tam*); 'temporal' (*cum, cum tamen*); 'conditional' (*si, etsi*); 'permissive', in a general sense (*quicunque, quamvis, quamquam*) or in a particular sense (concessive subjunctive or imperative); 'reservative' (*dum, dummodo*); 'limitative' (*quidem*); 'reversal' whether direct (*tamen*), connective (*ceterum, neque, sed*), or restrictive (*certe, saltem, utique*); 'responsible' (*et* in the sense of *etiam, et . . . et tamen*, and *asyndeton*). These are useful categories, based on sound evidence. The only difficulty is to decide how far one may generalize about 'concessive' usage from instances in which other aspects of the relationship of situation and event are present.

Can one go behind the syntax to the actual relationship of situation and event and the author's conception of it? Here the evidence may be less firm. Even if the context of a situation may be defined with some objectivity, it is important to show how this has been done. As for the mental context of a writer's work, when this can only be inferred from his words, it is even more important to indicate by what principles any argument has been carried on. Mikkola defines 'antinomies' or the 'objective' and the 'logical' antithesis of a 'concessive' relationship. The former corresponds to the situation in terms of Roman life, e.g. 'dignitative', as when something happens to a man despite his position (or *dignitas*); the latter corresponds to the mental context of Livy's thought, e.g. 'alogical', as when an action is regarded as unreasonable. Here his treatment is inadequate; for he has not indicated his method of inference or proceeded far enough in his classification.

Mikkola illustrates his syntactical classification copiously from the First and Fifth Decades. Although he handles each instance sensitively, his attitude is too subservient to the manuscripts, especially where in the Fifth Decade we depend on one uncial manuscript. There is no need to give any benefit of doubt to typical uncial errors. Then he goes on to generalize from his classification by tabulating instances under *narratio, oratio recta* and *obliqua*, in the First and Fifth Decades respectively. This is to ignore the shades of distinction in 'concessive' usage where 'sociative', 'temporal', and similar aspects are involved, often with equal emphasis. A quantitative survey must be based upon units that minimize qualitative complications. Then, although the distinction of *narratio* on the one hand and *oratio recta* and *obliqua* on the other is a good one, Livy's style also varies in different parts of the *narratio*, e.g. in formal notices, simple reports of operations, and elaborate 'periodic' descriptions. When Mikkola argues that if Livy wrote the Fifth Decade about fifteen years after beginning the First Decade his style might show some signs of development in

'concessive' usage, we may admit that Livy was feeling his way in the First Decade but doubt whether the classes of 'concessive' usage outlined above can indicate any development in style unless they are referred in more detail to the various elements of his narrative.

Coming to his results Mikkola notes that the 'explicit' types of 'concessive' usage (*quamquam*, etc.) are rarer in Livy than in Cicero. Does an historian, then, use the associative forms more than an orator? He finds twice as much 'concessive' usage in Livy's *oratio recta* and *obliqua* as in his *narratio*. Does this point to the same conclusion? 'Concessive' usage drops by 26 per cent. in the Fifth Decade, presumably (he remarks) because of the dryer annalistic style. Yet Livy has dry material in the First Decade and full-blooded description in the Fifth. As to the frequency of his classes of usage, their order seems to be the same, except that the Fifth Decade shows less 'associative', more 'limitative', usage. What can this mean, unless we study the instances in these mixed classes in their context? Finally, how would Mikkola relate Livy's 'antinomies' to his stylistic expression? Mikkola has a great deal of valuable material in this work, and he could add to its effect by using more thorough methods of analysis. Then it would be interesting to see him make a comparison of 'concessive' usage in Livy and Sallust or Tacitus.

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### PLINY'S NATURAL HISTORY xxvi

Pline l'Ancien: *Histoire naturelle*, livre xxvi. Texte établi, traduit et commenté par A. ERNOUT et R. PÉPIN. (Collection des Universités de France.) Pp. 129 (18-72 double). Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1957. Paper.

IN this volume Dr. Pépin has been largely responsible for the translation and, together with Canon P. Fournier, has assisted Professor Ernout in connexion with medical and botanical matters. Ernout is modestly reticent as to his own contribution. He has written a short but illuminating preface, in which he draws attention to the recurrence of the idea of 'sympathy' between plants of certain names or shapes with the affections that are treated by means of them. He has also edited the text, compiled the critical apparatus, and drafted the commentary. He pays a graceful tribute to his collaborators, thanks to whom 'cette édition présente, en ce qui concerne la nomenclature, un progrès certain sur les éditions antérieures'. It should be noted, however, that these words were written without any knowledge of Dr. W. H. S. Jones's vol. vii of the Loeb edition, which appeared when the present volume was in print, but not yet published. So far as the identification of plants is concerned, it is reassuring to find that the conclusions reached in the two volumes very largely agree. Honours in this respect appear to be even.

Ernout has introduced a few new readings: 2 *in altius* gives good sense and is neat, and the same is true of 67 *cetera idem*, 116 *⟨dandam⟩ drachmam* and 167 *⟨item⟩ soncum* are attractive because they provide a smoother text. The same applies to the old emendation *⟨qua⟩*, which is adopted in 138. One wonders, however, to what extent such a criterion should be allowed to operate in a book where the style is so often slovenly and rough. In 65, where *impositus*, agreeing with *sucus*, would be expected, Ernout defends *impositum* by supplying

*lac*, which occurs at some distance in the previous section, and even there only incidentally. It seems at least possible that Pliny, amidst the welter of fragmentary details, allowed his attention to wander. A few other readings call for comment. In 73 *aquas* is read with Hardouin and seems plausible, but Jones does not mention it, and one would like to know if medical considerations allow of its acceptance. The corresponding passage in Dioscorides gives no support, and Ernout here, as so often, admits a difficulty. The treatment of 77 *praecordiis . . . radices* as a parenthesis, proposed by Mayhoff (appendix) and adopted by Jones, seems desirable because it allows the rest of the section to be concerned, like the beginning, with the treatment of the spleen. In 113 *in oxymelitis drachma* has strong manuscript support, but Jones argues convincingly in favour of *in oxymelite drachma* (Gelenius).

Many of these points, however, are matters of opinion, and one is grateful to the editor for the care and discretion with which he has selected his readings. His apparatus is easy to use, and is puzzling only in 146, where *Scythaе uolnera . . .* in the text should, it seems, have read *Scythaе ulcera . . .*

Pépin's translation has the finesse and liveliness that we expect of this series. But in 5 can *euolso acu ab semet ipso tam paruo* mean 'après s'être enlevé lui-même . . . une écharde si petite'? Even if *acus* could mean 'splinter', we should need *euolsa acu*. Early editors read *tam paruo* <*uulnere*>, but it seems simpler to understand *carbunculo* from *carbunculum* earlier in the same sentence, even if the meaning thereby shifts from the disease (anthrax) to the symptom ('having dug out with a needle a carbuncle so small . . .'). 12 'plus de sagacité', but Pliny writes *sagacis* ('autant de sagacité?'), not *sagacioris*; 13 *fauentibus cunctis, ut essent uera* can hardly mean 'tous se plurent à tenir pour vrai', a difficulty which has been discussed in my review of vol. vii (Loeb); 32 *ex interuallo* is hardly 'de temps en temps' but 'after a time'; 42 'opposées deux à deux sur la tige' seems to translate *circa caulis geminis*, but the text has *c. c. geminos*; 46 here and elsewhere *spissare* is translated 'astringent', but 'bracing' sometimes suits the context more satisfactorily, as Jones points out; 59 *praeterquam si* is not 'surtout si', but 'except if': *scammonium* will produce *dissolutionem stomachi*, unless it is counteracted by aloes (which, though laxative, fortify the stomach, 27. 16); 96 'sa racine sert pour les maléfices' translates not the text *†radice fascin†*, but the reading of the old editions *r. fascinis utili*; 119 *e mulso*, correctly translated elsewhere, is here mistaken for *e passo*; 13 *euersis* 'aux chutes', but strictly the word applies to passengers in an overturned vehicle (cf. xxii. 43, *euersiones uehicularum*).

In the commentary, the numerous details of the text are clearly explained and, wherever possible, illustrated by means of quotations from writers such as Dioscorides and Marcellus: this is a valuable feature of the edition. Nothing of importance seems to be missing except perhaps a note on *somnia tumultuosa* (57).

Misprints are very rare. On p. 10 we should read *cetera idem* for *cetera item* (cf. 67 on p. 40), and in 43 *alias* for *alas*.

## THE LATIN LETTERS OF MARCUS AURELIUS

LUIGI PEPE: *Marco Aurelio Latino*. Pp. 170. Naples: Armanni, 1957. Paper.

AN exhaustive commentary on the Frontonian corpus is still awaited. In the meantime Pepe has provided a useful commentary on the letters of Marcus Aurelius contained in the corpus. In his introduction (pp. 13-56) he summarizes accurately and lucidly the evidence for the text, gives a description and critique of Marcus Aurelius' Latin letters, and characterizes the emperor's Latinity. The rest of the volume is taken up with the text, accompanied by a select critical apparatus and an extensive commentary.

The editor's debt to van den Hout, which he repeatedly acknowledges, is everywhere evident. His text differs from van den Hout's in about twenty passages—not counting obvious misprints, of which there are too many—and only in three of these does he offer a conjecture of his own, viz. *Caes.* i. 4 (p. 6. 7 v. d. H.) *σκόλια*; *Caes.* i. 6 (p. 13. 9 v. d. H.) *cliens laute donatus*; *Caes.* v. 38 (p. 77. 24 v. d. H.) *quod plane balbutis*.

In a few places inaccuracies have been introduced into the critical apparatus, e.g. p. 72 *Caes.* i. 6. 4 (p. 11. 28 v. d. H.) Pepe has the note 'haec: hac *m<sup>2</sup>*, hoc *m<sup>1</sup>*'; this note belongs properly not to *haec* but to *hac* later in the same line; p. 82 *Caes.* ii. 5. 1 (p. 28. 5 v. d. H.) 'quei *m<sup>1</sup>*' should read 'quei et *m<sup>1</sup>*'; p. 107, *Caes.* iii. 13. 1 (p. 45. 17 v. d. H.) 'resolvi vis corr. *m<sup>2</sup>*', Pepe, while van den Hout says that this is a correction by the first hand; p. 121 *Caes.* iv. 6. 1 (p. 62. 4 v. d. H.) the reading of the palimpsest is *Apollonis*, not *Apollinis*, as reported by Pepe. But in general the apparatus is a faithful and sensible abbreviation of van den Hout's.

The commentary is mainly linguistic and stylistic, though historical comment is not neglected. It is sometimes difficult to know for what class of reader it is designed. Those who need to be told that *cum* may be omitted with the ablative of manner (p. 80), or that a relative pronoun can introduce a final clause (p. 121), are likely to find much of the commentary above their heads. Most of it, however, seems to be aimed at what would in England be the good sixth former or average undergraduate.

There are some slips in the commentary, e.g. p. 61. 13 *Ter. Ad. 885 o noster, quid fuit* is cited as parallel to Marcus' *o me, quid dicam*; p. 71. 19, it is not correct to say that an imperial *decretem* gave legal validity to the judgement of a magistrate; p. 72. 3. 8, commenting on the phrase *crudum mare hibernum est*, he suggests that *crudum* may be an adverb, and cites by way of comparison Petronius 68. 7 *desperatum valde ingeniosus est* (the fact that the suggestion was originally made by his teacher Marmorale, and that the debt is acknowledged, does not palliate the blunder); p. 84. 29 Pepe, referring to his own article in *Giornale Italiano di Filologia*, i (1948), 100 ff., says that Marcus' statement that he had been making excerpts from *Scipionis oratiunculae* is the only evidence for the survival of speeches of Scipio Africanus; but surely what Marcus was excerpting was the well-known speeches of Scipio Aemilianus (so Malcovati, *Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta*<sup>2</sup>, p. 124); p. 86. 5 *videre* is said to be an historic infinitive 'caratteristico della lingua parlata e popolare', but it is in fact in indirect speech; p. 103. 22 *spiritus meus* is not 'nominativo esclamativo' but vocative; p. 107. 16, *post tempus ac negotium* does not mean 'dopo che è passato

del tempo e la cosa si è realizzata', but 'after all his time and trouble'; p. 121. 2, *Apollinis bibliotheca* is said to be not that founded by Augustus on the Palatine, but one forming part of the *domus Tiberiana*: what Marcus says is 'it's no use sending to the *Apollinis bibliotheca* for the books, since I have borrowed them from there', *igitur Tiberianus bibliothecarius tibi subigitandus est*; this surely implies that the two libraries are distinct.

However, the principal shortcoming of the commentary is Pepe's tendency to explain every feature of Marcus' Latinity as 'popular' or 'colloquial', a weakness which also appears in his introduction. Indeed, he seems to think that the archaizing Latin of the Antonine age was largely indebted to the spoken language of the times. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Fronto and his friends strove to avoid the banal and the everyday. *Solitis et usitatis verbis non sum contentus*, he writes to Marcus (p. 46. 1 v. d. H.); he advises him *ut verbum ex alto eras et ad significandum accommodes* (p. 58. 1 v. d. H.); when he wants to praise him, he says *scis verba querere, scis reperta recte collocare, scis colorem sincerum vetustatis appingere* (p. 145. 28 v. d. H.). The point is too commonplace to need further elaboration. There is, of course, a connexion between archaism and vulgarism in Latin (cf., for instance, J. Marouzeau, *Traité de stylistique appliquée au latin* [Paris, 1935], pp. 169 ff.), but Pepe does not discuss it. For him, everything which strikes him as unusual is vulgar or colloquial. So we get woolly notes like this on p. 60 on *huius modi eius valetudine*: 'tutta l'espressione è modellata su quelle usuali, ad es. *in eius modi re* (Cic. Att. 8, 15, 3), con la sostituzione di *valetudo* (qui "malattia") a *res*, la qual cosa rende colloquiale l'intera frase.'

The only major omission from the bibliography on pp. 11-14 is R. Marache, *La critique littéraire de la langue latine et le développement du goût archaïsant au II<sup>e</sup> siècle de notre ère* (Rennes, 1952), the perusal of which might have saved Pepe from some muddled formulations.

Nevertheless, it is easy to write an elementary commentary when generations of scholars have prepared the ground, but it is a very different matter when one has to start from scratch, as Pepe has had to do. His book is helpful, and therefore welcome.

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## GREEK POLITICS

ERIC A. HAVELOCK: *The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics*. Pp. 443. London: Cape, 1957. Cloth, 35s. net.

PROFESSOR HAVELOCK has essayed an important task, that of reconstructing the political thought most characteristic of the Greeks. The hierarchical, authoritarian theories of Plato and Aristotle, whatever their merits, had almost no effect in the Greek world. By the fourth century democracy was the form of government natural in many places (*Pol.* 1296<sup>b</sup>25) and usually most stable (*ibid.* 1302<sup>a</sup>9, cf. 1307<sup>a</sup>13); most Greeks lived under it, or wished to do so; in the Hellenistic world it became almost co-terminous with freedom (A. H. M. Jones, *The Greek City*, p. 157) and it was gradually extinguished only by the superior might of kings and proconsuls. Its watchwords were freedom and equality; to the former ideal we owe the masterpieces of Greek comedy, oratory, and philosophy (the *Republic* is the strongest proof of the *parrhesia*

Athens so deplorably encouraged); to the latter the readiness of the Greeks to admit barbarians to the comity of their civilization, with all the incalculable effects that hellenization produced. In Athens, it is true, these ideals were imperfectly realized, yet even foreigners, women, and slaves had a greater share in freedom and equality than philosophic critics could approve, and Isocrates 8. 50 complains of her liberality with the citizenship.

The liberal and democratic beliefs of ordinary men might be culled from a wide variety of sources, poets, historians, orators, and philosophers, and from a study of the actual democratic institutions, since institutions embody beliefs. Democracy was thought to ensure (despite its doctrinaire critics) the rule of law, and equality before it; fair shares in the dividends that society paid its members, and the full development of the human personality. The alleged incapacity of the poor and uneducated to take political decisions was met by flat denial; and history suggests that their errors were at least no more frequent or grave than those of kings or oligarchies. Usually the alternative to democracy was rule by the rich (*Pol.* 1301<sup>b</sup>40), and the oligarchic Ps.-Xenophon frankly admitted that this meant enslavement for the people (*A.P.* 1. 9); for many, this must have been the decisive, practical argument for democracy. With most of such justifications Havelock is, however, little concerned. His aim is rather to discover the ultimate, doctrinal foundations of liberal belief.

The 'full flower' of Greek liberal doctrine, he discovers (ch. xiii), comes to this. By nature men seek security and pleasure; to realize these needs, they must unite in an ordered society, and they have an instinctive amity for other men that enables them to do so. This is the origin of the *polis*, as of all other associations. Since all such association arises from men's having like impulses and needs, it is natural for them to enjoy equality in society. Since men naturally pursue pleasure, they naturally aim at the highest economic development. Since association in the *polis* is itself the result of natural evolution, it need not be the final stage of such evolution; the *philanthropia* innate in all men will naturally lead to wider, more inclusive societies. All this is not prescriptive, but merely descriptive of the way in which men behave. It is contradictory of the metaphysical belief that there are absolute, perhaps divine, moral laws on which unalterable, positive law should be based. Morality and law are functions of society and arise as responses to changing human needs.

Havelock's sources are scattered; much 'liberal' doctrine is anonymous, and no full account can be given of the teaching of liberal thinkers known by name. He seeks, then, to establish a trend; and his method is to examine texts, one by one, and almost in isolation. To guide scholars to particular discussions, to indicate more clearly the scope of the book, and to mark silently its omissions, I shall now summarize the chapters; there are few allusions to texts other than those named below.

He begins by contrasting the 'regressive' view of human history in Hesiod, *Politicus* 268-74 and *Laus* 677-9 (ch. ii) with the 'progressive' in *Prometheus Vinctus*, *Antigone* 332-75, Eur. *Supplices* 196-218, Diodorus i. 1-9, 14-17 (ch. iii) and in fragments of Anaximander, Xenophanes, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, and Democritus (ch. v) and a 'compromise' theory in the *Protagoras* myth, *Rep.* 369-74, and *Politics* i. 1-2 (ch. iv). In 'liberal' doctrine morality and law evolved along with techniques; the compromise view admits material progress, but sticks to absolute standards of morality. Democritus held that man's

selfish needs for survival and material welfare and his instinctive benevolence explain the origin of society and are best satisfied in a democracy in which the best men rule and are accountable to the people (ch. vi). The views of the great sophists are next considered on the basis of fragments and Plato's reports in the *Protagoras* and a few texts of the *Gorgias*, *Sophist*, and *Theaetetus*; Protagoras taught that morality, though a precondition of any society, developed with the pragmatic views societies formed of their needs, and that its source was self-interest, while sophistic in general sought to provide a technique whereby democratic decisions could be reached through discussion (chs. vii–ix). For Antiphon (ch. x) see below. In chapters xi–xii, the most striking of the book, and the chief foundation of its conclusions, we hear of liberal views on 'amity' and self-interest as the twin bases of human association, and of liberal economic beliefs and egalitarian conceptions of justice, reported, distorted, or absorbed by Aristotle (*E.N.* viii. 1–3, 9–12; ix. 5–7; v. 4–5; *Pol.* i. 1–11; iii. 1–6, 9).

My criticisms follow:

(1) Havelock admits that in modern times belief in absolute moral standards has existed among liberals. Why not in antiquity? It was surely not such belief that made Plato illiberal, but his notion that the good for man was the subject of a science, accessible only to a few. It seems doubtful whether plain men who thought democratic freedom just and fair were committed to naturalistic doctrines of morals. Alcidamas said that 'God freed all men; Nature made none a slave'; does not this imply some rudimentary conception of 'natural rights' based on divine will? The thinkers who held that slavery was unjust and against nature (*Pol.* 1253<sup>b</sup>20) cannot have meant 'illegal' by 'unjust' (as on Protagoras' theory); and there is no record that they argued that it was inexpedient to community or owners. If they also held that justice consisted in goodwill (there seems to be no need to amend *Pol.* 1255<sup>a</sup>17), and slavery therefore incompatible with it, they cannot have meant that the goodwill men actually feel for each other excludes slavery: for then there would have been no slaves. They were prescribing goodwill as just.

(2) Conversely, there was no necessary, and perhaps no normal, connexion, as Havelock often seems to suggest, between naturalistic ethics and political liberalism. If law rests only on collective interest, that interest may require (as Plato thought) expert, autocratic government. Some who rejected absolute moral standards drew the conclusion that where men's own interest does not seem to harmonize with that of the community, they have no motive to obey the law but fear, and, given the power, need have no scruple about altering it to their own advantage by force or fraud. True, Democritus recommended the rich to show kindness to the poor (B 255), from the standpoint of enlightened self-interest; similar prudential advice was given by Archytas (B 3, cited not by name on p. 239), Aristotle (*Pol.* 1320<sup>a</sup>36 ff.), and Isocrates 7. 31–32, who were hardly liberals. Other 'naturalists' drew different conclusions in practice or theory—for instance, Critias (whose evolutionary theory in B 25 is not noticed), Ps.-Xenophon (*A.P.* 1. 2), Athenian speakers in Thuc. i. 75–76; v. 105, who have little enough of natural benevolence. Aristophanes' *Adikos Logos* and the Platonic Callicles and Thrasymachus are not pure fiction. Havelock would save the credit of the historic Thrasymachus by examining the vague idealism of fr. 2. This need be no more than epideictic display, revealing as little as the *Menexenus* or the mutually contradictory pamphlets of Isocrates of the mind of the respective authors.

Despite Havelock and others, Antiphon, as revealed in B 44, can hardly be classed as a liberal, who wished 'to live in spontaneous amicable relationships with other men'. Because the fragment contends that justice cannot be obedience to the laws, which is against nature (Diels<sup>6</sup> 346-9), it does not follow that Antiphon accepts the view, shown to be incompatible with that conception (ibid. 353-5), that justice consists in not harming one who has not first harmed you. Antiphon says that both views may be wrong (ibid. 355. 24), and his claim that it is natural to forestall being harmed (354. 12 ff., cf Thuc. iii. 82. 5) suggests that this was his conclusion: certainly, he makes the individual's interest his one rule of conduct. If the Stobaeus fragments (which Havelock mostly rejects) are authentic, we should perhaps conclude that in B 44 Antiphon was stating a case for refutation later. But his liberalism cannot be inferred from 352-3, where he rejects the claims of *eugeneia*, and of Greek superiority to barbarians, with 'biological' arguments—perhaps to meet others of the same kind (cf. Aristotle, *Pol.* 1283<sup>a</sup>37; Ross, fr., pp. 59-60). Aristotle himself could ridicule *eugeneia* (*Rhet.* 1390<sup>b</sup>22); Xenophon could admire, and Alexander promote, barbarians; yet none of them embraced egalitarianism (for Alexander cf. Strabo 66-67; Plut. *Alex.* 27, 6). Antiphon too could have exalted the *κρείττων* without equating him with the *εὐγενής*. In any event the argument in B 44 is proof enough that naturalism and liberalism did not need to go together.

(3) Havelock seems to treat the kind of liberal doctrine outlined above, with its emphasis on *philanthropia*, as persuasive. It is symptomatic that he ignores *Politics* iv-vi and postpones Thucydides for separate treatment, though much in Thucydides is relevant to his theme. Thus he pays no heed to the most penetrating analyses we have of Greek society as it actually was. War and *stasis* are hardly mentioned. A doctrine that purported to be *descriptive* of human behaviour and ignored these phenomena could hardly have convinced many. Sophocles (*Ajax* 677-85; *O.C.* 610-15) expressed the Greek experience that amity was seldom a lasting tie. Aristotle held that it could be among good men. Mutual benevolence could be the bond of society, only if *prescribed*. As a mere instinct, it plainly had limited efficacy.

(4) Though not cogent, the kind of doctrine Havelock approves was held by the Epicureans (Epic. *κύριαι δόξαι* 31-40; Porphyry, *de abstin.* i. 7), and doubtless by some thinkers he discusses. But thinkers who explained society and morals in terms of man's evolving needs were not necessarily democrats. Democritus preferred democracy to *dynastiae* (B 251); so, on the whole, did Plato. What Democritus seems to favour is a Solonian rather than a Periclean system. As the friend of Pericles and legislator at Thurii, Protagoras may rank as a democrat; yet his views, as reported by Plato, apply expressly to *any* society; he does not defend democracy by arguing that the people are competent to rule. Isocrates' *Nicocles* is proof that the sophistic technique of persuasion was not thought to have any special relevance to democracy: at the least, it was useful wherever debate preceded political decisions. I find no evidence that 'liberals' foresaw or recommended larger political units than the *polis*; allusions to Panhellenism (*Protag.* 337) and alliances are beside the point, and a fragment of Democritus referring to 'any *kosmos*' implies as little as an isolated text of Aristotle (e.g. 1325<sup>a</sup>8). Comparison of civilized with primitive peoples could give the Greeks empirical grounds for a belief in past progress, material and moral; but relatively static conditions, so unlike those of the

nineteenth century, made it hard for them to project this idea into the future. Political theory advanced beyond the *polis* only when it was clear that the *polis* was outdated in practice.

Many of Havelock's detailed interpretations seem to outstrip the evidence. Nor can I accept his main conclusions. I wish his style were everywhere as terse and simple as in the Appendixes (whither he has relegated Greek and learned references). And yet his work is stimulating, and it will prove valuable, especially if it evokes a more cautious and comprehensive treatment of the same subject, embracing some of his material and also that indicated in my second paragraph.

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## THE NAVAL POLICY OF THEMISTOCLES

JULES LABARBE: *La Loi navale de Thémistocle*. (Bibl. de la Fac. de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Univ. de Liège, fasc. cxliii.) Pp. 238; map. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1957. Paper, 750 fr.

SEVEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY francs and the hours of concentrated study needed to master the closely reasoned pages of M. Labarbe's book might seem a small price to pay for more light on the dark but vitally important decade between Marathon and Thermopylae. It is doubtful whether those who pay the price will think they have gained the added illumination.

The book falls into two main sections. The first deals with the nature, background, and consequences of Themistocles' naval measures (the author calls attention on p. 51 to the inadequacy of the description 'la loi navale'). The second section deals with what is called the demographic context of distributions of money between 510 and 479 B.C.

Chapter 1 discusses the revenues from the mines and the number of ships built. It argues that the name Laureion has (a) a strict usage—the original one—signifying the immediate neighbourhood of the modern Lavrion, where, it is presumed, lay the original workings: and (b) a looser usage, signifying the mining area as a whole. Maroneia was a distinct area to the west of Laureion in sense (a): here rich deposits were just coming into working at the time of Themistocles' proposals. It had been the custom to distribute the revenue from the first area and there would have been a presumption that this procedure would be followed for the expected revenue from Maroneia. Two distinct measures were passed, each relating to one of these areas and each disposing of a sum of 100 talents to produce 100 ships. One group of ancient writers knew only of the Maroneia measure. They speak of 100 talents of new revenue from that district, which is to produce 100 ships. Another group knew only of the Laureion measure. They too speak of 100 talents and 100 ships, but they make the point, omitted by the first group, that the custom had been to distribute this revenue. A third group may be presumed to have known of both measures, for they speak of 200 ships and 200 talents. Their use of Laureion to describe the source of the revenue would have been in sense (b). This is quite a neat, though highly conjectural, reconciliation of the conflicting accounts of the measures.

The next chapter deals with the mining leases and with the distribution

described in Herodotus vii. 144 as ὁρχηδόν (or, as Labarbe would prefer to read with some manuscripts, ὁρχιδόν). He follows Momigliano in supposing that, until the discovery of the new veins at Maroneia, the State had exploited the mines directly and that the new discovery caused the adoption of a new system of leasing mining concessions. He goes on to conjecture that at that period the leases were uniformly triennial and were let out all at one time. This has the important consequence for him that the 200 talents in question represented the expected revenue from all mines for three years (as he later explains, the years 484/3 to 482/1), though the distributions were, he thinks, annual. A distribution ὁρχιδόν (from ὁρχις, not ὁρχος) included all males from the age of legal puberty (at the completion of the 16th year) upwards. There follow some too confident deductions from numismatics.<sup>1</sup>

Next comes a chapter on some chronological problems, in which the evidence is strained far beyond breaking-point in the vain attempt to reach precision of dating.<sup>2</sup> Two examples: on p. 94 the words ἥνικα βασιλεὺς ἐπεστράτευσεν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα are quoted from Andocides i. 107 to prove that Andocides was, in these words, consciously timing that measure before the invasion began, as opposed to the account preserved in Plutarch which puts it 'when Xerxes was passing through Thessaly and Boeotia'; in the archonship of Hypsichides therefore as opposed to that of Calliades.<sup>3</sup> On p. 101 we read 'ce n'est sans doute point par hasard que, dans sa *Vie de Thémistocle*, Plutarch a raconté l'évacuation juste avant l'amnistie'. The probatory value of these two passages I would reckon at zero.

In the second section of the book the author's feet seem to me seldom to touch the ground. Two examples again may serve. We get six pages on the visit of Aristagoras to Athens, this because Herodotus comments in v. 97 that he had found it easier to hoodwink three myriads of Athenians than one Spartan. One might have thought that the most that could be extracted from this was a somewhat vague belief, current at the time Herodotus was writing, that the number of adult male citizens of Athens at the beginning of the fifth century was 30,000. This is not enough for M. Labarbe. He traces this piece of information back to Aristagoras' own report of his mission on his return to Ionia and is confident that the figure included the 5,000 cleruchs of Salamis and Chalcis, on the ground that Aristagoras would have been likely to put potential help from Athens at its highest and that Herodotus for his part would have welcomed the chance of contrasting 35,000 instead of 30,000 to one. Again on p. 200, having conjectured that the sum left in the naval chest in mid-August 480 was between 288,000 and 300,000 drachmai, he uses the story of a distribution of 8 drachmai per head before Salamis to confirm a figure of 36,000 men mobilized for that battle, arrived at by reckoning 180 men per ship. It is hardly too much to say that anyone who can believe in the cogency of such arguments as these can believe in anything.

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<sup>1</sup> Based on Seltman, *Athens, Its History and Coinage*, pp. 105-9, now to be modified by reference to Kraay, *Num. Chron.*, 6th Ser. xvi (1956), p. 58 n. 3.

<sup>2</sup> A good instance on p. 109: 'C'est seulement après l'échéance constituée par la 9<sup>e</sup>

prytanie de 482/1 que Thémistocle entra en possession des dernières sommes dont les concessionnaires de mines étaient redevables.'

<sup>3</sup> He has incidentally to eject *Μαρθώναδε* from the text to save Andocides from talking complete nonsense.

## THE INDO-GREEKS

A. K. NARAIN: *The Indo-Greeks*. Pp. xvi+201; 6 plates, 3 maps. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957. Cloth, 42s. net.

DR. NARAIN has placed us much in his debt by writing the second general survey in English of recent years to deal with the abstruse but fascinating subject of the Indo-Greeks. The first, it need hardly be said, was the late Sir William Tarn's *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (1938, revised 1951) to which Narain constantly refers. Tarn's book will be remembered by most of us as nothing if not an intoxicant; it is no disparagement of Narain's to say that to some elements in the Indian chapters of Tarn he provides a useful antidote on the morning after.

The evidence on this subject consists of scattered references in classical authors, scattered finds of Indian coins, and Indian writings extremely difficult to interpret for the purpose. To attack the various problems without large and inspiring presuppositions looks an unrewarding task, and Tarn was not a scholar who proceeded without such inspiration. Narain's more cautious approach shows fundamental differences. The first of these is in his view of the Indo-Greeks as a people, the Yavanas or Yonas of Indian tradition. Tarn had regarded them as Hellenistic Greeks and their dynasty, the Euthydemids, as a Hellenistic dynasty, whose history was part of the history of Hellenism and had little meaning for India. Narain regards the Bactrian Greeks, and their Indian offshoot, not as colonists brought in by the Macedonians, but as settlers of a much older date, planted near north-western India by Xerxes and other Persian kings, and much mixed in the course of time with the natives of eastern Iran.

These were not satisfied with the treatment that they received from Alexander, who in the end had to find a Greek and not a Macedonian to govern Bactria and Sogdiana, nor with the rule of his generals after him. They were the supporters of Diodotus in his rebellion against the Seleucids to form the new Bactrian power, in this movement making common cause with the eastern Iranians who had most fiercely resisted Alexander. Thus the Bactrian power arose at the same time and by much the same process as did the Parthian. On this view the difference between Greek and Macedonian was hardly less important in Bactria than in Greece. This sounds convincing; yet it remains true that without the Macedonian invasion deported Greeks could never have formed themselves into a ruling class in eastern Iran.

On Alexander's death the Bactrian Greeks rose in revolt between the Oxus and the Indus. Seleucus recovered Bactria, but ceded Aria, Arachosia, Gedrosia, and the Parapamisadae to the Indian empire of Chandragupta Maurya. Thus some Yavanas were from the beginning subjects of the Mauryan empire, while the main body of them farther north passed to the Bactrian kings in two generations. When the Mauryan empire in turn disintegrated, the Bactrian Greeks first took the provinces ceded by Seleucus to Chandragupta and eventually made their frontier on the Ravi. South of them they had the Sunga kingdom, ruled from Pataliputra by the former Mauryan general Pushyamitra. When the Bactrian and Indian Greeks were reunited in one realm, it was in keeping with their history that Greek kings should introduce Indian legends and Indian scripts on their money, a step which has no analogies in the Hellenistic kingdoms.

In the account of the Indo-Greek kingdom itself, the chief differences are a much more sober estimate of its extent and of the degree of its unity under one family. Tarn, for instance, maintained that Demetrius I made extensive conquests in India in pursuance of a plan bolder than any that Alexander had conceived in this region. Narain denies that there is enough evidence for asserting that this Demetrius even occupied the Kabul valley, much less that he initiated a two-pronged advance, westward down the Indus under Apollodotus and eastward down the Ganges under Menander, the later king. His career was not so spectacular, nor was it ended by Eucratides as an agent of the Seleucids. It was Demetrius II who was defeated and killed by Eucratides, and Eucratides was not a cousin of Antiochus IV, but an upstart, possibly the son of a princess, who got control of Bactria for himself alone while Demetrius II was engaged in India. It was a much slower and more piecemeal advance that culminated in the rule of Menander, who was not a general of Demetrius I, and at no time ruled in Pataliputra or on the west coast by Broach. Nor did Menander proclaim himself a Chakravartin in the tradition of the Buddhist Asoka.

This may sound as though the book is no more than a catalogue of negations, but Narain has shown how difficult it is to make a sound synthesis of this tantalizing material, and how misleading to treat it, even with Tarn's brilliance, on the assumption that we have here something that even began as another Hellenistic kingdom of the well-known type. Whether his work of destruction has gone too far cannot yet be determined, certainly not by historians of purely classical training. Meanwhile we have no new synthesis that stands in the memory.

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## LATIN INSCRIPTIONS

ATILIO DEGRASSI: *Inscriptiones Latinae Liberae Reipublicae*. Fasc. prior. Pp. x+292. Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1957. Paper, L. 3,000.

THIS is the first of the two projected fascicles of a selection of Latin inscriptions of the Republican period, intended for university students.

In choosing the texts, Professor Degrassi has been remarkably generous. There are here more than 500, comprising the scanty group of survivors from the seventh century to the fourth century B.C., religious, magisterial, and military *tituli*, milestones and other documents concerned with road building, and boundary stones. They are drawn freely from recently published material as well as from the basic *C.I.L.* i<sup>2</sup>. 2, and in their total they demonstrate how successfully the editor has achieved his aim of sifting what is likely to be of use to students from what is too obscure or fragmentary to have significance.

In editing them he has in many cases re-examined the stones or photographs of them; and the new readings which he incorporates have not always been published previously. He has underlined the connexion of the inscription with the monument on which it is cut by giving with each text an archaeological description of that monument together with a comparatively precise note of find-spot and present location—in so far as the information is available. (Especially useful in this connexion is the account of the material of the monument, since, as is explained in the preface, this may be an indication of the date,

at least of items from the city of Rome itself.) He has also given with each text a good bibliography, which includes specific references to published illustrations; and, normally, a brief commentary. The commentaries he has sought on the whole to limit severely in space and scope. (Some space has been saved here by the resolution of most of the unusual abbreviations in round brackets in the texts.) For the most part they provide the essential introductory guidance; but brevity has sometimes induced a dogmatism that will seem unjustified and perhaps misleading—an example is in note 3 on no. 465a which gives no hint that there is any ground for disagreement on the date of the *Lex Antonia de Thermessibus*. There are also occasions, usually of minor importance, where the unaccustomed reader may feel the need of more help—thus, to take a very small instance, there could conveniently be a note to no. 167 to indicate that the censors are Praenestine and not Roman. On the other hand, there are a number of invaluable indications of Degrassi's views on the date of undated texts.

In presenting them he has followed, with minor adjustments, the model of *I.L.S.* They are printed continuously, with *hastae* to mark the original line divisions and catch-figures at every fifth line (confusingly, but no doubt inevitably, like the figures of reference to the footnotes). Since this is a method that seriously obscures the original layout, epigraphists cannot but regret it—although they must obviously accept, in a work of this character, a device that enables the editor to save room for so many more texts. It is also unfortunate that there is normally no indication of the amount of space available for restoration in a long gap; and that there is no illustration at all—a few plates in the second fascicule to show the salient features in the development of Republican letter-forms would be very helpful indeed.

But while one may cavil over points of detail it remains very clear that the work is something to be welcomed enthusiastically. To possess *C.I.L.* oneself (or even, more modestly, one volume of it) is more than most of us can do. In any case its format is unhandy, the bulk of its content perhaps a deterrent to the neophyte: and so on two counts there is a need for epigraphic selections. In *I.L.S.* Dessau threw his net to include Republican along with Imperial inscriptions. Since then the number of Republican examples available has increased considerably and many of those known to him have been reread and reinterpreted illuminatingly. In quantity of material wholly or partly new there is justification for a fresh selection of Latin inscriptions devoted entirely to the Republican period. Nor is the justification merely quantitative, for while one should not wish to mask the relationship of Republican and Imperial *mores*, the Republic had its distinctive flavour in epigraphic manners, as in other things. In a selection of this sort there are convenient opportunities to observe them; and, especially in the first century B.C., their movement in the direction of Empire (see, for example, the vivid reminder of the novelty of a professional army in the absence of *tituli* for soldiers before the middle of the first century B.C.).

Several Republican selections have of course been made in recent years, but always in illustration (in the first instance) of the growth of the Latin language, and never by an epigraphist. In Degrassi's selection the history, political and social, of *S.P.Q.R.* to the year 31 B.C. is the primary consideration. And the texts that he presents have the authority of his epigraphist's eye and learning. The result, as it has appeared so far, is a most valuable collection—and not only for historians, archaeologists, and epigraphists but also for philologists

who, obviously, will have to consider his new readings. It is made available in a conveniently manageable and easily digestible form, at a price which is, for the value given, a not unreasonable one. Misprints—very difficult to avoid altogether in this kind of work—are rare and usually unimportant (but note, on a point of substance, 259 for 298 in note 5 to no. 309). The index will naturally follow in fasc. ii and its absence here can only be a cause of complaint if fasc. ii is long delayed.

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## THE CHRONOLOGY OF DIODORUS

GERHARD PERL: *Kritische Untersuchungen zu Diodors römischer Jahrzählung*. (Akad. der Wiss. zu Berlin, Schr. der Sektion für Altertumswiss., 9.) Pp. vii + 174. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1957. Stiff paper, DM. 23.

IN this monograph the author combines the patient thoroughness which has come to be expected of German scholarship with an equally laudable determination to avoid undue speculation. The result is a work of inestimable value to the student both of Diodorus' method and of early Roman chronology. The limits which Perl has set for his investigations are narrow, as the title of his book correctly implies, and many of the conclusions he reaches are far from new or startling; but in a field where obscurity has only been intensified over the last fifty years by a spate of arbitrary hypotheses formulated with very little reference to the evidence of Diodorus' text, a sober attempt such as this to clear the path of irrelevancies and to conduct anew a critical analysis of the basic material is one which should be universally welcomed.

Perl begins with three short and scholarly chapters in which he is concerned to establish the use by Diodorus of a synchronistic table, and to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the lengths accorded by him to the reigns of the individual Alban and Roman kings have no bearing upon his main chronological structure. Then comes the central and most important section of the book, devoted to an examination of the consular Fasti. This is itself divided into two parts. In the first ('Namen') Perl analyses in detail the divergences between the names appearing in the Diodoran list and those in other sources. On the strength of a very careful classification of these differences he feels justified in pronouncing with more assurance on several matters which in the past have been the subject of debate and speculation. The falling off of *cognomina* after the late fifth century is shown not to be sufficiently marked to suggest a change of source, and is reasonably explained by the unreadiness of Diodorus or a copyist to reproduce Roman names in full when the number of eponymous magistrates rose to four or six. Costa's view that the cipher accompanying the lists of consular tribunes was systematically altered in the manuscript to accord with the actual number of names surviving is shown to be at variance with the facts, and it is concluded—perhaps in this case a little hastily—that the cipher as we have it appeared in Diodorus' source. The most important conclusion drawn from this analysis, however, is that many of the errors in the Fasti are a result of a slip of the eye and can only reasonably be explained if the source used by Diodorus was a simple list of the names of consuls, arranged column-wise in pairs, and containing no annalistic notices of any kind. As Perl illustrates

in later chapters, this fact has considerable bearing upon the question of the separate identity of the chronological and historical source.

In the second part of this chapter ('Zahlung') Perl turns to consider the light thrown by the Fasti upon Diodorus' chronological framework. The reasonable view is taken that in constructing his Roman chronology Diodorus worked back from his own time rather than forward from a fixed point in early history. The repetition of the five colleges *vulg. 394-390* is consequently accounted for not by reference to the omission of *vulg. 423-419*—the number five in each case being coincidental—but in relation to the careless dropping of *vulg. 367* and four of the years of anarchy. On referring to the synchronistic table Diodorus found himself to be five years out at the time of the battle of the Allia, and made an adjustment in the manner which involved the least amount of thought. In all this, as in his discussion of the responsibility of Diodorus or his source for the earlier omissions and insertions in the Fasti, Perl carries conviction; but, when he turns to consider the problem raised by the fact that Diodorus' list, if it followed the pattern of the extant lists for the early Republic, would only have stretched back to 502 B.C., his ready acceptance of the possibility that Diodorus recorded the names of the first Roman consuls some seven or eight years after his narration of the circumstances leading to the fall of the monarchy (dated from fragments to 512/11 or 511/10 B.C.) is less attractive. In taking this stand Perl is making the assumption that the date for the fall of the monarchy is based on a supposed entry in the synchronistic table (cf. p. 157) rather than, as is perhaps more likely, upon the length of the consular list which he had transcribed.

This same assumption is again to the fore when in the last chapter Perl considers and dismisses, among others, the doctrine that the chronological source of Diodorus was Castor (or, presumably, any list based on Castor). Apart from laying undue emphasis upon the tradition that the final year of Castor's list—61/60—was equated with the Roman year 61 (cf. Beloch, *R.G.*, p. 124 for the view that this was not Castor's normal practice), he seriously over-estimates the discrepancy between the length of Castor's list and the maximum length ascribable to that of Diodorus' source. If Castor, like Diodorus, normally equated the Roman year with the year in which the Attic year ended, his consular list could have begun under 519 B.C. (460 years from 61/60). Diodorus, on the other hand, could surely have recorded the names of the first consuls under 511. As Perl himself reckons the discrepancy between Diodorus and his source at the beginning of the extant account to be seven years, there is need only to make the quite likely supposition that Diodorus overlooked but one college in the early part of his source's list in order to bring about an exact equivalence between the lengths of that list and that of Castor. But, if Perl in this instance shows a slight tendency to make the evidence his servant, it is certainly not his common practice; and in dealing with a subject which seems to invite irresponsible speculation he has exercised commendable restraint. Of his book, notable for soundness of judgement and thorough attention to detail, I would make only one further criticism—and that a comparatively trivial one. It is that every vulgate date is religiously expressed in terms both of the birth of Christ and the foundation of the city. Here surely is thoroughness misplaced, not because it leads to ambiguity, but because a mere multiplication of dates in a work where it is often essential to give both an Olympiad and an Attic equivalent (the latter itself being necessarily

expressed by a double numeral) can only serve to bewilder the reader. Any work on chronology must perforce provide difficult reading, but it can be rendered much less formidable if figures are kept down to the very minimum which is consistent with clarity.

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E. S. STAVELEY

## SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE

M. ROSTOVTEFF: *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*. Second edition, revised by P. M. FRASER. 2 vols. Pp. xxxi+541, x+304; 80 plates. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957. Cloth, £8. 8s. net.

FEW books have had such an impact on Roman studies as Rostovtzeff's *Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*. Mommsen and his successors had focused attention primarily on constitutional and military analysis. New political theories, social revolutions, and the vigorous development of archaeology stimulated increasing interest in the social and economic fields. Rostovtzeff rode on the crest of this new wave and was able to combine a massive mastery of detail with a broad imaginative interpretation. His narrative moves swiftly, maintains its clarity of outline, and is immensely stimulating. The text can be read and enjoyed by all who are seriously interested in history; the notes have provided a fertile seed-ground for specialized studies.

In form the book is a model. Rostovtzeff was never a victim of his learning. His references are not overloaded with dead wood; his judgement is clear and penetrating. In his use and description of illustrations, an integral part of his work and no mere accessory ornament, he set a new standard. Had he lived longer he would have been able to make more use of the fruits of prosopography, an essential element in social analysis; but, though his chief strength lay in the archaeological field, he was primarily an historian in the widest sense of the word. His main theses, like those of most great historians, are controversial. Many would reject his interpretation of the Julio-Claudian period as a military tyranny; not everyone would accept his pessimistic view that civilizations decay when they attempt to penetrate the masses. Russian as well as Roman history was at the heart of his thinking and feeling. But what great historian has not been influenced by the contemporary scene? It was an exciting experience to share Rostovtzeff's vast canvas; it remains exciting to reread him.

The first edition, in English, was published in 1926. In 1931 it was translated into German; some new plates were added, and minor corrections and additions were made. A more thorough revision lay behind the Italian edition of 1936. Rostovtzeff took advantage of a visit to Africa to rewrite his section on the Cyrenaica and to add a new section on Tripolitania. Minor inconsistencies were removed, reviewers' corrections were recognized; the notes were considerably enlarged by extended bibliographies and a wealth of new material. Rostovtzeff's main interpretations, however, remained unchanged.

The English edition had long been difficult to obtain; it is now replaced in a considerably improved form. The principles adopted by the editor, Mr. P. M. Fraser, are logical and sound. He has incorporated in the original English text the changes made in the Italian edition, and they are widespread particularly

in the notes, which have been extended from 142 to 208 pages. But he has done much more than that. He has corrected a large number of wrong references, he has added references to more recent and comprehensive publications of documents, and he has rearranged some of the plates to associate them more closely with the text. A new index of passages cited from ancient authors is a useful addition, as is the separation of papyri from inscriptions. Mr. H. C. Oakley has been responsible for the general index, a laborious business in which he has made several improvements. The new index is more clearly articulated and is a more useful tool.

Some will regret that no attempt has been made to refer in the notes to the great range of new material that has accumulated since 1936, or to the more important discussions of Rostovtzeff's more vulnerable interpretations of monuments; but only another Rostovtzeff could have covered the whole field adequately, and Fraser is surely right in maintaining that as a classic the book deserves to be left as the author left it. A practical compromise might have been to add in an appendix a select bibliography of the most important archaeological reports and studies, especially where discussion or new discovery has invalidated Rostovtzeff's interpretations.

But those who use the new edition will be very grateful to Fraser, who has done his unspectacular work well. His translation from the Italian is well adapted to the style of the English edition; his keen eye has corrected many slips. Those who enjoy such pursuits can still find their reward, and students of text transmission might find the hunt a profitable discipline. Among the few corrections in the Italian which have not been picked up, C. Tyrannius (673<sup>46</sup>) should be C. Turranius; 'by the way of Egnatia, to the East' (253) should be 'by the Via Egnatia'; St. Augustine ch. 48 (724<sup>48</sup>) should be Ep. 48. 'Papinia in Latium' (550<sup>25</sup>, Varro, *R.R.* i. 9) was corrected in the Italian edition to 'tribu Papinia' and is so taken over, a nice conflation of Papiria and Pupinia. In a sample search I have noted only one wrong reference uncorrected: P. Oxyr. 1663 (745<sup>50</sup>) should be 1668. References to the first edition of Della Corte's *Case ed Abitanti*, very difficult to secure, could have been made instead to the second edition (1954), and the new volumes of *C.I.L.* iv (1952 and 1953) might have been used for Pompeian graffiti. But such minor blemishes as remain are trivial when compared with the vast number of improvements that have been made. The final word should be a grateful tribute to the editor.

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RUSSELL MEIGGS

## PRINCEPS IUDEX

JOHN MAURICE KELLY: *Princeps Iudex. Eine Untersuchung zur Entwicklung und zu den Grundlagen der kaiserlichen Gerichtsbarkeit.* (Forschungen zum Römischen Recht, neunte Abhandlung.) Pp. 107. Weimar: Hermann Bohlaus Nachfolger, 1957. Paper, DM. 6.45.

THIS is the Heidelberg doctoral dissertation of Dr. Kelly of the National University of Ireland. In it he addresses himself to an old and thorny question, the extent and constitutional basis of the emperor's right to hold a court of justice in the early Roman Empire. He writes lucidly, with plenty of common sense and a sound, down-to-earth judgment; and these exceedingly valuable

qualities make his study profitable reading. It is particularly to his credit not to have confined his attention to Augustus; a look at what is said about the other first-century emperors enables him to throw a stronger light on the powers that Augustus did *not* have (or at any rate use) as compared with his successors.

Few students of the Roman Empire will be unaware of the problem: of many of the emperor's actions the constitutional justification can be discovered, but of some it remains baffling, and historians have been led into perilous hypotheses. Most baffling of all is to find a justification for the emperor's jurisdiction, civil and criminal, on appeal and as court of first instance. The most powerful recent attempt at a solution is the paper of A. H. M. Jones, 'Imperial and Senatorial Jurisdiction in the Early Principate', *Historia*, iii (1955), 464 ff.; but Jones's conclusions rest on acceptance of a more extensive use by Augustus of *imperium* inside Rome than many would be willing to concede, and are heavily dependent on Dio li. 19. 6-7, a passage to whose difficulties of interpretation we shall return—and even then Jones has to posit an otherwise unattested clause of the *Lex Iulia Iudiciorum Publicorum*. One of the troubles about this subject is that there is no new evidence. Each would-be solver of the puzzle has to offer his own reinterpretation of the same few passages, and solution of any one corner of the puzzle depends on solving all the rest. It is fatally easy to land in arguments of a circular kind, and Kelly has not wholly avoided them.

Of the many points in this thesis deserving of discussion, it seems best in the present review to concentrate on that which is, in the opinion of the reviewer, the point most fundamental to Kelly's whole position. He argues that Augustus regularly took part in criminal cases brought before the ordinary *quaestiones perpetuae*—not merely as a witness or the like, but as a judge, whose view of the case was taken as more or less settling it. Two important questions arise, calling for comment, and we may take the less important of the two first. Kelly asks the usual question, by what constitutional right Augustus thus imposed himself on the ordinary courts, and finds the answer in Dio li. 19. 6-7. Dio there says that in 30 B.C. numerous privileges were voted to Octavian: *tribunicia potestas* for life, with an extended power of *auxilium*, *ἐκκληστόν τε δικάζειν* (Kelly bids us observe the close connexion—*τε*, not *καί*), some kind of casting vote in all the courts, and so on. Kelly derives from *ἐκκληστον δικάζειν* Augustus' right to participate in the *quaestiones*. His interpretation is rather strained, but so are everybody's interpretations of this obscure passage; the real trouble which always arises is this: it is not nowadays usually believed that Octavian accepted the *tribunicia potestas* for life in 30 B.C., and I do not suppose Kelly thinks he did; but if he refused it, does that not also involve him in refusing that closely connected *ἐκκληστον δικάζειν*? Dio a little farther on says that Octavian accepted all the offers 'except a few'. This would be a very strange way of expressing Octavian's acceptance of the minor honours and rejection of the major one, *tribunicia potestas* for life, and consequently it looks as though Dio believed that he did accept the *tribunicia potestas*—and most people would now say that Dio was wrong. These difficulties make the passage a poor stone with which to build.

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providing two examples of imperial *cognitio extra ordinem*, and he brings various arguments to bear against this interpretation, and in favour of the view that we have here cases before the *quaestio de parricidii* and the *quaestio falsi*. The reason why this is so important is that Kelly is going on to tell us that, with this passage out of the way, and granting the assumption derived from it that Augustus did much of his judicial work through the *quaestiones*, the only field in which he needed and used a criminal *cognitio extra ordinem* was that of *maiestas*—a political field, a field of *Macht* rather than *Recht*, in which his usurping power of the sword carried all before it. We do not then need to find a constitutional justification for Augustus' general criminal jurisdiction, because he did not exercise one, and for that which he did exercise he had no constitutional basis; 'it rested simply on a *cognitio* of a unique kind, arising from the entirely pragmatic, political and personal circumstances of power, and with that we must rest content'.

Suetonius, *Augustus* 33. 1–2 is consequently fundamental. If Kelly is wrong about it, then Augustus did exercise a personal criminal jurisdiction in cases of *parricidium* and *falsum*, and we are back where we started. It is just here that circularity creeps into the argument. For example: 'Elsewhere the emperor seems to have come in with his own *cognitio* only where personal or political factors were involved.' But it is not as if there were scores of other pieces of evidence—this itself is the primary passage. Again: 'precisely for parricide and forgery there were *quaestiones* of long standing; it is hard to see why Augustus should have taken these cases out of their hands.' Was there not also a *quaestio de maiestate*? Kelly's other arguments are not circular, and some are attractive; he lays stress, for example, on the way in which in these cases the emperor seems to accept the standard penalties and procedure of the Republican courts. On the other hand, when he asserts that the phrase 'simul cognoscentibus' hardly fits the relation between the emperor and his *consilium*, he should also reflect that the word 'cognoscentibus' scarcely fits the terminology of the *quaestiones*. There is, to say the least of it, genuine room for hesitation over the meaning of this passage, and it too is consequently a poor stone to make the key of the arch.

Proceeding to a discussion of *maiestas*, Kelly works rather hard another passage of Dio—lv. 14–21. This is the speech put by the historian into the mouth of Livia, dissuading Augustus from punishing Cornelius Cinna for attempted revolution—weak building material again, but less depends on it. On the other hand, his use of Tacitus, *Annals* xiii. 4. 2 to show that the development of a general imperial jurisdiction in all criminal matters was much furthered by Claudius, and much resented, seems a good and useful point, and his critical review of the main views that have been held about the constitutional basis of the emperor's jurisdiction is very shrewd.

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## VAE, PUTO DEUS FIO

L. CERFAUX, J. TONDRIAUX: *Le culte des souverains dans la civilisation gréco-romaine.* (Bibliothèque de Théologie, iii. 5.) Pp. 536. Paris: Desclée et Cie, 1957. Paper.

THIS must be the biggest book yet on its subject. Investigation begins with the oriental monarchies of Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Persia, and the kingships of the Hebrew and Canaanite peoples. A short study of Cretan institutions and Homeric royalty leads into the hero cults and religious and philosophical concepts of Classical Greece. With the Macedonian world treatment begins on an ampler scale. The attitude to Alexander in his lifetime, his legacy, the ithyphallic hymn to Demetrius, the relative contributions of Orient and Greece to the growth of Hellenistic ruler cults are analysed in detail, and great emphasis is placed on the choice of Dionysus as heavenly paradigm of kings. The rejection of ruler worship by the Jews is then traced. There follows a similar detailed study of the phenomenon in Rome: the impact on the Italic heritage of Greek practice and the repetition of the process in Roman forms. Its development is passed in review through all the emperors to Diocletian and into the Byzantine world. Its characteristic features are contrasted with Christianity, and a final chapter attempts to summarize the importance as a whole of ruler worship.

The book has a dual character. It is in the first place intended for the un-instructed, especially for theological students. Readers will, in fact, be left in no doubt that they are in the classroom. They will find themselves confronted with a list of do's and don't's, with adjurations not to underrate ruler-worship as megalomania or mere politics, and will have chapters summarized as an aid to memory. A classroom informality seems, indeed, to be the authors' deliberate aim. Their spontaneity and freshness of exposition no doubt will incite to discussion and study; but they have their penalties too. The argument tends to wind around in circles instead of taking a straight line, or important evidence may be held back until a late stage. Moreover, a classroom syllabus requires every corner of the subject to be treated. Yet one might be excused for wondering why it was thought worth while to include a section on the divinity of the Minoan/Mycenaean kings when there is no literature cited of date later than 1936, and the controversy over Linear 'B', which has transformed the problem, does not seem to exist. Of one benefit of the classroom, the ability to introduce new evidence, as will be seen, the authors have not always taken advantage. Possibly delays in publication may be the cause of this; for the imprimatur is dated September 1956.

As a learned work, the book is an encyclopaedia of the subject. Apart from a valuable bibliography, it teems with lists—e.g. of divinized orientals, Republican Roman recipients of cult; and these culminate in a twenty-four page catalogue of *theoi andres*, heroizations, deifications, and 'assimilations'. Indeed, apart from the insistence on Dionysus as royal model, this emphasis on 'assimilations' appears to be the principal original contribution. It is hard to see what value except of the most general kind is possessed by a concept which groups together disparate evidence of different periods and different degrees of reliability—e.g. Aelian's account of the erection of altars to Anaxagoras dedicated to Mind and Truth, the comic characterization of Pericles as Zeus

Olympius, posing by Phryne as a model for statues of Aphrodite. Definition of terms would have made for a clearer and more pointed account throughout. Only in their final chapter do the authors touch on the crucial question of the differentiation of divinity from mankind, and where the criterion is to be sought. Put as a problem for solution (as it is so admirably by W. K. C. Guthrie, *The Greeks and their Gods*, chap. iii) it would have provided an admirable principle by which to organize centrifugal detail.

A particular case will show the authors' merits and weaknesses. The deification of Ptolemy Philadelphus is the first occasion in which there is reason to think that a reigning sovereign in his lifetime officially instituted cult-worship of himself in Greek form. Its history is complicated by awkward problems of evidence, above all of absolute and relative chronology. Was there an official cult of the *theoi adelphoi*, the Brother and Sister Gods, instituted in the lifetime of Arsinoe, Ptolemy's sister-wife? Or was the loss to both monarch and country that prompted her deification after death made the occasion to introduce a Greek cult of the reigning monarch? The authors conclude in favour of the former hypothesis, on two grounds: (1) 'Arsinoe was even in her life-time indubitably "assimilated" to certain "divinities".' But the original cult-status (private, official?) as well as date of these 'assimilations' is not well enough defined to serve as cogent evidence. (2) The fact that Arsinoe had two distinct forms of cult: she shared the priest of Alexander and the *theoi adelphoi*, but she had a special priestess to herself, her own canephorus. Such multiplicity is easy to explain as the result of historical accident, but seems perverse if part of a deliberate arrangement. Now this conclusion may well be right, but not all the evidence is presented: (a) P. Petrie i. 24. 2 (cf. *Berichtigungsliste*, i. 346) shows the priest of Alexander and the *theoi adelphoi* in existence in the 16th year, but not the canephorus. (b) 'On sait que, morte le 9 Juillet 270, Arsinoe . . .' (p. 196). It is not explained that this date is not found in any document but results from a brilliant combinatory guess of R. Pfeiffer's. If this date for Arsinoe's death is right, is it later or earlier than P. Hibeh 99 (*Daisios* of year 15) which dates by the priest of Alexander and the *theoi adelphoi*? The authors rightly refer to the uncertainty in the equation of Egyptian and Macedonian months. But they do not quote P. Hibeh II. 199 (published in 1955), which appears to clinch the matter in their favour; this scrappy text apparently chronicles the introduction of the cult of the *theoi adelphoi* in the 14th year, and therefore certainly before Arsinoe's death.

The 60-page bibliography will certainly prove useful. English readers will observe some strange omissions—the total absence of Guthrie's name, of references to H. I. Bell's Forwood Lectures, to Ehnmark's *The Idea of God in Homer*, to R. B. Onians's *Origins of European Thought*. A few errors have crept in—Mylonas (Helladic) has got into the Hellenistic list, and a remarkable character called Estein (Stein, E.) appears on p. 52. There are some slips spread through the book, but not many considering its enormous documentation. P. 119, l. 26 read 'Ath. Pol.' for 'Politeia'. Arsinoe's sister was called Philotera, not Philetaira.

## BOEOTIAN AND WEST GREEK TOMBSTONES

P. M. FRASER and T. RÖNNE: *Boeotian and West Greek Tombstones*. (Skrifter utgivna av Svenska Institutet i Athen, 4, vi.) Pp. xv + 229; 32 plates, 2 maps. Lund: Gleerup, 1957. Paper, Kr. 85.

THIS study offers *Wissenschaft* at its most *wissenschaftlich*. The field with which it is concerned is commendably precise, namely those tombstones of Central and Western Greece which involve architectural features, relief ornament, or the use of cartouches, *tabulae ansatae*, relief lettering, and so forth. Its nucleus consists of a series of 110 stones from Tanagra and Thebes, the majority of which were hitherto unpublished, the basic type being an oblong beam-like monument originally (as may be seen from surviving illustrations) set upon an upright to form a T-shaped ensemble. The authors examine in exhaustive detail the technique of these monuments, the decorative elements and their affinities elsewhere in the Greek world, the evidence of the inscriptions as regards both style of lettering and names of the deceased, and finally a useful comparison of the general type (name or name-plus-*xaipē*) with the formulas of *tituli sepulcrales* in other places. The section on Western Greece is somewhat loosely attached and has less homogeneity, although the stones dealt with form a main, if not the main, type of funerary monument there in the Hellenistic period. Many of the inscriptions represented as unpublished have now appeared in *I.G. ix<sup>2</sup>. 1, fasc. 2*, a volume which was, however, published in time for inclusion of references in the full *comparatio numerorum*. The indexes (pp. 204-27) are proudly comprehensive, and the whole volume is printed in a generous and leisurely style with plenty of illustrations (not all showing to the best effect the features under discussion).

The price of the book is high, and no concession is made to the reader who has afforded it. There is a minimal table of abbreviations, the majority of which are claimed as self-evident even though so many of the citations are to books rarely disturbed on the library shelves. Many readers may be regrettably unfamiliar with some of the material which is familiar pabulum to the erudite authors; but, if they are so, it may perhaps be argued that this book is in any case not for them. In keeping with this Olympian austerity of outlook is the fact that the authors have preferred to begin each section with a catalogue of the stones with which they are concerned, rather than to add them as appendices to a general discussion. This is doubtless the more scholarly proceeding; it makes the book as a book rather unpalatable. The footnotes are models of their kind and contain, as good footnotes should, some remarkable and independent contributions to scholarship, tangential but never irrelevant to the main topic: notable in this respect are pp. 83-84 nn. 7, 8 (on *alpha* with curved crossbar and on the varying shapes of *omega*) and 63-64 nn. 4-13 (on caryatids or mourners with upraised arms). The learning and research embodied in these and other equally valuable collections of material merit profound respect. The art of the footnote and its place in a learned work are, while sometimes spoken of in a light-hearted spirit, in fact deserving of serious study; in this volume the notes fulfil their proper function as laconic, relevant, and comprehensive, and, if they may be so described, are aesthetically as well as scholastically satisfying.

On the basis of the evidence they present, the authors' general conclusions

appear incontrovertible, and they throw a convincing light on the second-rate artistic productions of several provincial centres of Hellenistic Greece. One may well doubt whether these are in themselves worth the care and scholarship here so lavishly bestowed on them; perhaps their greatest service is to have provided the occasion for so fruitful a collaboration and the basis for discussions of comparative material of a consequence far overstepping the immediate confines of these rather dreary backwaters of Greek art.

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## ECCE FORI FONTES, FORULIS FORMOSA FACULTAS

R. E. WYCHERLEY: *The Athenian Agora*. Vol. iii: *Literary and Epigraphical Testimonia*. Pp. x+259; 4 plates. Princeton, N.J.: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1957. Cloth, \$10.

It is a pleasure that comes seldom to a reviewer to be able to write a eulogy so unqualified that the publishers might have used it for their advertisement. This undertaking of Professor Wycherley, to present in a single volume all the *testimonia* relating to the buildings and activities of the Agora, now published in the definitive series of the Agora publications, demands and deserves the highest praise. The material has been carefully and painstakingly assembled; the entries are clearly arranged, with a welcome abundance of cross-references; the commentary is useful and in general not cumbersome; the indexing is excellent; and the preface is as succinct and as indicative of what the book offers as a good preface ought to be. The credit for such an admirable production, though mostly Wycherley's, is not entirely his. The care and devotion of Dr. Lucy Shoe as editor of the Agora publications are fittingly rewarded by the quality of the volume and the accuracy and general presentation of its contents; and it may be hoped that Mr. John D. Rockefeller, Junr., who made so generous a contribution towards the publication, will feel encouraged by the success of his subvention to remember that this is only the third volume in a distinguished series.

It would be a waste of the reviewer's time to go hunting for possible omissions on Wycherley's part.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, the main question which springs to mind is quite the reverse—whether we have here too much material, an *embarras de richesse* which sacrifices the precise needs of the reader to the general principle of completeness. It almost seems as if, in the course of writing the book, the author made some change of plan with regard to its scope. Was it simply to list the *testimonia* which would be of most value for those who, later, would read the volumes of the series dealing with the architecture and monuments, on the analogy of vol. ii of *The Athenian Tribute Lists*? Or was it to be an end in itself, amassing everything of even incidental relevance and not confining itself to the requirements of its companion volumes? The result of indecision has been a certain unevenness in treatment, of which I quote a few examples.

The Prytaneion and Gymnasium of Ptolemy need not have been included at all. The only connexion the latter in particular has with the Agora is that

<sup>1</sup> J. H. Oliver, *A.J.A.* lxii (1958), 335, already notes the omission of *Her.* vi. 103 (concerned with the Prytaneion); no similar omission has occurred to me, but I have not made very strenuous attempts to find any: life is too short.

Pausanias says it was not far away and a couple of boundary stones found in the Agora *might* have come from it. But if these are included, why not other sites in the immediate vicinity—Klepsydra, Eros and Aphrodite, even the Areopagus itself? The Stoa Poikile has a comprehensive entry (pp. 31–45), far beyond plain topographical requirements, and anything remotely mentioning it or its contents is given the full treatment—even Hesychius' definition of *στρωτικόν* and a poor joke from Athenaeus; but *sitesis* in the Prytaneion is dealt with simply as a list of references with very brief notes, a system which in my opinion could have been more widely used for casual and recurrent mentions adding nothing constructive (e.g. a number of entries under 'Bouleuterion'). The problem of the Stoa(s) of Zeus Basileios and Zeus Eleutherios (now perhaps more definitely resolved by the discovery of another road radiating from the Agora's north-west corner) might either have been dismissed with a brief reference to Homer Thompson's article in *Hesperia*, vi, and to any forthcoming treatment in the Agora series, or fully stated with some discussion of the archaeology: the entry on pp. 30–31 falls between two stools—unlike the entry on the Odeion, which is content with a reference to *Hesperia*, xix. The section on the market (pp. 185–206) is a luxury as far as the Agora and its topography are concerned; many of its entries refer to other parts of the town and some are concerned with social life in general (e.g. nos. 668 and 680 from Theophrastus) without any precise location. All this material nevertheless is extremely interesting, and it is certainly welcome and useful to have it in one place: the same is true of the important and penetrating discussion of the law courts, worth a monograph to itself, but which may well escape the student of Greek law in its present context.

It seems, however, from these and similar indications that the work has outgrown the limited scope of the Agora publications for which it was planned, and is out of place where it is. It belongs rather to a new Judeich, and Wycherley promises, as we may note with pleasure and anticipation, a companion volume dealing with the rest of the city. We may depend on it, from the evidence of the present work, that this will be a thorough and judicious study, and that it will offer its readers in a clear and palatable form all the material they are ever likely to need, whether their needs are superficial or *recherché*.

Yet completeness in such a work, until the archaeologists put away their tools, is impossible, especially as regards the epigraphical contribution. Even as I write, squeezes of unpublished Agora inscriptions lie on my desk which will add to pp. 54, 59, and 179, and there will no doubt be more to follow. There is perhaps more work to be done on the Agora's south-east corner; to the Enneakrounos study (awkwardly divided between pp. 139–40, 142) must already be added Gomme's excursus in *Commentary on Thucydides*, ii. 53–61; and Lycurgus' 'fountain in the reeds' (p. 142) is possibly identifiable with the fountain-house in the south-west corner of c. 425 B.C., formerly thought to be Enneakrounos—and this in turn may be the fountain-house of *I.G. i<sup>2</sup>. 54*, if, as is not impossible, this is to be dated after Pericles' death.

It will be readily apparent that what has been said above serves only to emphasize the value and stimulating qualities of a work which I find it hard to think will fail to achieve a universal welcome. The author deserves the liveliest congratulations for carrying so exacting a task through to so successful a conclusion.

## SHORT REVIEWS

ERNESTO VALGIGLIO: *L'Ippolito di Euripide*. Pp. 64. Turin: Ruata, 1957. Paper, L. 300.

In this short essay Dr. Valgiglio touches on the problems which arise from the *Hippolytus* and comments judiciously on the possible answers. He shows a good acquaintance with recent work on the subject, and if he fails much to increase our understanding of the play, it should be remembered that many of the problems are not susceptible of solution in terms of logic, and that criticism which starts from the assumption that logic must not be demanded must itself be somewhat nebulous.

Hippolytus, Phaedra, and Theseus are each the subject of a section, and the last section is devoted to the general significance. Consideration of Hippolytus centres on his oath, and 1034-5 *ἔσωφρόνησεν οὐκ ἔχονσα σωφρονεῖν . . .* are explained as a direct reference to it; thanks to the oath Phaedra has an undeserved appearance of *σωφρούνη*, while he is not helped by possessing the reality. But 1060-3, 'if I break my oath and tell the truth I shall still not be believed', suggest that the ethical issue is not meant to be pressed. As for his 'natural' purity, with which is involved the symbol of Artemis, Valgiglio, like Euripides, has little to say.

Phaedra's position is clearer, though one may suspect that by nature she is something more than 'debole, mite, innocent, innocua'. Valgiglio inclines to the view that she supposed the philtre to be a device for ridding her of her passion, not for procuring Hippolytus. It is asked why Theseus banishes his son as well as cursing him; since even a guaranteed curse need not work instantaneously and Theseus would not wish to have Hippolytus in his sight, this is perhaps no great mystery. But the tone of 1164-5 is such that it is hard to avoid the suspicion that Euripides is indulging a little rationalistic animus even at the expense of his play.

The total effect of the play depends largely on the interpretation of Aphrodite and Artemis. That the action is, as often in Greek literature, on two planes is undoubtedly true. It may be true also that these actions can be brought into some sort of connexion, 'that the divine will is realized by the human will through a development which is logically and psychologically true and independent', yet the starting-point of

the development, Phaedra's passion, continues to present a difficulty. If Phaedra fell in love just as any woman might, there is no logic; if her love was impelled by the divine will, there is no independence. È naturale però che il problema conservi delle zone oscure ed impenetrabili, come il problema del libero arbitrio.' But Valgiglio rightly concludes that if, as seems certain, the gods are significant, there is little room for the explanation of inherited guilt which is suggested by 337, 831, and 1378, since Artemis attributes the tragedy to other causes.

The book concludes with an appendix of 15 pages of smaller print dealing with the *Medea*, which is justified by the basic resemblances between the two plays. The resemblance is real enough, but Valgiglio is inclined to over-estimate the erotic element in the *Medea*. Medea would have hated less violently if she had not once loved, but this has little to do with a scale of values according to which the sneers of her enemies are the supreme evil. Nor need we suppose jealousy to be an important part of her feeling towards Glauce. The main reason for destroying her is that Jason wants her. Jason may suppose that it is the loss of her man that moves *Medea*, but this opinion throws more light on Jason than on Medea.

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(1) *The Complete Greek Tragedies* translated with introductions. Aeschylus, ii: *Seven against Thebes* and *Prometheus Bound* by DAVID GRENE, *Suppliant Maidens* and *Persians* by SETH G. BENARDETE. Pp. vii + 179. Sophocles, ii: *Ajax* by JOHN MOORE, *Trachiniae* by MICHAEL JAMESON, *Electra* and *Philoctetes* by DAVID GRENE. Pp. 253. Chicago: University Press (London: Cambridge University Press), 1957. Cloth, 28s. net each.

(2) THEODORE H. BANKS: *Sophocles, Three Theban Plays* newly translated. Pp. xvi + 144. London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. Cloth, 18s. net.

(3) ROGER LANCELYN GREEN: *Two Satyr Plays (Ichneutae and Cyclops)*. A new translation. Pp. 96. West Drayton: Penguin Books, 1957. Paper, 2s. 6d. net.

WITH the second volumes of Aeschylus and Sophocles the University of Chicago translation of these dramatists is completed. The *Supplices* and *Persae* are from the hand of Dr. Seth G. Benardete. They are perhaps the most austere versions of the series. The clipped, staccato phrases may reproduce something of the oracular quality of the original, but the texture of the language is curiously unlike Greek. The work of Professor Greene, who here translates the *Septem* and *Prometheus*, is already well known. He has strangely elected to use prose for considerable parts of the *P.V.*, including the opening dialogue, on the ground that 'they seemed intolerable in any strictly formalized medium in English'. Greene is responsible also for the *Philoctetes* and *Electra* in the second volume of Sophocles. His solution of the problem of the latter play is along the lines of 'I think we are meant to see Electra not as a real person in her own right but as a mass of responses to other persons and their deeds and words, whether true or false'. Yet the *Electra* of this translation is more than a bundle of responses. Professor John Moore's rendering of the *Ajax* suggests both the strength and the stiffness of the original, but Professor Jameson's *Trachiniae* is too flat for the more mature Sophocles.

The translation of the Theban plays by Theodore H. Banks, Professor of English at Wesleyan University in Connecticut, is in a different idiom. He uses blank verse of traditional pattern, though fairly light in diction, and his lyrics are in fully rhymed stanzas. Though most critics consider such a style outmoded, there may well be a large, if unvocal, audience which will appreciate Banks's simple effects. They should, however, be warned against certain inaccuracies in the introduction; whatever else the *cithurnus* may have been, it was not a foot high, nor was 'a small speaking trumpet' built into the actor's mask. The chorus of Aeschylus, at any rate in the extant plays, did not number fifty. Not all the plays in which Euripides treated of Oedipus are lost, and Chrysippus has no place in the legend of Thebes as presented by Sophocles.

Mr. R. L. Green's Penguin contains the *Cyclops* and a version of the *Ichneutae* with the missing portion supplied along lines suggested by the *Hymn to Hermes*. The

high-spirited translation is reminiscent of Gilbert or Rogers and, as the author admits, stresses the burlesque element at the expense of the tragic.

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JEAN VAN CAMP et PAUL CANART: *Le sens du mot θεῖος chez Platon*. Pp. 452. Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1956. Paper, 375 B. fr.

This piece of research was originally projected, and the first half carried out, by the first named of the two authors. M. Canart has taken over from him, dealing with the use of *θεῖος* in the later dialogues from the *Theaetetus* onwards, and has given the work its final shape.

The primary purpose of both authors has been to consider the use of *θεῖος* in the dialogues in an unprejudiced empirical fashion, although in the final summary the outline of a synthesis becomes visible. The length of the book is explained by the fact that each passage in which *θεῖος* occurs is translated, even when the usage is conventional.

It is difficult to express briefly the general result at which the authors have arrived. In ordinary usage *θεῖος* had three main senses, (1) the religious, 'pertaining to God or the gods', (2) the hyperbolical, 'wonderful', 'more than human', (3) as an equivalent of *θεός*, 'possessed or inspired by God'. The same meanings are perceptible throughout Plato's writings. In his earlier dialogues the meaning 'inspired', and the phrase *θεία μοίρα*, soon come into prominence. Later, as his philosophy takes shape, *θεῖος* acquires also a special use as denoting a higher order of reality, having in contrast to *τὸ ἀθρόμινον* the attributes associated with the gods, and especially that of permanence. In this fourth sense, however, it is maintained, *θεῖος* has really no fixed connotation, but is a term of approval whose application is relative to the subject of the dialogue and, perhaps, to the general progress of Plato's thought; so that the Ideas and the human intellect are in turn described as divine.

Applied, therefore, to realities in which philosophy is interested, *θεῖος* does not bring any indispensable complement to their definition; but thanks to its very flexibility it is able to transfer to such realities, whatever they are, the prestige which for a normal reader surrounds the divine. Now some scholars, dealing with Plato's religion, have inferred from the application of *θεῖος* to the

Idea of the Good that it is this, rather than the semi-popular gods brought to the front in *Laces* x and xii, which has the role of a personal deity in his system. The authors hold that, if anything, an opposite inference should follow from this point of vocabulary. The examples of *θεῖος* show that it is by no means dependent upon the substantive *θεός*. In so far as the adjective does call up personal gods, it is in order to subordinate them to something higher. It is in intellectualist rather than in theological terms that Plato conceives the supreme reality.

This is a point which I presume some Platonists will not easily concede. I think the case in its favour might have been reinforced if the authors, instead of passing straight from unsophisticated usage to that of Plato, had studied the use of *τὸ θεῖον* in the pre-Socratics. Indeed, I regard this as something which should in any case have been done. (Is it not also possible that in the instance of the important combination *θεία μοίη* Plato was reproducing a favourite phrase of the historical Socrates?) A valuable feature of the work is the careful discussion of the more difficult and controversial passages. A study which follows a single concept through the writings of Plato brings out points which the commentator intent upon a single dialogue may fail to notice.

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FRANCIS H. FOBES: *Philosophical Greek. An Introduction.* Pp. xii+321. Chicago: University of Chicago Press (London: Cambridge University Press), 1957. Cloth, 37s. 6d. net. This book provides a complete course for beginners in Greek. In successive chapters we are taken step by step through the accidence, with sentences for translation from and into Greek at each stage, together with the appropriate special vocabularies. Syntax is introduced gradually and incidentally, and the later part of the book consists of annotated passages for translation from Greek. There is one long passage from Plato, and a selection of maxims from Menander, but all the rest comes from moderately technical works of Aristotle. The accidence is collected together in paradigms at the end of the book and there are substantial Greek-English and English-Greek vocabularies as well. The whole work is beautifully printed on large pages with abundant spacing and margins, and is very clear and pleasant to use.

We are told that the work is intended 'not only for students of philosophy, but also for students of linguistics, literary criticism, physics, biology, or of other disciplines in which the acquisition of a technical vocabulary is of importance'. The vocabularies are not confined to philosophic terms but are in effect confined to prose words. A great deal of etymological and philological material is incorporated painlessly, and a special feature is the comparison with cognate Latin words and modern derivatives from Greek which is done neatly by the use of distinctive types. Latin equivalents are also frequently given when there is no philological relationship—sometimes this becomes pedantry as when we are given *λεκτός*, 'capable of being spoken', Lat. *dicibilis*, but for philosophic terms it is often very valuable. The work is clearly intended for mature students who have previously done no Greek. The dust cover claims that its contents can be mastered by a serious student, even without assistance, in a year's time. This is too optimistic. The Aristotelian texts would certainly be extremely difficult without assistance for those who had had no other practice in reading Greek than that provided earlier in the book. But one can only admire the robustness of spirit exhibited in such an enterprise—those who wish to learn Greek in order to read Greek philosophy are here given not an easy path to success but a thorough grounding in the accidence and syntax of the language as a whole.

The following points of detail may be noticed. The declensions are printed with the order N. G. D. A. V. and the dual is included throughout. The sentences in the earlier exercises are of the type hallowed by tradition—'we shall not steal the Persians' letters', etc. When so much philology is given—Ablaut grades are there—it is a pity that the opportunity was not taken to include an explanation of the varying forms of the first declension feminine endings in terms of sound changes. As it is, we are simply given rules based upon observation of the written accent which do not help in the case of the masculines, etc. Indeed the virtual omission of any information about varying dialect forms is a pity, since not all philosophic Greek is the Greek of Aristotle. The treatment of verbs of 'knowing and perceiving' is refreshing—we are told that 'any verb of saying, thinking or perceiving may take one or more of the three forms of indirect discourse', and we are given a table of the more usual verbs showing which are found with each of four constructions: *ως*, *στι*, infinitive, and participle. On the other hand, the

classification of future conditionals under headings 'future less vivid', 'future more vivid', 'future most vivid' seems less felicitous.

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C. W. VAN BOEKEL: *Katharsis. Een filologische Reconstructie van de Psychologie van Aristoteles omtrent het Gevoelsleven.* Pp. viii+270. Utrecht: De Fontein, 1957. Paper.

In this rather strange book, to which the author brings a knowledge of Thomist and of Freudian thought which is beyond the range of most classical scholars, a meaning is attributed to *καθάρωσις* far wider than the purgation through aesthetic or religious stimulus to which, in its technical sense, it is usually confined.

In his first four chapters Dr. van Boekel seeks to trace the historical development of the idea and of the view of psychology of which it is a part; to this end he quotes and comments on a number of passages from Plato and Aristotle, and considers at some length the chronology of the latter's works, particularly the date of *Politics* vii and viii. The conclusion is that these books belong to the middle period, while the *Poetics* and *Problem* 30, which is assigned to Aristotle with fair confidence, date from the period of the Lyceum. It is questionable whether some of the passages cited, e.g. *Phaedo* 58 b where *καθάρωσις* refers to the maintenance of ritual purity by not putting condemned criminals to death, have any relevance to the subject under discussion. In the last chapter the idea is considered synthetically in the light of modern psychological theory which, one may suspect, is the real starting-point of the views here put forward.

Van Boekel's theory depends on a reconstruction of the psychological conceptions held by Plato and, more particularly, Aristotle which is too complicated to be summarized here. Briefly, the purpose of *καθάρωσις* is to resolve a conflict between emotions, as exemplified in the story of Leontius, in whom *τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν* and *τὸ θυμοειδές* were at variance, *Rep.* 439 e. It works by expelling from one of the emotions the impure component which prevents the two emotions from harmonizing, and so brings about the resolution of the conflict. These emotions are conceived as being on different levels, and the author himself seems a little hesitant in justifying his assumption on the ground of the use by Aristotle of such terms as *κατέχειν*

and *ὑπομένειν*. The cathartic effect is brought about in two stages; in the first, which corresponds to the hypnotic stage in the early technique of Freud, a state of passive receptivity is produced; in the second there is a transference in the course of which the peccant emotion in the subject, though not directly amenable to reason, is affected by the logical cohesion in the work of art supplying the stimulus. The result is a pleasurable and beneficial relief of tension. Thus in the phrase *κατέχειν παθητάτων* the genitive is to be taken as objective. But doubt must remain whether Aristotle's picture of the working of the emotions was such that this double process could be sufficiently suggested to any human audience by the phrases used in the *Politics* and *Poetics*. Further, it is suspicious that whereas this is a process of very general application which can be set off by stimuli other than aesthetic ones, it is only with reference to literary and musical experiences that Aristotle specifically mentions *catharsis*.

An interesting sequel to this interpretation is the view put forward by Dr. van Boekel that since a sense of immediacy is a necessary part of fear (*Rhet.* 1386<sup>a</sup>31-<sup>b</sup>7), ancient tragedies, being based largely on events which have lost for us much of their emotional impact, are unlikely to exert the full cathartic effect. Films and novels are likely to be more cathartic for us.

In the course of his commentary on *Poetics* 1449<sup>b</sup>22-28 the leading ideas in the treatise come up for discussion and there is a detailed examination of the meanings of *τοιοῦτος* in Aristotle.

*King's College, Cambridge* D. W. LUCAS

M. J. CHARLESWORTH: *Aristotle on Art and Nature.* (Auckland University College Bulletin No. 50, Philosophy Series No. 2.) Auckland: University College, 1957. Paper.

The purpose of this essay is to relate the doctrine of Mimesis in the *Poetics* to the discussions of Techne, Physis, and Mimesis in the philosophic treatises and so to arrive, at least in part, at an understanding of Aristotle's general theory of art. It is indeed a matter for comment that so often the *Poetics* should be expounded by those whose interests lie anywhere rather than in the philosophy of Aristotle. This is perhaps not so much due to any preference for linguistic and textual studies over philosophy, as Charlesworth is inclined to suggest, but simply because of the supreme importance of

the work for students of drama and literature who tend not to be philosophers by training. None the less there is every reason why the *Poetics* should always and only be read within the context of Aristotle's thinking taken as a whole.

Charlesworth argues that Mimesis is the heart and soul of Aristotle's philosophy of art. His position is summarized in the saying Art imitates Nature, which means not that art or the artist imitates natural objects, but that artistic activity is comparable to the processes of nature in that each involves the bestowal of a form upon matter. Unfortunately it is perfectly clear that this is not the sense in which Mimesis is used in the *Poetics*, where it obviously means 're-presents' as in the statement that the poet imitates actions. All the same, Charlesworth argues, the first sense of Mimesis is also fundamental to the *Poetics*, since it lies at the root of the theory of probability by which art is distinguished both from history and science. For Aristotle claims that Poetry is concerned with the Universal and so is distinct from history. But he is using Universal not in the sense of Necessary (this applies to nature not art) but only in the sense of the probable.

There is dire confusion and misunderstanding of Aristotle here. First of all, in *E.N.* 1140<sup>a</sup>14 Aristotle distinguishes three classes of objects—those that are by necessity, those that come to be by nature, and those that come to be by art. Necessity here refers to *τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ ἄλλας ἔχειν*, while nature and art refer to *τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ ἄλλας ἔχειν*, being differentiated according as the *ἀρχή* lies in the object or the artist. Charlesworth strangely supposes that Aristotle is saying that in a natural being there is an intrinsic necessity between matter and form, which is lacking in the case of the artefact. It is true that in the *Physics* there is a doctrine of hypothetical necessity in natural objects, but there is no question of this here and in any case it means something quite different. Secondly, in *Poetics* 1451<sup>b</sup>7 it is not said that the universal excludes the necessary in favour of the probable—it is made quite clear that it is regarded as covering both probable and necessary, words which are linked throughout the *Poetics*. And the reason is also clear—art is dealing not like history with what actually happened, but with the universal (of course in concrete form).

University College, Swansea G. B. KERFORD

NORMAN W. DEWITT: *St. Paul and Epicurus*. Pp. ix + 201. Minneapolis:

University of Minnesota Press (London: Oxford University Press), 1955. Cloth, 32s. net.

In this work Professor DeWitt seeks to establish in detail the contention of his *Epicurus and his Philosophy* that Epicureanism formed a bridge from Greek philosophy to Christianity. One of the few things C. F. Angus wrote for publication was the chapter on Stoics and Epicureans in the seventh volume of *C.A.H.*, where he stresses the common factor in Stoicism and Pharisaism and suggests that an Epicurean might more easily belong to a society of friends. This, one-sided as it is, is fair comment; but one doubts whether DeWitt has brought valuable documentary support for such a view in this book.

It is never quite clear whether St. Paul is a castigator or a borrower. The general suggestion is that in any case he had to take notice of Epicureanism and offer blessedness, freedom, and brotherly love to Christians because such boons were already known among Epicureans. On the other hand, 'their god is their belly, their glory is in their shame, they mind earthly things' is an anti-Epicurean tirade.

The difficulty of such a book is that those who wish to deny any but strictly 'Hebraic' influence on N.T. writers will seize on its excesses of overstatement as proving the impossibility of believing in 'Hellenic' influence at all. One cannot enter into detail, but one must note that even the 'weak and beggarly elements' of Galatians iv would now be referred by many N.T. scholars to cosmic powers, not to atoms. However, N.T. scholars sometimes change their minds. DeWitt does service in calling attention to evidence of the existence of Epicurean societies in Asia Minor in St. Paul's time—after all, Colossae and Oenoanda are near each other—and this is perhaps the most positive contribution the book makes.

University of Durham

J. B. SKEMP

EMILIO MERONE: *Sulla Lingua di Valerio Flacco*. Pp. 118. Naples: Armanni, 1957. Paper, L. 1,000.

MERONE deals with three aspects of the subject in this short monograph, syntactical innovations and rarities, stylistic variations, and deviations from the correct classical sequence of tenses. As a general discussion of the poet's style it is unlikely to be of as much value as W. C. Summers's *Study of the Argonautica of Valerius Flaccus*, which does<sup>r</sup> or

Valerius what Heitland did for Lucan. Merone's study is deliberately circumscribed, which is a pity since Valerius has never received much attention from scholars. One could wish that Merone had decided to incorporate his material in a commentary; what he has written will be of much value to a future commentator if only one can be found.

Not all the rarities and innovations claimed by Merone for Valerius can be allowed to pass. For instance, *secum dequestalabores* (v. 448) finds a parallel in Stat. *Theb.* i. 404, *Notos dequestus et imbræ*, and no one can be certain who is the innovator, although Merone says 'Stazio ha seguito Valerio Flacco'. Merone points out that compound verbs, *interuolare*, *praefugare*, *superfugere*, *transabire*, *enare*, *absistere* are found with accusatives of the direct object, whereas, according to Riemann-Ernout, Caesar and Cicero prefer to repeat the preposition. It should be pointed out that Virgil has *ensis* . . . *transabuit costas* (*Aen.* ix. 431-2), in a different sense from Valerius' use of the word at ii. 613, admittedly, but still without a preposition. Virgil's use is imitated by Statius (*Theb.* ii. 9). The construction *Tanain tenus* (i. 538) is too dubious, its only support of any value being the possible instance in *Suet. Jul.* 52 *Aethiopiam* (or *Aethiopia*) *tenus*: Merone also produces instances from Solinus, Ausonius, and Martianus Capella. The active use of *medicabilis* iv. 87, wrongly claimed as an innovation, is anticipated by Columella (vii. 10. 8).

The chapter on stylistic variations is very well compiled and many of Merone's explanations of the variations between indicative and subjunctive are convincing, but it is important to bear in mind that Plautus, whose Latin the Muses would have spoken, could quite cheerfully write *uides quae sim et quae fui ante* (*Most.* 199). Editors who write *uides quae sim. Et quae fui ante!* are overconscientious and it is a mistake to suppose that these variations of mood are always capable of explanation. It is, however, noticeable that such variations, uncommon in the classical age, recur in Silver Latin. The section on curious variations between indicative and infinitive should have contained a reference as a precedent to *Luc.* i. 131 ff., which has driven Lucan's commentators to a suspiciously unanimous silence.

The final chapter on the sequence of tenses is the most satisfactory. There is an index of the passages of Valerius discussed which is useful as a sort of abbreviated commentary, an index of passages cited which surprisingly contains only one reference to Lucan and none to Seneca's

tragedies (cf. Summers, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-41), and an index of names and subjects discussed.

There is much solid work in this short book. Perhaps Merone will embody it later in a full commentary and put all Latinists in his debt.

*University of Edinburgh* J. H. BISHOP

MOSES HADAS: (1) Seneca's *Medea*; (2) Seneca's *Oedipus*; (3) Seneca's *Thyestes*. Translated with introductions. Pp. 39, 38, 32. New York, The Liberal Arts Press, 1955, 1956, 1957. Paper, 45 c. each.

THESE three versions of Senecan tragedies are published in separate volumes in the collection entitled 'The Library of Liberal Arts', which consists of an assortment of ancient and modern classics ranging from Hesiod to Walt Whitman. The presentation is, considering the price, respectable, if not seductive. The character of the series suggests that these translations are designed for use by the general reader rather than by any class of Latinist, and this presumption is confirmed, among other things, by the fact that, although the plays are divided into five acts, there is no linear reference whatever to the Latin text. We may, therefore, dismiss any consideration of Professor Hadas's work as an aid to translation and examine its usefulness to the student of more recent European drama, whose curiosity concerning this mysterious source of dramatic peculiarities will have been stimulated by his favourite books of reference.

Since the volumes are in any case unlikely to enjoy extensive currency in this country, the Loeb edition being, apart from any other considerations, better value for money, a reviewer need not go very deeply into the matter, beyond regretting that he is not in the enviable position of hailing a resounding triumph. Translation of these odd products of febrile imagination rhetorically expressed requires considerable subtlety, combined with a certain unhealthy vigour, of style, and the unusual gift of conscious bad taste. With these virtues, or vices, Hadas is not richly endowed. He has, instead, an attractive normality, compounded of the classicist's conventional affection for the archaic and the prosaic colloquialism now notably in vogue, which, in dialogue at least, suits a dramatist of Euripidean, or even Sophoclean, calibre better than Seneca. In fairness to Hadas, whose version is reasonably careful

and by no means unreadable, it should be said that in the reviewer's opinion the translation of Seneca's tragedies is a task demanding faculties that would be better employed in other spheres, that the result of their application would probably be less agreeable than what Hadas offers, and that, to come out with the brutal truth, would-be readers of these plays should be required to learn Latin as the price of their curiosity. The Loeb edition would help them out, and they would derive unlooked-for benefits in the process.

It is a delicate question how far a translation not intended as an aid to readers of a classical text should be expected to adhere to the details of the original. The question is, in any case, not of primary importance, and everybody would grant that in a version of a play intended for use by actors deviation is often not only permissible but necessary. In the present instance the latter consideration does not arise, but the fact remains that departures from the text ought to show some sign of purposiveness rather than of arbitrariness, not to say inattention. It is, therefore, the reviewer's duty to mention, without accumulating embarrassing details, that these versions contain not infrequent inaccuracies of syntax and vocabulary for which no purposive explanation seems probable, but from which Hadas's public will suffer no palpable hurt.

W. S. MAGUINNESS

King's College, London

LUIGI PEPE: *Studi Petroniani*. Pp. 139. Naples: Armanni, 1957. Paper, L. 1,200.

With the exception of the essay 'Il monumento sepolcrale di Trimalchione' (pp. 45-60), all the studies in this book are reprints. The two reviews of works by Marmorale (pp. 111-33) are taken respectively from the *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa* (1948), pp. 130 ff., and the *Rivista di Filologia Classica* (1949), pp. 281 ff.; the remainder are all said to be reprinted from the *Giornale Italiano di Filologia*, though no references are given.

In 'Petronio e il "Porcus Troianus"' (pp. 9-20) Pepe explains the *aper pilleatus* stuffed with live thrushes (40. 3) as an example of the 'porcus Troianus' mentioned by the Republican orator Titius ap. Macrob. *Sat.* iii. 13. 13, and the animal's Phrygian cap as an allusion to its 'Trojan' nature. The explanation given by Hermeros (41. 3-4) is therefore to be taken as mockery of the

naïve Encolpius, who has failed to see the literary practical joke. This is an interesting suggestion.

In 'Manius e mania' (pp. 23-41) he argues that *Manius* as applied to gladiators in 45. 7 means 'victims devoted to sacrifice', and is in origin a technical term of the cult of Diana at Aricia. His very erudite argument is, as he admits, inconclusive. And surely the context does not permit *Manius* to be interpreted as a term of disparagement. But he successfully demonstrates the weakness of current interpretations of this passage.

In 'Sul monumento sepolcrale di Trimalchione' (pp. 45-60) he interprets the ships (*te rogo ut naves etiam monumenti mei facias plenis velis euntes*) and the raised dais (*et me in tribunali sedentem praetextatum cum anulis aureis quinque*, etc.) on Trimalchio's tombstone (71. 9 ff.) as eschatological symbols rather than as scenes from the deceased's life. That ships and tribunals could have an esoteric significance on funerary monuments he amply proves. Whether Trimalchio thought of them in that light is much less certain. The plural *naves* is difficult; one ship usually suffices to convey the soul to the Isles of the Blessed; why should Trimalchio's need a convoy? When he goes on to argue that *populus* on the tombstone refers not to Trimalchio's grateful fellow citizens but to fellow members of a religious *collegium*, he does not carry conviction.

The remaining items, which are all short, will be treated in less detail. Two seek to provide evidence for the dating of Petronius c. 200 A.D., by comparing Trimalchio's cult of Mercury with the appearance of Commodus *ἐν τῷ τῷ Ἐρμοῦ σχήματι* (Dio lxxii. 17. 4), and by seeking parallels for the metrical irregularities of 5. v. 1 and 93. 2. v. 4 in a dedication to Priapus dating from the middle of the third century (Buecheler, *C.E.* 1504). Both arguments are too trivial to prove anything, and the first revives the silly search for an imperial prototype for Trimalchio.

In two other studies Pepe criticizes Hadas's theory of Semitic influences in the Satyricon and commends Sinko's emendation of the meaningless *similia sicilia interiores et* (44-45) to *simila si sicilico inferior eset*. He is probably right in both cases. But he has nothing new to say. Such *misses-av-point* are excellent in a lecture, but scarcely merit reprinting.

Another study is a critique of an argument used by U. E. Paoli in *Stud. Ital.* xiv (1937), 3-46. Paoli had argued that Echion's remark *magis illa matella digna fuit quam taurus iactaret* (45. 8) presupposed that erring women were regularly tossed by bulls, and

since he knew of no evidence for such a legal punishment before the third century, he found here confirmatory evidence for his late dating of Petronius. Pepe points out that an enigmatic passage of Clement of Rome, διὰ ζῆλος διωχθεῖσαι γυναικες Δασάδες καὶ Δέρκαι (1 Ep. ad Cor. 6. 2)—the text was often emended by earlier editions but is now confirmed by the Latin, Syriac, and Coptic translations, a point which Pepe does not make—may refer to such a punishment being inflicted on Christian women in the first century. But Echion is only saying what he thought the woman deserved, not what might legally be done to her, so the whole argument is about nothing.

In another essay Pepe draws attention to certain phraseological parallels between Petronius and Salimbene da Parma (mid-thirteenth century). He is not bold enough to suggest that Salimbene had read the *Cena*, but attributes the coincidence to similarity of 'atteggiamento psicologico'. He may be right, but was it worth eleven pages?

The book is pleasantly written and well printed. But it is really rather light-weight. Only the first three items can be regarded as contributions to Petronian studies.

ROBERT BROWNING

University College, London

KARL STRECKER: *Introduction to Medieval Latin*. English Translation and Revision by ROBERT B. PALMER. Pp. 159. Berlin: Weidmann, 1957. Paper, \$3.50.

For more than a quarter of a century Karl Strecker's *Einführung in das Mittellatein* (Berlin, 1928, 3rd ed. 1939) has been among the first books that any teacher of medieval Latin would recommend to his students. The French translation, considerably augmented, by P. van de Woestijne, *Introduction à l'étude du latin médiéval* (Ghent, 1933, 3rd ed. Lille-Geneva, 1948), made it accessible to most English undergraduates. Professor Palmer's translation, with a bibliography brought up to 1955, is designed primarily for American post-graduate students, but it will be equally useful in England.

A book which is built around a critical bibliography is bound to change considerably as the bibliography is brought up to date. Palmer, however, has continued to preserve not only Strecker's lucidity and certainty of touch, but most of his actual text. Some of his own additional notes, e.g. that on the Schrijnen-Mohrmann school on

pp. 22-23, that on 'vulgar Latin' on pp. 28-30, and that on the influence of rhetorical theory on pp. 68-70, are excellent *mises-en-point*, though it will be realized that they introduce subtleties of which Strecker, who believed that 'Mediaeval Latin evolved naturally from Classical Latin' (p. 21), might not have approved. They are indeed a measure of the advances made in the last generation.

The bibliographical information, which is still rather awkwardly divided between text and notes, is very extensive, thorough, and accurate: more than 750 names appear in the index of scholars on pp. 150-9. But one wonders whether it would not have been better to drop some of the references to older works now superseded. And there are some surprising gaps in the modern literature quoted. The following are some omissions noted in fields with which the reviewer has some familiarity: on prose rhythm (p. 88) F. Novotny, *État actuel des études sur le rythme de la prose latine* (Eas Supplementa vol. 5) (Lwów, 1929); on patristic studies (p. 24) J. de Ghellinck, *Patristique et moyen âge*, 3 vols. (Brussels-Paris, 1946-8) and A. Siegmund, *Die Überlieferung der griechischen christlichen Literatur in der lateinischen Kirche bis zum zwölften Jahrhundert* (Munich, 1949); collections of texts (p. 101) *Analecta mediaevalia Namuricensia* (Louvain-Lille, 1950 ff.); on Cassiodorus (p. 121) H. Thiele, 'Cassiodor, seine Klostergründung Vivarium und sein Nachwirken im Mittelalter', *Studien und Mitteilungen zur Geschichte des Benediktinerordens und seiner Zweige*, 1 (1932), 394 ff., and A. van de Vyver, 'Les Institutions de Cassiodore et la fondation de Vivarium', *Rev. Bén.* (1941), 59-88; history of medieval libraries and scriptoria (p. 131), no mention of the extensive literature on Bobbio; palaeography and manuscript studies (p. 136), A. Dain, *Les manuscrits*, (Paris, 1949), and G. Pasquali, *Storia della tradizione e critica del testo* (Florence, 1952).

In the section on photostats and microfilms (pp. 136-9), which is entirely new, Palmer discusses the microcard, which is hardly known outside America, but does not mention the microfiche, which is widely used in Europe. And he says nothing of the *Bulletin d'Information de l'Institut de Recherche et de l'Histoire des Textes*, but refers the reader for the latest news from the Institut to the *Philologische Wochenschrift*, which ceased publication in 1944!

The full subject-index and index of scholars makes the book very easy to consult. It should be in the hands of every student of the Middle Ages. The price, however, is

rather high by English standards for a paper-covered book of 160 pages.

ROBERT BROWNING

University College, London

SIMONE WEIL: *Intimations of Christianity among the Ancient Greeks*. Edited and translated by ELIZABETH CHASE GEISSBUHLER. Pp. vii+208. London: Routledge, 1957. Cloth, 25s. net.

This remarkable book contains Simone Weil's writings on Greek authors. The translation is sensitive and allows the author her characteristic utterance. The material is mostly in the form of composed writing rather than 'Notebook' entries: we are told by the publisher that it was prepared for reviews or for informal talks in the crypt of the Dominican Monastery at Marseilles.

Some will say after reading this book—and one hopes that it will be widely read, especially by classicists tied to specialisms—that Simone Weil reads the authors with Christian eyes and so sees intimations of Christianity in them. This is partly true: it is most true of the long treatment of the *Timaeus*, the *Symposium*, and the Pythagoreans, for in this region affinities have always been found by Christians gifted with poetic and mathematical souls. But it is certainly not all the truth even in this section, while it is far less than true of her treatment of Homer and of Attic Tragedy. This is really the most valuable part of the book. A sense of the meaning of power in human society, sharpened by experiences of 1940, gives a sympathetic insight into epic and tragedy which is significant even for those who doubt the Christian 'intimations'.

'Might is that which makes a thing of anybody who comes under its sway. . . . There where someone stood a moment ago stands no one. This is the spectacle which the *Iliad* never tires of presenting. . . . The hero is become a thing dragged in the dust behind a chariot. . . . The bitterness of this scene, we savour it whole, alleviated by no comforting fiction, no consoling immortality, no faint halo of patriotic glory.'

We are not surprised that Simone Weil prefers the *Iliad* to the *Odyssey* and to the *Aeneid*.

University of Durham

J. B. SKEMP

ANGELO BRELICH: *Tre variazioni romane sul tema delle origini*. Pp. 127.

Rome, Edizioni dell' Ateneo, 1958.  
Paper.

The three essays of which this little book is composed have for their respective subjects Praeneste and Rome (the relations between the two states and their respective cults of Fortuna and Juppiter), the first kings of Latium (with reference especially to Faunus and Picus), and the ritual of February. The whole is pervaded by the idea, now fashionable in some quarters, that Rome had after all a mythology of her own. Brellich asks emotionally if it can really be true that the Romans were 'not only isolated in the world, impregnated with mythology and richly expressive, of the first half of the first millennium B.C.' but also 'deprived of complex divinities and of myths' and reduced to attributing deity 'at most to inanimate objects such as the door and the hearth, the boundary-stone and the rust on grain' (p. 6). Apart from the detail that rust on grain is not strictly inanimate, what he implicitly denies here and explicitly argues against elsewhere seems nevertheless to be the fact. The Romans were remarkably devoid of scientific curiosity and of imagination alike, witness the paucity of imaginative writers in Latin who were Romans in the narrower sense, as opposed to Italians, Celts, Spaniards, and others who came to Rome or had Roman citizenship. It seems to have contented them to know, or believe, that a power, whether great like Juppiter and Mars or small like Robigus, had *nunquam* of some kind, and could be persuaded to exercise it for their benefit or refrain from using it to their harm. It cannot, I think, be truly said that the explanations Brellich offers are plausible or any more likely to accord with the real state of mind of the earlier Roman of whom we can know anything than the theory just sketched.

Dealing with Fortuna, he makes her out to be a sort of pre-cosmic power (p. 25), fit to nurse a baby Juppiter (supposing that this interpretation of her cult-statue is not simply an ancient mistake), whereas the Capitoline god rules the ordered universe as it now is, and is *garante sovrano dell' ordine* (p. 27). Apart from the well-known fact that much ritual, Roman and other, is directed towards the maintenance of the existing order of things, there is little in this which fits the known facts concerning that ancient power of fertility which Fortuna seems originally to have been and the weather-god of speakers of Latin and its cognate tongues.

Concerning Faunus, he has much to say of his alleged connexion (in my opinion, a false theory of ancient theologians) with the

Lupercalia, and lays great stress on Cicero, *pro Caelio* 26, of which he says (p. 67) that *ogni parola di questa frase merita attenzione*. So it does, and if attentively read with its context (which he does not quote), it shows itself a humorously sarcastic passage, a long way from a sober discussion of the Luperci with whom it deals. There is no sufficient reason for introducing Dumézil and his favourite Gandharas here (p. 66) or finding in the magic circle drawn by the Luperci any signs of *un disordine demoniaco e brigantesco*.

Of February Brelich has not a little to say which is learned and acute, as indeed much of this work is, despite its unsound assumptions regarding Roman myths; I gravely doubt his conclusion (p. 120) that the earliest Roman year began with the season in which *far* was roasted and for that reason.

Printing and paper are good, accentuation of Greek words shaky.

St. Andrews

H. J. Rose

DONALD M. NICOL: *The Despotate of Epirus*. Pp. xii+251; map. Oxford: Blackwell, 1957. Cloth, 32s. net.

Dr. Nicol has given us the first fully documented history of the thirteenth-century Despotate of Epirus. His lucid and scholarly study is a substantial contribution towards the full history of the Byzantine Empire which has yet to be written. It shows the extent to which fresh material is still coming to light, particularly archaeological and numismatic, while sources published many years ago are now being effectively used for the first time. The greater part of the book is concerned with politics during the years 1204-67. It deals with the Greek struggle to regain Constantinople from the Latins and approaches the problem from the point of view of the western Greek principalities of Epirus and Thessalonica. Generally speaking, historians from the twelfth century onwards have emphasized the role of the Greek kingdom of Nicaea to the detriment of Epirus. Nicol has done great service in redressing the balance. With the help of Epirote and other sources, he shows that it was touch and go whether the victor in recapturing the capital and successfully establishing a claim to the imperial title would be Epirus or Nicaea. He admirably brings out the strong separatist tendencies and unravels the tangled threads of the political opportunism which marked the Greek world in the troubled days after the Fourth Crusade.

Nicol draws on a variety of material—

archaeological and numismatic, genealogical and topographical, as well as the more obvious literary evidence—and he has the unusual advantage of knowing the countryside well. His treatment is in fact much more than purely political. The discerning reader can gather a good deal of information on related topics: for instance, ecclesiastical problems, not only the major issue of the relation of the western Greek Church and the Metropolitan of Naupactus and Archbishop of Ochrida to the eastern Greeks and the Patriarch in Nicaea, but such questions as jurisdiction over monasteries, diocesan problems, or the claims of Mt. Athos. Family ramifications and their territorial implications are well brought out, and there is an illuminating little appendix on the Petraliphas family, originally Normans from Italy who became completely hellenized and were important figures in Byzantine circles.

Work of this kind, based on regional investigations, is one of the most constructive approaches to Byzantine history in the later Middle Ages. Perhaps Nicol will put us further in his debt by continuing the story of these western Greek territories in the later Middle Ages.

University of London

J. M. HUSSEY

MAURIZIO BORDA, GINO FUNAIOLI, LUIGI PARETI, ALDO VALORI: *Caio Giulio Cesare*. Pp. 82; 11 plates. Rome: Istituto di Studi Romani, 1957. Paper, L. 800.

To commemorate the bimillenary of Julius Caesar, a series of short essays by Italian scholars on various aspects of his life and work are here assembled in a single small volume. As the primary purpose of the publication is presumably to present the general reader with a reasonably comprehensive picture of the dictator's aims and achievements, it is to be regretted that it does not contain more than it does, and, more particularly, that nothing has been included about the powers and honours which Caesar either courted or received in the last few years of his life. Without this no portrait of Caesar—the man or the politician—can claim to be complete.

The first essay—'L'essenza della concezione politica di C. Giulio Cesare', by L. Paret—i perhaps the one which scholars will find most interesting, if only because its subject-matter is the most controversial. Paret is one of those who believe Caesar not only to have developed *grandiose* plans

for military conquest, but also to have worked out a reasonably constructive policy for the reform of the constitution and the imperial administration. His liberality with the *civitas* and Latin rights, his colonial establishments and his encouragement of municipal life in outlying provincial areas, his changes in the provincial taxation system—all are interpreted as indicating a general design to effect the levelling-up of the provinces to the status of Italy and to bring about *la fusione etnica di tutto il mondo romano*; while the various measures taken to regulate the composition of the Senate and to control the activities of the classes are viewed not as isolated legislation, but as instalments in a plan to secure a lasting and stable constitutional settlement. To ensure success his continued supremacy was essential, and he planned to educate Octavian for the succession. These views are in general acceptable to the present reviewer, but, in view of the fact that there are many dissentients in the world of scholarship, it could be argued that they are presented with an excess of assurance. And it might be questioned whether Pareti's trust in the completeness of Caesar's political conceptions altogether warrants his confidence that the implementation of his policy would have led to the emergence of *una grandissima supernazione*. The extravagance of his panegyric demands that he should give his readers a clearer idea of how, in his opinion, Caesar's plans for ending factional and inter-class warfare would have developed, and further that he should explain why the policy of transforming Empire into Commonwealth should have been any less hazardous than it proved to be—admittedly under somewhat different conditions—in the second century A.D. Finally, it should perhaps be noted that Pareti speaks as if Caesar's provincial policy had been shared by his partners in the 'first triumvirate'. A bold suggestion this, which surely derives no firm support from Strabo's action in 89 B.C., and which by an emphasis upon community of outlook among the triumvirs tends to give an entirely false impression of the nature of their alliance and of its *raison d'être*.

The second essay—'Giulio Cesare scrittore' (G. Funaioli)—is devoted largely to an appreciation of Caesar's *commentarii*. On the question of purpose, he concludes that Caesar's aim was political, but not deliberately propagandist. But the line is not easy to draw, especially if one believes, as Funaioli does, that the *Bellum Gallicum* was written and published in 52–51 B.C. (Incidentally, is it altogether logical first to reject the view

that the books were written over a period of years on the strength of Hirtius' remarks concerning the haste of composition, and then to explain this haste away as 'il respiro stesso del personaggio Cesare'?) It is surely somewhat naïve to praise Caesar overmuch for doing justice to the honour of his enemies!

In the third essay A. Valori considers 'Le imprese militari di Cesare'. We are provided with a sketch of his early career, a brief description of the army of his day, and an appraisal of his major campaigns. In the attempt to account for Caesar's brilliant success as a commander, his versatility is rightly stressed, but perhaps the tendency to over-eulogize can be discerned again in the absence of any reference to the element of luck. When Valori enters the field of political history, he is on less sure ground. The suggestion that Caesar had never intended to use his army as an instrument of power ill accords with the recruitment of legions in Gaul, and must be quite unacceptable to those who regard Caesar as a man with a mission and a realist.

The book ends with a short but admirably documented study of the iconography of Caesar by M. Borda, to which is appended a handsome bibliography and a series of photographs.

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**TITO TOSI: *Scritti di Filologia e di Archeologia*.** A cura di Nicola Terzaghi. Pp. xxxiii + 195; 29 figures on plates. Florence: Le Monnier, 1957. Paper, L. 2,000.

PROFESSOR TERZAGHI prefaces this publication of papers by Tito Tosi with an account of classical studies in Florence at the beginning of the twentieth century, in which the great figures of Comparetti, Milani, and Vitelli are charmingly presented. Tosi himself was born in 1876 and came to Florence in 1897 to finish his studies. He taught six years at Messina and twenty-two years in Florence and died in 1945. His output was small but the papers united here make pleasant reading, leisurely, well informed, with a wide command of archaeological and literary material and a full acquaintance with modern scholarship up to the date of writing. The earliest of the ten papers is dated 1904 and the latest some time after 1929. The first is a long study of early representations of the Sack of Troy, expanded from three earlier papers (the last of these appears again pp. 164f. with no cross-reference

and with no reference to the illustration taken from it in ch. i). Tosi deals successively with the death of Priam (sometimes joined with the death of Astyanax and sometimes influenced by the death of Troilos), Menelaus and Helen, Ajax and Cassandra, the Trojan horse; he believes that the Corinthian painter Cleanthes was inspired by Arctinus to create the Trojan pictures, which were then varied within the artistic tradition. It would have been useful to have had references to later publications of the vases discussed (particularly to Beazley, *A.B.V.*) to newer material (e.g. the Corfu pediment, the relief pithos from Tenos), and to more recent discussions of the subjects (a good bibliography is given by M. I. Wiencke, *A.J.A.* lviii [1954], 285 f.; cf. also on Helen and Menelaos, Ch. Dugas, *B.C.H.* [1936], p. 158).

A long study of Nietzsche, Wagner, and Greek tragedy follows, and then an interpretation of Pindar's sixth paean (the supplements suggested are noted by Bowra and Snell). Tosi then divides representations of the sacrifice of Iphigenia into a group in which she accepts her fate (as in the *Iphigenia in Aulis*) and a group in which she has to be dragged to the altar. In the Euripidean group he finds three separate but later intertwining strands, of which one is the famous picture of Timanthes to be recognized in the mosaic from Ampurias (contrast E. Pfuh, *M.u.Z.*, para. 758 ff.). The other group consists of the Pompeian picture and some Etruscan urns. Iphigenia is lifted on to the altar by Ulysses; Clytemnestra begs Agamem-

non to save her; Achilles tries to stop the action and is in danger of being stoned. Tosi finds the inspiration of these works in the *Iphigenia* of Ennius, who had himself developed *I.A.* 1015 f., 1349 f., 1361 f. Apart from the improbability of the Etruscan artist's being influenced by Ennius, we have no evidence that Ennius departed from Euripides except for the choral fragment (cf. most recently O. Skutsch, *Rh. Mus.* xcvi [1953], 193). Another bold suggestion is that a note in Servius on *Aen.* ii. 457, that Astyanax was killed by Menelaus in the absence of Pyrrhus, may contain the argument of a tragedy by Pacuvius (the other aberrant account of the death of Astyanax, that he was killed by Ulysses, may go back through Accius to Antiphon, cf. *Hermes*, lxxii [1954], 299).

Like Iphigenia, Polyxena also, according to Tosi, was redrawn by Euripides as the willing sacrifice; the older epic tradition he finds on sixth-century works of art including the Tyrrhenian amphora in London (Beazley, *A.B.V.* 97. 27; cf. P. Maas, *C.Q.* xliv [1951], 94). He might also have quoted the fifth-century Polyxena begging for her life 'with the whole Trojan war in her eyes' (*A.P.* iii. 147 = Overbeck, *S.Q.* 1061).

The concluding papers are on a cup in the manner of the Brygos painter (cf. now *A.R.V.* 257), notes on Pausanias (reprinted from *R.F.I.C.* ii [1919]), an emendation of Xenophon of Ephesus, and an introduction to Cicero, *Cato Major*.

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## SUMMARIES OF PERIODICALS

### RHEINISCHES MUSEUM CL. 3 (1958)

E. Sander, *Das Recht des römischen Soldaten*: concludes his study of the duties, privileges and civil rights of Roman soldiers. R. Kassel, *Kleinigkeiten zu den Kallimachos-Fragmenten*: Callimachus, fr. 195 is a remarkable imitation of Hipponax, fr. 10. Sen. *Cons. ad Marc.* 13. 1, contaminates the account in Callimachus, fr. 3-5, of Minos' behaviour on hearing of his son's death, with Xenophon's. D. Hereward, *The Flight of Damaratos*: Damaratos was forced into exile during the Carneia of the year of Marathon. His claim to be going to Delphi to consult the oracle was genuine, but he was forced to go straight

to Persia by the intervention of Cleomenes' agents. W. Kranz, *παλντρόπος ἀρμονίη*: argues for the variant *παλντρόπος* at Heraclit. fr. B 51. L. Alfonsi, *Da Valerio Edituo a Porcio Licio*: in Valerius Aeditius (Gell. xix. 9. 11) read *dum stupeo*; in Porcius Licius (Gell. xix. 9. 13) read *viridis propaginis*. E. Vetter, *Zum Text von Varros Schrift über die lateinische Sprache* (to be concluded): classifies the kinds of errors found in the text and offers emendations of many passages. W. Nötzel, *Zu Horaz c. iii 14*: in l. 9 read *iuvenumque utrinque*, in 11 *patrum expertes male in omen aptis*. E. Bickel, *Die beiden Villenstrassen in Baiae, die am Berghang und die am Strand*: at Sen. *Epp.* 51. 12, read *in ima ripa* Catonem.

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## PRELIMINARY NOTES ON MENANDER'S *DYSKOLOS*<sup>1</sup>

EARLY in March M. Victor Martin in his *editio princeps* of the *Dyskolos* published excellent photographs of the 21 pages on which the play is written;<sup>2</sup> with their help the preparation of a critical edition of the text can be begun. I have been asked to edit the play for the Oxford Classical Texts, and have in consequence received from other scholars a great number of valuable suggestions, some of which it was thought should be published without delay. I am very grateful indeed to Messrs. E. A. Barber, W. S. Barrett, E. Fraenkel, P. Maas, D. L. Page, and C. H. Roberts for permission to publish their suggestions; and if in any way I have misrepresented any of them, I wish to apologize in advance. The text offers so many problems that it is unlikely that a definitive edition will be possible for some time. What follows should be read as preliminary notes towards a provisional text; and the reader is asked to note that the limited space at my disposal has enjoined the greatest brevity.

*Hypothesis.* The split anapaests at 2 and 6 may stand. Such metrical hypotheses were not the work of Aristophanes, but of some grammarian of the imperial period (cf. Wilamowitz, *Einleitung in die griechische Tragödie*, p. 145), and they abound with similar errors; (see, for example, the argument to Aristophanes, *Wasps* 1, 4). Nor should we be surprised to find it stated that *Sostratus* saved Cnemon from the well; for similar errors, see the arguments to the *Peace* and the *Birds*.

10. Read ἔχειν for ἔρῶν, which has got in from l. 4.

### Text

10. οὐδεν<sup>̄</sup> (Lloyd-Jones).

12. τοῦτ<sup>̄</sup> (Page; *vid. L.S.J. s.v. μεταμέλει*, II).

18. It is better to read καὶ πολὺ and delete τὸ: cf. 372.

26. ἔνα is preferable to ἄμα

49. σ[υνοοουμ]ένονς (Fraenkel).

52. ἔρῶν ἀπῆλθες εὐθύς; Σω. εὐθ[ύς.] Χα. ὡς ταχύ (Lloyd-Jones).

53. ἐ<sup>̄</sup>βε<sup>̄</sup>βούλενσ (Lloyd-Jones).

66. Delete the stop after χρόνον: colon after τρόπονς.

76. τὸ τοιοῦτ[ό γ'] (Page).

88 ff. No one can understand ὁδύνης... νός, which seems less like Greek than Hebrew. The following tentative supplements are offered:

90  
οδύνης γὰρ νός η κακοδαιμ<sup>̄</sup>ον>ῶν τις η  
μελαγχολῶν ἀνθρωπος οἰκῶ[ν εὐθάδ]ε  
τὴν οἰκίαν, πρὸς οὐ μ' ἔπειπτ[ει. ὡ θεοί,  
μεγάλουν κακοῦ τοὺς δακτύλους [κατέαξα γὰρ  
σχεδόν τι προσπταίων ἀπαντας. Σω. δρ' ὁ παῖς  
ἐλθών τι πεπαρώνηκε; Πυ. δεῦ[ρο προσβαλεῖ.

<sup>1</sup> This article was accepted by the editors for the June number of *C.R.*, out of turn and notwithstanding its scale, on representations that early publication was important in the interests of scholarship but that publication in *C.Q.* would not be possible before November.

ber. The Clarendon Press kindly made provision for the necessary additional pages.

<sup>2</sup> Papyrus Bodmer IV: Ménandre, *Le Dyscolos*. Geneva: Biblioteca Bodmeriana, 1958. The book became available in this country in March 1959.

Σω. εὐδηλός ἐστι. *Πν.* νὴ Δι' ἔξωλ[εις] –  
 95 Σώστρατ' ἀπολο[ύμεθ]. ἴθε] δέ πως φυλακτικῶς.  
 Σω. ἀλλ' οὐ δύναμαι. λ[έγ]ειν εὐθύ]ς ἐστηκεν δέ μοι  
 τὸ πνεῦμα. <*Πν.*> κόφας, κτλ.

90 Page; 91 Barrett; 92, 93 Ll.-J.; 94 Barrett; 95 Ll.-J. (N.B. : not only *Oθι*, but the iota that precedes these letters, is deleted in *Π*). 96 Roberts.

98. [έφ]ην, not ἔλεγον (Lloyd-Jones).

101. Despite the evidence quoted from the lexica by Martin, I do not believe that περιφθέρομαι can come from φθείρ, any more than χείρομαι can come from χείρ. The sense must be, 'prowling round the pears, curse him!' What follows is difficult; I suspect the words to mean 'collecting a large amount of wood to build a pillory for himself'. The slave means that that is what he *hopes* Cnemon was doing; but instead of using a wishing construction, he has put this into a participial clause attached to what precedes. I should write η̄, not η.

106-7. Fraenkel defends the papyrus reading; but the syntax that results is strained, and Barrett's suggestion that ΙΔΕΙΤΙΚΕ conceals an infinitive ending in -σαι is attractive. The line may have ended, for example, χρηματίσαι, πάτερ: I should prefer to obelize it.

107. πρᾶγμ'. <ό δ'> εὐθύς, κτλ. (Fraenkel).

110. ἥκεις τι μαθών; <καὶ> βῶλον, κτλ. (Fraenkel).

112. ἐς κόρακας: cf. 432.

117. Pyrrhias' speech continues uninterrupted till ἀπτε at 123 (Barrett, with *Π*).

136. The colon should stand after εὐληφεν, not after εὐθύς (Fraenkel).

138. βουλήν ἐμῆν (Page).

140 f. Roberts has discovered that the scrap from Hermopolis published by B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt in *Mélanges Nicols*, Geneva, 1905(H), of which he will be publishing a revised text, contains parts of ll. 141-9. With its aid the text may be reconstituted as follows:

140 *Πν.* ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἐνθάδ'] ἡδίκηρα, Σώστρατε.  
 οὐθ' ὑβρισ'] εἰς τὸ χωρίον τι δηλαδή,  
 οὐ μῆλον ἔκλεπτον. (Σω.) ἀλλ' ἐμαστίγουν σέ τις  
 οὐδὲν ἀδικοῦντα; (*Πν.*) καὶ πάρεστι γ' οὐτοσὶ<sup>1</sup>  
 αὐτός· ὥπαγ', ω βέλτιστε, σὺ δέ τούτῳ λάλει.  
 145 (Σω.) οὐκι ἄν δυναίμην ἀπίθανός τις εἴμι' ἀει  
 ἐν τῷ λαλεῖν.

140, 141 Ll.-J.; 142 Shackleton Bailey; 143 οὐδὲν αδικοῦντα H; 144 αὐτός· ὥπαγ' ω H (the colon is Barrett's); 145 Barrett: οὐκ[.....] H.

This would involve rejection of *Π*'s indications of speaker after βέλτιστε in 144 and at the end of 145 (Barrett).

147. βλ[έπειν] (Lloyd-Jones).

149. The vertical stroke before the gap is too long for *gamma*; Roberts thinks it is *mu* or, more probably, *mu*. A word that would fit the traces perfectly is μ[ακκ]οφ, which seems appropriate to the eccentric behaviour of the elderly; see Σ on Ar. *Eq.* 62.

150-2. Fraenkel would print dashes after δοκεῖ at the end of 150 and after μέντοι in 151, so as to take οὐχ...δοκεῖ with μὰ τὸν Απόλλω, κτλ. He compares

Eur. *Or.* 619 f.; but the resulting interlaced order seems a very strange one, and Barrett would prefer to change *μὰ* to *νῆ*.

152. *μὴ* del. Fraenkel.

164. *τοῦτο τὸ μέρος τοῦ* (Barrett).

172 f. 'Cnemon's speech continues to the end of 178: Sostratus speaks 179-188' (Barrett).

180. *πρᾶγμα* (Page).

183. *ἔχει* (Page) *διάπυρον* (Fraenkel).

193. Barrett thinks *νῦδωρ* may have been a gloss on *θερμὸν* (cf. Ar. *Nub.* 1044, etc.), and suggests *θερμὸν δὲ προσέταξεν* εὐτρεπές.

194. *ἄνδρες* (Page): *ἄνδρες φίλοι* (Fraenkel).

195. *κακ[ιστα] δὴ* (Barrett); which is better than my first idea, *κακ[ῶς πάντα*.

197. *ληπτέον* (Barrett).

198. *ἄνων*? But Page may be right with *εἴ τις ἐστι θύος ἄγων*.

199. *δοῦναι θέλης* (Barrett).

200. Is *ναὶ πρὸς θεῶν* spoken by the girl, accepting Sostratus' offer, or by Sostratus, pressing her to accept, as Barrett suggests? I think the latter; and, accepting Page's supplement *ἄ[ποδος δ]* and comparing 387, I would have Sostratus continue down to *ἐστι* in the next line. With *ἐλευθερίως γέ πως | ἄγρουκός ἐστιν*, cf. 387.

203. *τις ἄν με* (Lloyd-Jones).

Fraenkel and I both thought of *γ[ειτό]νων*, but the trace before the gap looks like part of a *delta*, and Barrett's tentative suggestion *δ[αμό]νων* seems likeliest to be right.

206-7. Barrett convincingly suggests that Daos' opening words are spoken back into the house of Gorgias (visible on the left at the shrine) and addressed to Gorgias' mother. *ό δὲ* = Gorgias.

209. *τηλικοῦτ* should be kept.

211. .... (Σω.) *λάμβανε | τηνδί· φέρε, δεῦρο.* *Δα.* *τι ποτε βούλεθ' οὐτοι | ἄνθρωπος;* (Σω.) *ἔρρωστ', κτλ.* (Barrett).

219. Colon after *ἀρέσκει*.

223. *ώς προ<σῆκ>ον ἦν* (Barber).

230. *τούσδε πανιστάς τινας* (Lloyd-Jones).

235. *τὸν τῇ κόρῃ <τοῦτον> προσύντ* (Barrett: cf. Plato, *Phaedo* 69 c *οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἡμῖν οὐτοι καταστήσαντες.* 'οὐδὲ seldom, if at all, in Menander except in paratragic passages or of persons or things visible on the stage': Barrett).

240. *ἔτι μέλει* (?).

241. *τί μή[ν]* (Page).

242. *μή τὸ* (Lloyd-Jones).

244. *αὐτη* (Lloyd-Jones).

247. *ἄλλ' οὐδέν* (Page).

248. *λάβη, κρεμᾶ* (*λάβη*, which fits the space better than *ἴδη*, is due to Roberts, *κρεμᾶ* to Barrett).

250. *ἔξεις ξυγομαχῶν* (Lloyd-Jones).

251-2. *ἀναγκάσαι* (Lloyd-Jones): *τρέπων* (Page): *μεταπείσαι* (opt.) (Lloyd-Jones): *ο[ι]δέ οὐδέ εἰ* (Maas).

255. *ἔπισχε μικρόν* (Barber). This form of the imperative is not normal in comedy, and in drama recurs only at Eur. *El.* 758. But the whole line has a tragic ring, and I suspect that Daos may be paratragedizing.

262. *θύοντα* must be kept.

280-3. Very difficult. Fraenkel observes that we could obtain sense by altering *πίστω*; we should expect to find in that place a word meaning either 'a turning-point' or 'repose'. I can do no better than *παῦλαν*, in which I have little confidence.

288. *σοὶ τι* (Maas).

296. Barrett suspects that the title has ousted *δυσποτιμάτατον* or *ἀθλιώτατον*.

298. [ἔβρω] (Maas).

299. *βραχίνι τι μου* (Barrett).

300. The slave who intervenes is probably Daos, not Pyrrhias.

302. Martin's *παγκάλην* will not do: Fraenkel suggests *ἐνθαδί*, Page *ώρικήν*.

303. *εἰρήνας* (Lloyd-Jones).

310. *ὑμῶν* <*τι*> *κακοτεχνεῖν λάθρᾳ* (Fraenkel).

311. *οὐτός* should be kept; cf. 412 (Page).

313. *τετάραγμ* <*αὶ γ'*> (Page).

321. *όρῶ* <*ν*> (Fraenkel). I think it follows that the full stop at the end of this line must go, and everything from the beginning of 321 down to *ἡμᾶς* in 325 must be given to Gorgias.

346. *πε[ρὶ τ]αῦτ'* (Barrett).

348. *οὐδὲν* <*γ*> (Page).

349. *εἰ γάρ* (Page).

350. The letter immediately after the gap is not *iota*, but *upsilon*, as Barrett first saw and Roberts confirms.

351. *αὐτὸν* *παραιτή* (Fraenkel): *υ - παραστῆς* (Barrett).

352. *ἔργάζεται* <*θ*> *ἡμῶν* (Barrett).

353. *εἰκῇ* (Barrett): *οὐτω* (Fraenkel).

354. *ἴδοι* <*ά*>*ν* (or *μάθοι* <*ά*>*ν*) *αὐτὸς* (Barrett); who before *ἀσμενος* would insert <*μάλ*> or <*ποτ*>. There will then be a full stop after *ἀσμενος*.

356. [*ᾶν* *ἄγοιτ*] <*ά*>*ν* was no doubt written. But as the text seems to me suspect wherever this manuscript presents us with a split anapaest, I should transpose and read *ἄγοιτ* <*ά*>*ν*.

357. *όρ[ῶν γ']* (όρῶν Lloyd-Jones, γ' Roberts).

358. *ἐστ' ἔκει*. Fraenkel would prefer *μ[ικρ]ὸν*.

369. Fraenkel would insert *σ'* after *νομίσας*.

375. Daos, not Gorgias, must be the speaker (Barrett).

376. *έποικοδομήσω* (Barrett).

378. *δίωκέ με* (Page).

379. *οὐτω* *ἔχω γάρ*: *ἀποθανεῖν, κτλ.* (Lloyd-Jones).

387. *δειδισσομένη* (Lloyd-Jones).

389. *ἐστι ταῦτης* (Barrett).

390. The stop should come not after *τέτταρα* at the end of this line, but after *αὐτη* at the beginning of the next (Page).

393. *κακόν* (Fraenkel).

394. The stop should come not after *φέρω* at the end of this line, but after *μετέωρον* at the beginning of the next (Fraenkel).

396. *ἀποσπῆ πρὸς βίαν* (Lloyd-Jones).

398. *τούναντίον* <*δὴ γέγονε* (Barber). Maas thinks a line has dropped out before this one (e.g. *καγώ μὲν ἡλπιζον κατακόψειν τοῦτό γε* | *τούναντίον* <*δὲ γέγονε*).

400. *τοδ[ί]* (Page).

402. Question-mark after *ἀπολείπῃ* (Page).

406. *Γε. τί δ' ἔγωγ' οὐ;]* δεῦρ' ἔρεισον ταῦτ' (Page).

414. κομψῶν νεανίσκων γε.

416. Οτ δίκελλαν ἐν τῷ πλησίον χωριδίῳ (Lloyd-Jones).

422. θύσαι: but Fraenkel would prefer θύειν.

426. Page thinks that *〈γ>οῦν* could 'convey the idea of reservation'; but I should prefer *μὲν*.

432. ὄχλος τις, with a colon instead of a question-mark (Fraenkel). Menander seems to have preferred *ἐσ κόρακας*.

445. At the beginning of this line the scribe wrote *α...αρπαροικον*: the third missing letter could be *γ* or *π*. *ἀτάρ* is not attested in Menander, and could hardly come sixth word. I would read *ἀεὶ* and delete *γαρ* as originating from a dittography, at the same time removing the stop from the end of the previous line: *αὶ δὲ Νύμφαι μοι κακόν | ἀεὶ παροικοῦσ* . . . .

446. Before *οἰκοδομήσειν* there is room for four letters, the last of which is more likely to be a *sigma* than a *tau*.

449. We would have to read *ενσεβέσ*, even if two of the three witnesses did not support it.

454. [*τηρητέ*]ον (Barrett). Fraenkel and I both thought of [*φυλακτέ*]ον, but there is hardly room for [*τηρητέ*]ον, let alone this. *όρατέον* (Page).

456. ἐπιλελή[ιστα]ι (Roberts).

464. *τοντί 〈τί〉 τὸ κακόν ἔστι;* (Page).

465. *τί τῆς θύρας ἀπ<τ>ει;* (Barrett).

477. *τέ με.*

488. I began by doubting the adverbial form of the undoubtedly Menandrian word which Martin conjectures here; and thought of *ἢ τεις, κατάφαγ*, 'you asked for this, now eat it up', with *τυχόν* belonging to the sentence before and *ώς* belonging to the sentence after. But now I think Martin is probably right.

493 ff.

*πρεσβύτερός τις τ[ῆ] θύρα*

*ἐπακήκο', εὐθὺς πατέρ<α> καὶ πάπ[ταν καλῶ-*

*γραῦν, μητέρ'. ἀν τῶν διὰ μέσου [τις ἢ γυνή,*

*ἴέρειαν ἐκάλεσ'. ἀν θεράπων[, ἢ τις πένης,*

*βέλτιστον.*

The supplements are mine, except that the transposition of 'ἐκάλεσ' and 'ἴέρειαν' in 496 (made to avoid five consecutive short syllables) is due to Maas. That at the end of 496 is not certain; e.g. [, *μακάριον* *ἢ* might be considered.

499. *σὲ β[ούλομαι* (Barrett).

500. *τα[ντὸ το]ῦτ'* (Barrett) is given by him to Cnemon. But I think it is Sicon's answer to Cnemon's question.

502, 504. Fraenkel makes Getas, not Sicon, the speaker in these lines.

503. The indication of change of speaker after the first *ἀφεις* is probably right; Getas speaks the words *ἀφεις, βέλτιστε.*

504. *ἢκε πάλιν* is imperative; Fraenkel compares the German 'Komm du mit wieder!' καὶ λαλεῖς *ἔτι* should be followed by a question-mark.

505. *αἰτούμενος χυτρόγαυλον* (Lloyd-Jones).

510. *οὐδ'* (Barrett).

511. *οὐν ἔγώ λέγον;* ?

515. *οἰον . . . νή Δι'* is given to Getas by Barrett.

516. *ἔτέραν* (*ἔλθη* is deliberative subjunctive).

527-8. *ῶσπερ* (Fraenkel). This passage is a crux. Martin's quotations only indicate that *βαθὺς* (like our 'deep') can mean 'cunning', and this is not likely

to be the sense. Possibly Menander wrote *ώσπερ ἐργάτης βαθύ | ἐπὶ λῆσον ἐπεκ., κτλ.* (cf. Pherecrates fr. 20 K., where Meineke conjectured *λῆσα*: the passage would then be a reminiscence of *Il. ii. 147*, and Sostratus would be saying that he approached stone-breaking as light-heartedly as if it were reaping).

534. ἀπεξιλούμην ἀτρέμα. κούδεις ηρχέτο (Lloyd-Jones).

542. ἐπι] (Lloyd-Jones).

543. ἔφοδος (Lloyd-Jones).

545. ἐλκ]ει (Barrett).

546-51. τί τὸ κ]ακόν; οἰει χεῖρας ἔξηκοντά με,  
ἀνθρ]ωπ', ἔχειν; τοὺς ἄνθρακάς σοι ζωπυρῶ,  
....]μα, τπολυνωφερω† κατατέμνω σπλάγχν', ἀμα  
μάττω, περιφέρω ταῦ[τα, τηρῶ το]υτονί·

550 ὑπὸ τοῦ καπνοῦ τυφλός [εἴμι πρὸ]ς τούτοις· ὄνος  
ἄγειν δοκῶ μοι τὴν ἔορτήν.

I noticed that *οἰει* in 546 was right, and supplied *ἀνθρ]ωπ'* in 547. The rest (except for my *τηρῶ* in 549, where Barrett suggested *ἴκετενώ*) is due to Barrett; for his *ὄνος*, cf. Ar. *Ran.* 159, and see Page, *Greek Literary Papyri*, pp. 313 f. In 548 I have thought of *πολύτονων φέρω*, but now prefer to obelize.

568. Maas deletes *των*' and writes ἀλλὰ *〈τὰ〉*. Cf. *Peric.* 272.

569. Keep *τυος* with a question-mark.

578. Keep *αὐτὴ*: the only comma should be at the end of the line (Barrett).

582. Perhaps *τὸν κάδον* (Lloyd-Jones).

584. ὁ δ' (Fraenkel).

595. ἀνόσι' ἀνγηρηκυά [με (Barber).

596. σοὶ (with accent): εἴσω [σύ, γραῦ (Lloyd-Jones).

598. Barrett observes that *καταβήσομ'* must be said by Cneinon, and that the letter after *ει* in 598 is unlikely to have been *tau*. He suggests εἴ[σ τὸ φρέαρ· τί μοι | ἔνεστω (or ἔξεστω) ἀλλ'; Getas will then say *ἵμεῖς ποριοῦ[μεν ἀσμενοι, κτλ. (not ποριοῦ) μεθ']*.

601. εἴ τι μ[οι λαλεῖς (Fraenkel).

602. Getas says καὶ μάλα δικαίως (Page): ἐκ]πεπήδηκεν (Fraenkel).

606. ἐπιστᾶ[τ'] (Lloyd-Jones): which I now see is in *Π.*

616. λαβὼν ταῦτ' *〈οἴκ〉*αδ' εἰσένεγκε σύ (Lloyd-Jones).

627. Perhaps κάπωλισθ'.

629. Question-mark after *οἴτος*, comma after *ἐπόησε*.

639. Colon after *θεοί*, comma after *Διόνυσον* (Fraenkel).

648-9. πάπτων φίλτατον | κλάσινος ἀπομάζει τις (Roberts); the speaker will be the daughter, who has heard the screams of Simice. But Barrett (who at first read *υσ* before *ἀπομάζει*), suspects that an imperative ending in *ινσατ'* preceded *οἴμωζει*.

650 f. I wish I knew why Martin thinks there is such a large gap; cf. 703 f. Are the photographs all on the same scale?

655-6. Delete Martin's supplements: in 656 Barrett reads *αὐτοῦ τὴν* [a.

657. βεβ[ρεγμ]ένον (Barrett); Maas prefers βεβ[αμμ]ένον. Either would fit the space; but in view of 231 and 950 I incline to Maas's word.

658. Question-mark after *τρέμοντος*, colon after *μέν* (Barrett).

662 ff. ἀνάπτηρον ὄντα, χωλόν. οὔτω γίνεται

ἀλυπότατος γάρ τῷδε γείτων τῷ θεῷ

καὶ τοῖς ἀεὶ θύοντι.

Thinking *μοι* to have been written in 663, I conjectured *τῶι θεῶι: μοι*, I thought,

was an interpolation from 664, but Roberts has pointed out to me that  $\tau[\hat{\rho}] \theta\epsilon\hat{\omega}$  can be read in the papyrus.

669. Of course there must be a colon after *μικροῦ*.

678. *πεπνιγμένου* (Page).

679. *τριχός* (Fraenkel).

681. *έξαπολώλεκα* (Lloyd-Jones)?

683-4. Fraenkel wants a comma after  $\eta\nu$ . But why should not Sostratus say 'no common *Atlas*'?

688. *έ[μ]μανως ἔγώ* (Fraenkel, comparing *Mis.* fr. 5). But Page suggests *οὐτω* *σφόδρ* *έ[ρω], γαμεῖν δ'*, *ἐπει | ἐρώ, κτλ.* Perhaps *παρασκευαζόμ* *ηδη* should be read.

691. *τί [σοι λέγω; (Maas).*

692. Barrett reads the letters at the end of the line as *τεθρη[* and supplements *τεθρη[ρηκ'] οὐκέτι*, comparing Eur. *Hipp.* 1454-5.

693. Remove Martin's *δη*. At the end, Page reads *το[ῦ χρόνον*: see Fraenkel on Aesch. *Ag.* 1300. (But Barrett reads the traces as *π[*, and suggests *π[αρὰ βίον*. I think Page is right.)

694. *έστ*'.

697. Delete Martin's *σε*.

699. *ώς ἐνι μάλιστα* worries Page, who takes it with the preceding sentence, and Maas, who would read *τάχιστα*. But perhaps it merely has the effect of a vague superlative attaching to what follows.

702. *ἀθλί[ω* (Page).

703. See above on 650 f.

713. *ὅτι <μοι>* (Page).

715. *[ι]δών* (Page).

717. *δεὶ γὰρ [ει]ναι κα<i> παρεῖναι, κτλ.* Page read the *γὰρ*: the supplement is mine.

718. Dashes after *"Ηφαιστον* in this line and after *ἔχουσιν* in 720 (Fraenkel).

724. Fraenkel fills up this defective line by reading *οὐκ ἔωνθ' ἔαντον <έπι>*, and in the next line he reads *οὐ βοηθήσανθ' ἔαντρη*. Page suggests *τὸν γὰρ οὐκ ἔωντά τ' αὐτὸν προσιέναι <γε> τῇ θύρᾳ*.

726. Comma after, not before, *ηδέως*.

727-9 are all spoken by Cnemon, whose great speech goes on uninterrupted till 748. I suggest:

*εἰπ' ἄν ἄλλος, καὶ δικαίως, “οὐκ ἔᾶς με προσιέναι,  
οὐ προτέρχομ· οὐδὲν ἡμῖν γέγονας αὐτὸς χρήσιμος,  
οὐδ' ἔγώ σοι νῦν.” τί δ' ἔστι, μειράκιον; ἔαν τ' ἔγώ ...*

731. *ἄ γ' ἔχων* (Page).

733. *νύσιαν* (Lloyd-Jones).

736. Dash after *νοῦν ἔχεις*.

737. *τ'* not needed.

738. *<τὴν> προῖκα* (Fraenkel): or *<σὺ> προῖκα* (Lloyd-Jones).

739. *τ[ό] δ'* (Barrett).

740. *ἄλλα*] (Fraenkel).

742. *περὶ ἐμ[οῦ* (Lloyd-Jones).

743. *εἰ τοιοῦτοι* (F. H. Sandbach).

746. Comma after, not before, *μᾶλλον*.

752. *τὴν κόρην αἰτῶν. <Κν.> τίς; <Γο. ὅστις>; (τίς; Barrett: <ὅστις;> Lloyd-Jones).*

755Δ. ....]. [Kv.]  
 756. ....]. ... ἐνὸς τη[λάντου (Barrett).  
 757. προ]φθίδου πόει ⟨τε⟩ τού[τω (Barrett).  
 758. εἰσκυ]κλεῖτ' εἰσω με. ⟨Γο.⟩ καὶ δ[η] ... (Barrett).  
 762. τε is not needed.  
 763. ἔξενεγκεῖν, ὡς (Roberts). The word after ἔστι begins πι or πρ; then three or four letters' space; then η. It has defeated all of us.  
 765. Colon after ἔνεκα, no stop after ὡν.  
 769. μεταβολήν (Page).  
 771. κρείττω[ν μενώ (Lloyd-Jones).  
 773. εἰς καλόν θ' (as the papyrus indicates) (Page).  
 774. γι' ἀνήρ (Fraenkel) or γ[έ τις (Page).  
 775. καὶ δίκαιος καὶ γεωργός ἀμάχος. (Ka.) ἀπολέλειμμ' ἵσως (Fraenkel).  
 781. Instead of αὐτῷ Fraenkel would write οὗτω and Page αὐτὸς. Instead of ⟨οὐ γ'⟩ I should prefer to insert ⟨νῦν⟩.  
 788. After γινώσκω is visible the bottom corner of a letter. Roberts thinks it is *epsilon* or *alpha*; Page thinks it is *alpha*; but I agree with Barrett that it could be a narrow *omicron* like that in *μοι* at 785, and think his reading δ[η]τι may be right. Perhaps the ἔτι that was at first written in wrongly instead of *τοῦτο* originated from this word.  
 791. ἐπεὶ δ' (Fraenkel).  
 800-2. Sense can be made of the papyrus text by reading with Page μή τι at 802. But a man *is*, in the ordinary sense, κύριος of what is his own; Stobaeus' text does not have to be altered to make sense; and on the whole it seems a shade preferable.  
 805, 807. Stobaeus' reading is again to be preferred.  
 809. πτομι. Π: but Martin in both text and transcript prints Stobaeus' πταίσας.  
 819. ἔκών. Σω. ἔκών; Ka. εὐ ἴσθι, κτλ. (Page).  
 823. ἐγώ σ', ω Σ(ώσ)τρατ' (Page).  
 830. τρυφᾶν ἔν (Maas); δοκεῖ (Lloyd-Jones).  
 835 ff. may be tentatively restored as follows:

835 η̄ τὸν Δία τὸν μέγιστον, εὐγενώς γέ πως  
 πα[ράδοξ]ος εἰ. Γο. πῶς; Ka. οὐκ ἔχω βούλει δοκεῖν  
 μή 'χειν· ἐπεὶ δὲ συμπεπευσμένον μ' ὄρᾶς,  
 ήγιαν]ε. Γο. τούτῳ μ' ἀναπέπεικας διπλασίως·  
 ἀεὶ γάρ] ὥν πένης ⟨τις⟩ ἀπόπληκτός θ' ἀμα,  
 840 τίν' ἐλπίδ' ὑποδείκνυων εἰς σωτηρίαν;  
 ἐπειτ]α λοιπόν ἔστιν ἡμῖν ἐγγυᾶν.

836 Ll.-J.; 837 Page; 838-9 Ll.-J.; 840 Barrett; 841 Ll.-J.

Whoever wishes to improve on these supplements is warned of the extreme difficulty of finding words short enough for the spaces here. The supplement I print is 840 is one I had thought of but rejected because the traces seemed to me to rule it out. But Barrett thinks the upper one may be an apostrophe and the lower one part of a *delta*. Despite the double point at the end of 840, I think 841 must be spoken by Gorgias.

841. ἔστιν ἡμῖν.

845. Question-mark after ἔχεις (Fraenkel).

856. ἡμῶν γενέσθαι, παπία, νυμ[κ]αλόν (Lloyd-Jones).

861. The variants point to Grotius's *πονοῦνθ'* (Fraenkel).

870. Page gives *τοιοῦτος* to Gorgias.

875. *ταλας φύ τοῦ τρόπου* (Page).

877-8. Fraenkel suggests [*κακόν* | *νή τώ θεώ, πολὺ*] *μεῖζον η νῦν*: Page [*τί σοι* | *νή τώ θεώ, τί μεῖζον η νῦν*];

880. *σχολή* [μοι] (Lloyd-Jones).

886. *τ[ο]ῦτ[ο]γ λαβε[ῖν]* *τὸν καιρόν*, ἀλλὰ διαπο[ρῶ τί χρή δρᾶν (beginning Barrett, end Maas).

889. Colon after *θάττον*.

890. *οίαν ἔχειν οίη* [δι] *ατριβήν* (Lloyd-Jones).

892. 'Ον οὐδ λακάσει see Housman, *Hermes*, lxvi (1931), 408, n. 2' (Fraenkel).

893. ὁ δύσκολος [*γέρ*] *ων* (Barrett): 'or ἔχει δὲ πῶς *νῦν*' (Page).

901. *καθαίρη*. Theocr. 5. 119, irrelevantly cited by Martin on 114, is relevant here; see Gow, ad loc.

904. *ἀεί*.

905. *προθυμοῦ* (Fraenkel); but is this necessary?

909. *νῦν οὐ καιρός εἰλέν*.

910. Barrett suggests that the point of *τὸν ρύθμὸν σὺ τήρει* is that 921 f. repeats the pattern of 912 f. Getas (asking for hardware) is Cnemon's interlocutor down to 920, and then pretends to go away; Sicon (asking for soft furnishings) is his interlocutor down to 925, when he pretends to go away in his turn. Getas then reappears to say *κρατήρα... μέγαν* at 928, and Sicon to say *ἔστω, κτλ.* at 929.

911 is deleted by Page as a botched effort to write l. 912; this suggestion seems to be confirmed by Barrett's observation recorded on 910 f. above.

914. *λέβητά σ'* (Page): *παρ'* *ύμῶν* would mean 'from your house'.

917. *εἰσο* *αγγεῖλατε* (Page).

920. Page observes that the space is such that the line probably began *τίς μ' εἰ*.... He suggests *καμ'* *ἔθηκεν*: another possibility is *και* *κατέθηκεν*. Barrett prefers *τίς μ' εἰ* *τὸ πρόσθε* *— — — κατέθηκεν; ἀπαγε καὶ σύ*.

923. *χρήσατ* [ε] (Barrett).

924-5. *έκατον* *ποδῶν τὸ μῆκος*. *⟨Kv.⟩* *έκατόν*; *εἴθε μοι γένοιτο* | *έ]γ[ός*] *π[ο]θεν* (Barrett).

926. *κακόν σε κακῶς ἀπαντες* (Lloyd-Jones).

930. *μὰ τὸν Δὲ* for *παιδίον* (Fraenkel): *μὰ... κρατήρ* is said by Cnemon.

931. *μηδέ* *γρύζων* (Lloyd-Jones).

934. *πρέσσαντὸν αὐτός* (Maas) or *πρέσσαντὸν αὐτοῦ* (Page) must be accepted with the reservation that we know no parallel to such an expression. But we cannot exclude the possibility that it is a corruption of the familiar *πρέσσαντος*.

935. After *πάντα* Roberts reads *γαρ*...[...] *τις*.

939. There was probably a stop at the end of this line, and a new sentence, beginning, for example, with *καὶ μῆν*, at the beginning of the next.

942. *πρόσ[εχε καὶ]* (Page).

943. The metre favours Maas's *στιβάδα*. And yet we should expect a plural (cf. 420).

949. This line is puzzling. We do not need *ἄν*, and its introduction would compel us to read *έσ*, a form Menander seems not to have used except in the phrase *έσ κόρακας*. *ταῦτα* probably goes with the following sentence.

952. Keep *μέλλοντα*.  
953. *κάχορενον* (Maas) is not strictly necessary, but may be right.  
955. *τύπτετε*; (Fraenkel).  
958. *κρατοῦ<μεν>* (Maas).  
959. *Σίκων, Σύρε* (Maas).  
963. *τὸ τηνίκ'*. *ἄλλ' ἔξω δότω* (Page): but the crux seems hardly soluble.

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## The Classical Association

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